Jürgen Stark
Central bank (via BIS)
Track record: 5 forecasts checked: 1 came true, 1 partly, 3 did not.
141forecasts & commitments on the record
67%can be checked as stated
35average ambiguity (0-100)
0goalpost moves recorded
0confirmed U-turns
Timeline
came true partly did not not due / being checked / too vague
Calibration score: shown after 10 checked forecasts with a stated likelihood (now 2).
How they speak about the future: based on data 111, educated guess 15, stated on authority 15.
Kinds of claim: forecast 115, scenario (if… then) 12, mixed claim 9, commitment 5. · Download this report card as a picture
In the nine words
πρόγνωσιςInference from evidence105 · 74%μαντείαInspired knowledge15 · 11%πρόνοιαPreparing for the future12 · 9%προαναγγελίαPublic pre-announcement5 · 4%εἰκασίαConjecture3 · 2%πρόβλεψιςSeeing the signs1 · 1%
How to read this
Each box is one sentence a public figure or institution said about the future, word for word, with a link to the official text. Can be checked means it names what will happen, by when, and how likely - so it can be compared with official figures later. Too vague to check means it does not. Ambiguity (0-100) is how many different ways the sentence can be read. When the date passes, the forecast is compared with official data and marked came true, partly or did not come true. Labels judge the sentence, never the person. Full guide and glossary.Checked
The Eurosystem staff projections foresee annual HICP inflation rates of between 3.2% and 3.4% for 2008 and declining rates of between 1.1% and 1.7% for 2009.
Did not come true. Said: inflation between 1.1% and 1.7% in 2009. Official figure for Euro area: 0.5% (World Bank open data). Missed. Off by 0.6 points. official data · checked 14 Nov 2026 · automatic check against official data (rules v3)
For 2010, HICP is projected to lie between 1.5% and 2.1%.
Came true. Said: inflation between 1.5% and 2.1% in 2010. Official figure for Euro area: 1.5% (World Bank open data). On target. official data · checked 14 Nov 2026 · automatic check against official data (rules v3)
The ECB staff projects average annual HICP inflation between 3.4% and 3.6% in 2008 and between 2.3% and 2.9% in 2009.
Did not come true. Said: inflation between 2.3% and 2.9% in 2009. Official figure for Euro area: 0.5% (World Bank open data). Missed. Off by 1.8 points. official data · checked 14 Nov 2026 · automatic check against official data (rules v3)
Regarding 2007, staff projections suggest real GDP growth between 1.6% and 2.6%.
Partly came true. Said: economic growth between 1.6% and 2.6% in 2007. Official figure for Euro area: 3.0% (World Bank open data). Close: outside the margin, but within one more half point. Off by 0.4 points. official data · checked 14 Nov 2026 · automatic check against official data (rules v3)
In Argentina the economy will contract by more than 10% this year and the social situation is still deteriorating dramatically.
Did not come true. Said: economic growth above 10% in 2002. Official figure for Argentina: -10.9% (World Bank open data). Missed. Off by 20.9 points. official data · checked 14 Nov 2026 · automatic check against official data (rules v3)
On the record (141)
They are expected to fall below 2% in the course of 2012.
Looking ahead, euro area inflation rates are likely to decline in the coming months.
Looking ahead, short-term indicators and survey data suggest that real GDP growth may be very moderate towards the end of this year and at the beginning of next year.
At the same time, the general government deficit is expected to remain close to 10% of GDP in 2011 [Slide 12] As you can see from the slide, significant aggregate structural adjustment of 1 percentage-point of GDP per year will be necessary in the euro area to reduce the debt ratio to below 60% of GDP by 2030.
Notably, for the US, the IMF estimates that general government gross debt will reach 100% of GDP in 2011 and that it will continue to rise through the year 2016.
Most countries will have to reduce their deficit ratio to below 3% of GDP by 2013 at the latest.
The counter-cyclical capital buffer will vary between 0% and 2.5% of risk weighted assets. See OECD (2010), „Economic Policy Reforms – Going for Growth“, Part 1. Currently no exact definition of the “shadow banking system” exists.
The full set of regulations will only be phased in by 2019, more than ten years after the recent financial crisis had seen its peak.
