William C Dudley
Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Track record: No forecast checked yet (162 not due, 162 being checked).
324forecasts & commitments on the record
73%can be checked as stated
39average ambiguity (0-100)
0goalpost moves recorded
0confirmed U-turns
Timeline
came true partly did not not due / being checked / too vague
Calibration score: shown after 10 checked forecasts with a stated likelihood (now 0).
How they speak about the future: based on data 195, stated on authority 67, educated guess 62.
Kinds of claim: forecast 201, mixed claim 55, scenario (if… then) 52, commitment 16. · Download this report card as a picture
In the nine words
πρόγνωσιςInference from evidence184 · 57%μαντείαInspired knowledge55 · 17%πρόνοιαPreparing for the future52 · 16%προαναγγελίαPublic pre-announcement16 · 5%εἰκασίαConjecture14 · 4%πρόβλεψιςSeeing the signs3 · 1%
How to read this
Each box is one sentence a public figure or institution said about the future, word for word, with a link to the official text. Can be checked means it names what will happen, by when, and how likely - so it can be compared with official figures later. Too vague to check means it does not. Ambiguity (0-100) is how many different ways the sentence can be read. When the date passes, the forecast is compared with official data and marked came true, partly or did not come true. Labels judge the sentence, never the person. Full guide and glossary.On the record (324)
As Andrew highlighted, there is no guarantee that LIBOR will continue to exist beyond December 2021.
Although the ARRC's transition plan anticipates that this will be completed by the end of 2021, it would be better for this to occur more expeditiously.
According to the projections released earlier this month from the Congressional Budget Office, or CBO, the federal budget deficit is anticipated to exceed 4½ percent of GDP in 2019, well above the level that would be needed to keep the federal debt-toGDP ratio from rising.
Although that is higher than the estimates from some models, I have nudged up my estimate because financial conditions are still easy and fiscal policy will likely be quite stimulative in 2018 and 2019. 4
Most FOMC participants-including me-have the unemployment rate moving considerably below their estimate of NAIRU by 2020, with inflation climbing slightly above 2 percent and the federal funds rate moving above their estimates of its likely long-run value.
Whether monetary policy will need to move to a restrictive setting depends crucially on how low the unemployment rate can go without inflation climbing meaningfully above 2 percent.
I anticipate that the economy will continue to grow at an above-trend pace in 2018 and 2019, which will put sufficient pressure on the nation's resources to push up inflation to the FOMC's longer-run 2 percent objective.
Robust job gains coupled with moderate growth in labor compensation should ensure that household incomes will continue to rise at a solid rate, even before factoring in the impact of this year's reduction in personal income taxes.
For example, supervisors seek to address the externalities created by the failure of a systemically important firm by imposing higher capital and other requirements than the firm would likely select if left to its own devices.
If the domestic saving/investment imbalance is unchanged, then any reduction in the trade balance from higher trade barriers will need to be offset by lower exports.
If support for liberalized trade and an integrated global economy were to suffer a significant setback, the consequence could be slower economic growth and lower living standards around the world.
If we are going to enhance the benefits of free trade and better manage its costs, it is critical that we continue to strengthen the global rules-based system.
of asset purchases until some economic objective is reached and, at the same time, were to make it clear that the policy rate would not begin to rise until the asset purchase program were completed, these steps might help anchor expectations about the likely path of short-term rates more effectively.
Even if the caps were to be removed completely at the end of 2018, it would most likely pull forward the timing of normalizing the balance sheet size by only two quarters.
As we will show, job losses following the storm were very substantial, totaling around 4 percent in Puerto Rico and 8 percent in the U.S. Virgin Islands.
Under such conditions, I would expect the inflation rate to drift higher toward the FOMC's 2 percent long-run objective.
economy that is growing at an above-trend pace-at a time when the labor market is already quite tight-but the economy will be getting an extra boost in 2018 and 2019 from the recently enacted tax legislation.
The CBO projects that, by 2027, outlays on Social Security and Medicare will rise to 6 percent and 5 percent of GDP, respectively-each more than a percentage point higher than in 2017.
For example, the CBO projects that debt service costs in 2027 will be more than $800 billion-nearly 3 percent of GDP, more than double their current share. 10
In fact, I anticipate that the civilian unemployment rate will fall below 4 percent this year and reach the lowest level since at least 2000.
While this legislation will reduce federal revenues by about 1 percent of GDP in both 2018 and 2019, I anticipate the boost to economic growth will be less than that.
Turning to the outlook for inflation, I have been surprised by the persistence of the shortfall from the FOMC's 2 percent long-run objective.
While some of this year's shortfall can be explained by one-off factors-such as the sharp fall in prices for cellular phone service-its persistence suggests that more fundamental structural changes may also be playing a role.
Coupled with uncertainty about the likely growth in other factors, such as currency outstanding, this implies a normalized balance sheet size of, perhaps, $2.4 trillion to $3.5 trillion in the early 2020s. 6
Assuming that this process begins later this year and continues uninterrupted, the balance sheet size would likely normalize in the early part of the next decade.
When combined with a firmer import price trend-partly reflecting recent depreciation of the dollar-and the fading of effects from a number of temporary, idiosyncratic factors, that causes me to expect inflation will rise and stabilize around the FOMC's 2 percent objective over the medium term.
