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THE ORACLE HUNTERS • EVERY PROPHECY ON THE RECORD 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Oracle HuntersEvery prophecy, on the record. · Οἱ Κυνηγοὶ τῶν ΧρησμῶνUnder development

← Tracking the Prophets

Victoria Saporta

Bank of England

Track record: No forecast checked yet (15 not due, 10 being checked).
25forecasts & commitments on the record
56%can be checked as stated
48average ambiguity (0-100)
0goalpost moves recorded
0confirmed U-turns

Timeline

20182018: Due - being checked2018: Due - being checked201920202020: Due - being checked20212021: Not due yet2021: Not due yet2021: Not due yet2021: Due - being checked2021: Not due yet2021: Not due yet20222022: Not due yet2022: Not due yet2022: Not due yet2022: Not due yet2022: Not due yet2022: Not due yet2022: Not due yet20232023: Due - being checked2023: Due - being checked2023: Due - being checked2023: Due - being checked2023: Not due yet2023: Due - being checked2023: Due - being checked2023: Not due yet (+1 more)
came true partly did not not due / being checked / too vague

Calibration score: shown after 10 checked forecasts with a stated likelihood (now 0).
How they speak about the future: based on data 13, stated on authority 10, educated guess 2.
Kinds of claim: forecast 13, mixed claim 7, commitment 4, scenario (if… then) 1. · Download this report card as a picture

In the nine words

πρόγνωσιςInference from evidence12 · 48%μαντείαInspired knowledge7 · 28%προαναγγελίαPublic pre-announcement4 · 16%πρόνοιαPreparing for the future1 · 4%εἰκασίαConjecture1 · 4%
How to read this Each box is one sentence a public figure or institution said about the future, word for word, with a link to the official text. Can be checked means it names what will happen, by when, and how likely - so it can be compared with official figures later. Too vague to check means it does not. Ambiguity (0-100) is how many different ways the sentence can be read. When the date passes, the forecast is compared with official data and marked came true, partly or did not come true. Labels judge the sentence, never the person. Full guide and glossary.

On the record (25)