Detailed recommendations on the regulatory treatment of shadow banking are expected to be prepared only by 2012.
Also the necessary regulations or legislation to implement the Basel III framework – especially the strengthening of banks’ capital and liquidity standards – will start to be put in place as of January 2013.
This is true. for instance for the important field of regulating and supervising the shadow banking system, in which only next year work will begin on setting the details of the respective policies.
To ensure fiscal discipline, all planned deficits of more than 3% of GDP and those in excess of a country’s medium term objective would be approved by all euro area governments.
Another phenomenon is that economic growth after a financial crisis tends to be much slower due to the debt overhang. While emphasis on measures of the output gap can give the impression that output could be increased by monetary means, it becomes an illusion if the problem is due to a mismatch of skills or a debt overhang.
Commodity prices and the outlook for price stability On 7 April we increased our key interest rates by 25 basis points.
The concrete steps of adjustment will remain guided by our aim of keeping inflation in the euro area below, but close to, 2% over the medium term for the euro area as a whole.
The Europe 2020 Strategy for jobs and smart, sustainable and inclusive growth may provide the institutional framework at the European level for ambitious progress with respect to structural reforms.
Of course, if the liquidity is gradually reabsorbed through a deleveraging process of a partly over-indebted private sector, it will dampen money growth as part of a healthy adjustment process.
Therefore, the commitment by the leaders’ of the G20 countries at the Summit in Toronto to pursue fiscal plans that will at least halve deficits by 2013 and stabilise or reduce government debt-to-GDP ratios by 2016 is also an important step.
In this sense, we will act whenever we anticipate that higher costs and price increases pose upward risks to price stability over the medium term. 8.
We have announced that we will do so at least until the end of this year’s third maintenance period (on 13 April 2011).
Inflation rates could temporarily increase further in the next few months and are likely to stay above 2% in 2011, before moderating again.
The ECB’s Governing Council has defined its aim of keeping inflation rates below, but close to 2% over the medium term.
Which of these changes will be temporary, which ones more permanent? - Most likely we will see lower but more sustainable growth paths. - I would expect risks to be priced more appropriately. - As exemplified by the recent agreement on Basel III at the G20 level, regulation and supervision will be strengthened. 3.
As the sovereign debt crisis in May this year has further underlined, reliable and timely government finance statistics are key to the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact and the credibility of its budgetary surveillance.
In 2009, the fiscal outlook deteriorated again with an estimated deficit of around 7% of GDP .
In Japan, the government deficit-to-GDP ratio is foreseen to reach around 9.0% of GDP in these years, whereas the UK and US government deficits are expected to be in excess of 10.0% of GDP in the period 2009-11.
According to a recent OECD study, financial crises in OECD countries are estimated to lower potential output by 1.5 to 2.4 percent on average, while the magnitude of this effect might be significantly larger in the case of a severe crisis.
Further credit-related write-downs are expected throughout this year.
These high government deficits are reflected in mounting government debt, which will reach 88% of GDP in 2011 in both the euro area and the United Kingdom, 100% of GDP in the United States and 200% of GDP in Japan.
In the euro area, according to the latest projections by the European Commission, the general government deficit is expected to exceed 6.0% of GDP in 2009, 2010 and 2011.
At the global level, economic activity is expected to grow by around 4% this year, while global trade is expected to increase by almost 6% (according to the IMF’s April WEO).
With an annual structural deficit reduction of only 0.5% of GDP, it will take the euro area 20 years or more to return to the pre-crisis debt-to-GDP level.
Further credit-related write-downs are expected throughout this year, and the risk of a negative feedback loop emerging between the household and corporate sectors and the banks persists.
Fiscal policy challenges Most governments in the advanced countries will exit from the recession with the highest deficit and debt-to-GDP ratios recorded in times of peace. [Show slide 1, 2 and 3] As can bee seen in the chart, the general government deficit in the euro area is expected, according to the latest projections by the European Commission, to exceed …
Hence, after falling last year, global activity is expected to grow by around 4% this year, while global trade is expected to grow by almost 6% [IMF January WEO update].
All in all, inflation expectations remain firmly anchored in line with our aim of keeping inflation rates below, but close to, 2% over the medium term.
