Yutaka Yamaguchi
Bank of Japan
Track record: No forecast checked yet (15 not due, 7 being checked).
22forecasts & commitments on the record
86%can be checked as stated
39average ambiguity (0-100)
0goalpost moves recorded
0confirmed U-turns
Timeline
came true partly did not not due / being checked / too vague
Calibration score: shown after 10 checked forecasts with a stated likelihood (now 0).
How they speak about the future: based on data 12, educated guess 8, stated on authority 2.
Kinds of claim: forecast 12, scenario (if… then) 8, mixed claim 1, commitment 1. · Download this report card as a picture
In the nine words
πρόγνωσιςInference from evidence10 · 45%πρόνοιαPreparing for the future7 · 32%πρόβλεψιςSeeing the signs2 · 9%φρόνησιςPractical wisdom1 · 5%προαναγγελίαPublic pre-announcement1 · 5%μαντείαInspired knowledge1 · 5%
How to read this
Each box is one sentence a public figure or institution said about the future, word for word, with a link to the official text. Can be checked means it names what will happen, by when, and how likely - so it can be compared with official figures later. Too vague to check means it does not. Ambiguity (0-100) is how many different ways the sentence can be read. When the date passes, the forecast is compared with official data and marked came true, partly or did not come true. Labels judge the sentence, never the person. Full guide and glossary.On the record (22)
Therefore, there was a widespread belief that the situation would turn around if business could be sustained until land prices started to rise again.
However, as suggested by Chart 5, asset price deflation, which has been continuous for ten years at an annual rate of close to 10 percent, has likely exerted far greater pressure on activity than slightly positive real interest rates.
Admittedly, under the non-negativity constraint of nominal interest rates, real rates will be pushed up by the extent of deflation, even though deflation itself is rather limited at less than 1 percent a year in Japan now.
On the other hand, however, if policy efforts to promote future growth are seen to be promising, it could lead to an increase in the current demand partly through a rise in stock prices.
However, if demand is not created to meet an increase in supply capacity, the output gap will widen further.
This commitment aims to drive down interest rates of longer maturity by clearly stating that the Bank will continue the current monetary easing measures in the future.
In the outlook report in October, the Policy Board members' assessment was that, for fiscal 2002, economic growth will remain negative and prices will continue to decline.
Given the baseline scenario that I mentioned earlier, the output gap in the economy will be likely to widen into fiscal 2002.
If the consumer price index falls, albeit modestly, in fiscal years 2001 and 2002, this will be a post-war record of a continuous decline for three years.
Even in that case, more time will be needed before clear signs of recovery can be confirmed and prices are expected to continue declining gradually in fiscal years 2001 and 2002.
The October 2001 report covered fiscal years 2001 and 2002, the period from April 2001 through March 2003, and assessed the most likely scenario, or a baseline scenario, for economic and price developments during the period, and the upside and downside risk factors involved.
Therefore, if an additional supply of current account balance results in a change in the prices of financial assets, it could be achieved either through a) reallocation of money from no-risk-no-return current accounts to higher-return-higher-risk assets, or b) effects on inflation expectation for the future.
We could raise the current account balance above 12 trillion yen in September because of a surge in demand for liquidity caused by the terrorist attacks, the collapse of a large retailer, and a fall in stock prices.
In fact, in May, the Bank frequently experienced a shortfall in bids even at 0.01 percent.
According to the Blue Chip Economic Indicators, an average forecast for the US economic growth in 2001 was 2.6 percent in January, which was lower than four percent-plus in 2000 but not a significant slowdown.
If we have to humbly accept such uncertainty even after we try our utmost to make accurate economic forecasts, one useful approach might be to confirm the degree of economic improvement and adjust monetary easing accordingly in order to realize sustainable growth.
In other words, the source of interest income received is economic growth, and interest income will not be generated if the economy does not grow.
And hence, even if the potential growth rate is low, the economy will be able to grow strongly with the cyclical growth rate exceeding the potential growth rate.
Yet I think that if household income recovers even moderately, there is a higher probability that the economy will return to a growth path led by business fixed investment.
While June's Tankan survey shows that the ratio of current profits to sales in the manufacturing industry for fiscal 2000 is expected to recover to 4.01%, which is slightly higher than the average of 3.84% since fiscal 1980, the recovery of the household sector has been delayed.
And, the consensus forecast of the private sector for real GDP growth for this fiscal year has been revised upward from 0.8% at the beginning of this year to 1.5% recently.
One such example is the publication of a report titled 'Market Liquidity: Research Findings and Selected Policy Responses' in May this year.
Also said - not checkable as stated (12 newest)
Remarks about the future with no date, figure or likelihood that could be checked. They are kept on the record and shown here, but not scored.
The central bank pursuing such a strategy would have to be fully convinced, substantiated by quantitative analyses, and strongly concerned about the risk of deflation a few years into the future.
It is against such uncertain setting that economic forecasting must incorporate the timing and magnitude of the "headwind" generated by the deteriorating balance-sheet conditions of businesses, households and particularly banks.
And yet, even with a policy response which could be considered appropriate in normal times, there emerged a substantial decline in the trend growth rate as well as rapid and continuous fall in asset prices that weakened the financial system and destabilized the economy.
I believe that, in order to fully perform its duty, a central bank needs to be able to accurately assess the economic environment, demonstrate a strong will to conduct appropriate monetary policy, and explain its policy fully.
Fully recognizing that this is the conundrum facing Japan's economy, I want to stress here that, when pursuing 'structural reforms,' it should clearly be recognized that such reforms could cut both ways as I have explained.
Such price developments must to a large extent reflect cyclical economic weakness but may also be affected by other factors.
With this in mind, we will continue to exert our best efforts.
Based on these experiences, I should say that an approach enhancing the visibility of stress appears more appealing. 'Macro stress-census', an experiment conducted by the CGFS, might be one of the options for developing commonly recognised stress scenarios among market participants and central banks, although not a panacea.
This may argue in favour of the view that the traditional principle should be augmented.
But the contemporary reality, as I noted earlier, is that systemic problems could originate in financial markets and such markets are populated not only by banks but also by a large number of non-bank financial institutions and conglomerates.
Today, I have offered my views on systemic risk, which might have raised more questions than answers for central banks.
Second, central banks are expected to confront almost every systemic crisis as entities that can readily provide liquidity.