Against that backdrop, one major issue that remains outstanding is whether the Fed will continue to operate with a 'floor' system, in which the Fed maintains a relatively abundant supply of reserves and the effective federal funds rate is managed by periodic adjustments to the interest rate the Fed pays on bank reserves.
While some of this year's shortfall can be explained by one-off factors, such as the sharp fall in prices for cellular phone service, its persistence suggests that more fundamental structural changes may also be playing a role.
Our outlook anticipates a continued moderate growth trend, with some further strengthening in the labor market and an increase in inflation over the medium term toward our objective of 2 percent.
We also said clearly in the FOMC statement that if the economy evolves in line with our expectations, we expect to begin this process this year.
These minutes also noted that most participants judged a change in reinvestment policy would likely be appropriate this year, should economic data develop as they expected.
If the domestic saving/investment imbalance is unchanged, then any reduction in the trade balance from higher trade barriers will be offset by lower exports.
On the positive side, I would point to the WTO's recent Trade Facilitation Agreement, which addresses customs procedures and could reduce global trade costs by almost 15 percent.
As we will show in today's presentation, compared to 2008, a greater proportion of overall debt today is now held by older households that have higher and more stable incomes and more experience as borrowers, on average.
If you go ahead and increase that interest rates when they are still struggling to pay what they have now, I think many will lose their homes.
You could probably push that unemployment rate even lower, but if you did, you'd probably start to have an inflation problem.
They just say, 'What's my payment going to be next month?' And if the payment is low, they don't look at the fine print about what the payment is going to be not next month, but a year from now, or two years from now.
And if that happens, if we stay on that trajectory, I think as Chair Y ellen said yesterday and today, we would expect to gradually remove further monetary policy accommodation, snug up interest rates a little further in the months ahead.
So generally, if you look at the FOMC projections, people think that the federal funds rate in the medium term is going to more like 3% rather than the 4% that might have been attained historically.
But the baseline forecast is pretty similar in 2017 to 2016, slowly above trend growth, a little bit more pressure on the labor market, gradual rise in inflation, back towards our 2% objective.
That's going to generate job gains that put, you know, more pressure on the labor market, and as a consequence of that, we think inflation's going to move back towards our 2% objective.
This increased equity cushion would guard against the risk that the household could find itself in a negative equity position in the event of a future decline in home prices.
However, increases in single-family housing starts and permits in October suggest that we are likely to see a reversal of this trend in the fourth quarter and into next year.
Although the trend in Medicare expenditures has flattened out in recent years as healthcare inflation has moderated and utilization growth has slowed, the CBO nevertheless projects that such expenditures will rise from 3.2 percent of GDP in 2016 to about 4.0 percent of GDP in 2026.
Looking ahead, the CBO's baseline projection is that debt-service costs will rise from 1.4 percent of GDP in fiscal 2016 to 2.6 percent of GDP in 2026.
Although the precise trajectory of future reimbursements is highly uncertain, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects that Federal Reserve payments to the Treasury will drop from around 0.6 percent of GDP in fiscal 2016 to 0.3 percent of GDP by 2026.
Growth has averaged about 1.8 percent this year and seems likely to continue at or slightly above this pace in 2017.
And, I expect that we will make further progress toward these goals in 2017.
If another recession were to happen in the next few years, it is likely that the FOMC would be unable to respond with a cut of such magnitude.
Any fixed level of debt will grow even more burdensome if the economy is shrinking.
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Remarks about the future with no date, figure or likelihood that could be checked. They are kept on the record and shown here, but not scored.
LIBOR's potential cessation after 2021 poses a clear risk to financial stability, and prudent risk management means that all of us must prepare for a world without LIBOR. 10 11 12
Besides being more resistant to manipulation, this nearly risk-free rate should also prove much more resilient during periods of financial stress, because the U.S. Treasury repo market is likely to remain deep and active during such episodes. 17
The International Swap Dealers Association (ISDA) has been working on this issue for the derivatives market and is expected to issue a consultative document soon that should prove instrumental in making further progress.
In my view, LIBOR is likely to go away-and it should, because it is not supported by a sufficiently robust regime.
T oday's customer expects increased digital access, and a bank's failure to advance technologically would be very damaging for its franchise value.
It will be important for community banks that are very sensitive to interest rate risk to evaluate the risk management of their loan portfolios.
As the U.S. economy continues to grow and expand-as I expect it will-your personalized customer service, commitment to relationship banking, and adaptability to technological advances will serve you and your communities well. 3
Reserve included-that we need to reform the regulatory requirements for small banks.
But, even as we reduce or eliminate old vulnerabilities, we must not rest on our laurels, for new vulnerabilities will inevitably take their place.
They may also question how much protection is necessary-for example, how stringent the capital requirements or how severe stress testing assumptions should be.
Also, we must recognize that, at times, actions will be taken that are clearly inconsistent with the spirit of the rules that are place, or the rules will simply be violated.
Shareholders should not be shielded from such costs and fines-as they may have also profited from associated gains-but it doesn't seem fair or prudent to shield the decision-makers from responsibility for costly breakdowns as much as they are now.