More specifically, we expect inflation to stay at around 1% in the near term, and to remain subdued over the policy-relevant horizon, largely on account of the abundance of idle resources and the moderate recovery.
This is in line with the latest projections by ECB staff [who predict real GDP growth of between 0.4 and 1.2% for this year and between 0.5 and 2.5% for next year].
As a result of the budgetary loosening in the context of the economic and financial crisis, many euro area countries will need to engage in ambitious fiscal consolidation to put their debt levels back on a declining path towards the Maastricht reference value of 60% of GDP.
If reform challenges are not met, there is a major risk that global economic activity will remain subdued, high public debt will become more persistent and unemployment will remain high.
I will then move on to discuss what the obstacles to global growth might be in future and what features the “new norm” should have if growth is to be sustainable.
With inflation rates in the euro area currently projected to be slightly above 1% in the short to medium term, deflation risks continue to be absent, and price stability has been maintained.
In case money market tensions persist while upside risks to price stability emerge, some elements of the enhanced credit support would need to remain in place.
First, consistent with its mandate of maintaining price stability over the medium term and, specifically, in view of rapidly receding inflationary pressures, the policy rate was cut by 325 basis points and now stands at 1%.
First of all, in order to provide a yardstick against which the ECB can be held accountable, the Governing Council, in line with its definition of price stability, aims to keep inflation rates below, but close to, 2% over the medium term.
I do not want to reveal too many details at this stage, but, as you may have a chance to discover for yourselves later this year, the “Euro Exhibition” features a common theme that will naturally complement the exhibition on the “Language of Money”.
For example, unless we decide otherwise, the maturity and size of our operations will automatically decrease, starting next year.
This is the only decision we have taken which directly affects a market segment other than the money market, and the total sum allocated to the programme – €60 billion – may appear modest compared with asset purchases performed by some other central banks.
By the end of August 2009, the simplified balance sheet of the Eurosystem stood at around €1,500 billion – about 16% of euro area GDP.
The revival of global trade, the rebuilding of inventories and the positive impact of policy stimulus and liquidity support measures are expected to be the main drivers of economic activity, and we may see a positive quarter on quarter growth rate already in the third quarter this year.
Showing the newest 50 - the ledger has all 141.
Also said - not checkable as stated (12 newest)
Remarks about the future with no date, figure or likelihood that could be checked. They are kept on the record and shown here, but not scored.
This will not only be useful to understand what has happened in the recent period but also to frame the challenges that might lie before us as a result of the changed global environment under which monetary policy must operate.
The relationship between monetary policy and globalisation will have to be redressed in the years to come.
Once we accept that globalisation is not an irreversible or uniform process, the need to invest in better governance through co-operative outcomes at a global scale will follow.
The good news, therefore, is that we live in challenging times and that for those of you who work in the Institute this will mean important and policy relevant work today and in the future.
I will do this by drawing on the relationship between globalisation and monetary policy in recent years and considering the extent to which both variables have influenced each other in either a ‘virtuous’ or ‘vicious’ manner.
First, I will not purport to be exhaustive but selective in my discussion of the factors conditioning monetary policy frameworks in the global environment.
The new frameworks should be guided by the FSB’s new international standard for resolution regimes, as endorsed by G20 Leaders at their Cannes Summit of 4 November 2011. This standard could mean a substantial improvement, since it not only contains a broad arsenal of effective resolution tools, but also provisions to facilitate cooperation among national authorities.
The current sovereign debt crisis in Europe is proving to us that fiscal policy should be more grounded – in a similar way to monetary policy – within a rules-based framework with clear medium-term objectives.
Should the ESAs be deemed not to have adequate tools and powers, there may be a case for greater integration of the supervisory framework – including tools for crisis management and resolution.
Then I will dwell on the inherent tensions that exist between a need for financial integration within European Monetary Union (EMU) and the micro-prudential supervision and fiscal policies that have remained national competencies.
As you probably know, the European Central Bank (ECB) has close links with the ESRB.
And for rules and sanctions to be fully credible, they should be stricter, automatic, and as free as possible from the political process, so that countries have the right incentives to address their problems.