The DSS will be established later this year via secondary legislation under powers granted as part of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2023.
Bank of England · said 19 Sep 2023 (date) · Competitiveness and growth - continuing the conversation · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidencePartly checkableForecastbased on dataambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partbelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2023Due - being checked
feedback we receive from the conference will then form an essential input to the consultation we plan to put out on our approach to policy making by the end of the year.
Bank of England · said 19 Sep 2023 (date) · Competitiveness and growth - continuing the conversation · evidence & why
μαντεία · Inspired knowledgePartly checkableForecaststated on authorityambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partbelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2023Due - being checked
These views will then feed into the consultation paper on our approach to prudential policy which we will publish later this year, as well as into our overall approach to metrics.
Bank of England · said 19 Sep 2023 (date) · Competitiveness and growth - continuing the conversation · evidence & why
μαντεία · Inspired knowledgePartly checkableMixed claimstated on authorityambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partbelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2023Due - being checked
could benefit from a review. I can announce today that we will also pilot a roundtable with interested stakeholders focussed specifically on innovation in regulation to take place in the first part of next year .
Bank of England · said 19 Sep 2023 (date) · Competitiveness and growth - continuing the conversation · evidence & why
μαντεία · Inspired knowledgePartly checkableMixed claimstated on authorityambiguity 56/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partbelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2024Due - being checked
For owner-occupier mortgages with LTV ratios below 50%, the gap between risk weights could narrow by between 50% and 70%.
The Bank intends to consult early this year on the regulatory framework that will apply to such systemic payment systems.
μαντεία · Inspired knowledgePartly checkableForecaststated on authorityambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partbelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2023Due - being checkedfinance
The Bank and the PRA will continue this year to support the Government's negotiations on at least seven more, including by completing an assessment of the Swiss regulatory regime for a mutual recognition agreement which is currently under negotiation.
μαντεία · Inspired knowledgePartly checkableForecaststated on authorityambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partbelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2023Due - being checkedfinance
This is why I am delighted to announce that we will be holding an international conference on 19 September to deepen our understanding of the links between prudential regulation, international competitiveness, and growth.
I'll conclude by launching a conference we will hold in September to deepen our understanding of the links between prudential regulation, international competitiveness, and growth.
Indeed, when a menu of options is available for pursuing safety and soundness, we will choose the one that facilitates competitiveness and growth.
But alongside these we will have a new secondary objective to facilitate, subject to alignment with relevant international standards, the international competitiveness of the UK's economy and its growth in the medium to long term.
In addition to these actions, regulators also issued clear guidance that banks should use their liquidity buffers to continue to service and support their customers and clients, even if it would mean that LCR levels fall significantly below 100%.
Bank of England · said 14 Jul 2022 (date) · Capital and (for a change) liquidity buffers · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidencePartly checkableMixed claimbased on dataambiguity 56/100below the RIM-1 standardNot due yetfinance
A complementary analysis based on historical data on bank losses conditioned on elevated risks environment suggested a UK CCyB rate of around 5% could be warranted in these circumstances.
Bank of England · said 14 Jul 2022 (date) · Capital and (for a change) liquidity buffers · evidence & why
In addition to the studies already discussed in my previous speech, Berrospide, Gupta and Seay (2021) use US confidential loan level data and find that low-headroom banks reduced lending to SME by an average of 1.4 percent more and were 4 percent more likely to end pre-existing lending relationships than their peers.
Bank of England · said 14 Jul 2022 (date) · Capital and (for a change) liquidity buffers · evidence & why
The PRA for example stated there is no requirement to rebuild the LCR buffers within a set time period, whereas other regulators such as the Reserve Bank of India set expectations for a 'phased approach' in LCR replenishment to 100% as well as lowering the regulatory requirement to 80%, whilst the Banco de Mexico provided a final cut-off date past …
Bank of England · said 14 Jul 2022 (date) · Capital and (for a change) liquidity buffers · evidence & why
We may have found ourselves in an unintended equilibrium where the idea that a bank should not fall below 100% LCR is hardwired within banks' internal governance systems and internal risk appetites, meaning that when a shock hits banks are reluctant to use their liquid assets - they would rather deleverage.
Bank of England · said 14 Jul 2022 (date) · Capital and (for a change) liquidity buffers · evidence & why
If I can use the analogy of a fire, one did break out in the banking system following the onset of the pandemic, but because the locus was well fire-proofed - with capital and liquidity - and because both the monetary and fiscal firefighters were alert and acted quickly and decisively, the fire was put out before it could take …
Bank of England · said 21 Jul 2021 (date) · Emerging prudential lessons from the Covid stress · evidence & why
πρόνοια · Preparing for the futurePartly checkableScenario (if… then)educated guessambiguity 56/100implied call / likelihood: No · 35% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetfiscalfinancehealth
In contrast, they showed that the costs to the wider economy, and ultimately the banking system, from not lending could be very large: reducing aggregate bank capital ratios by as much as 0.8 percentage points due to negative feedback to banks' credit exposures from worse unemployment and corporate insolvency outturns over time when lending is restricted. 11
Bank of England · said 21 Jul 2021 (date) · Emerging prudential lessons from the Covid stress · evidence & why
For example, 40% of the existing rules and technical standards for credit risk relate to the internal ratings based approach. 3 If just those firms which only use the standardised approach were eligible for the simpler regime, these rules could be entirely removed.
Bank of England · said 29 Apr 2021 (date) · Building strong and simple - the first step · evidence & why
Sam Woods spoke about this in his Mansion House speech last November. 2 He said then that the PRA would publish a Discussion Paper in the spring of this year explaining more about what we want to achieve with this initiative and how we think that might be done.
Bank of England · said 29 Apr 2021 (date) · Building strong and simple - the first step · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidencePartly checkableForecastbased on dataambiguity 56/100implied call / likelihood: No · 35% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2021Due - being checked
But that might not always be possible or appropriate for all firms, so we will need to design the simpler regime in a way which minimises barriers to growth as far as possible.
Bank of England · said 29 Apr 2021 (date) · Building strong and simple - the first step · evidence & why
μαντεία · Inspired knowledgePartly checkableMixed claimstated on authorityambiguity 56/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partbelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetgrowth
Before moving on to talk about what the simpler regime might look like, I need to address the fact that reducing small firms' compliance costs from complexity might introduce another sort of problem if it erects new barriers to growth.
Bank of England · said 29 Apr 2021 (date) · Building strong and simple - the first step · evidence & why
εἰκασία · ConjecturePartly checkableMixed claimeducated guessambiguity 71/100implied call / likelihood: No · 35% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetgrowth
While we are in the implementation period, the Government and the regulators will continue to onshore any new financial regulations and standards coming from the EU that take effect this year.
Bank of England · said 10 Mar 2020 (date) · The ideal post-EU regulatory framework · evidence & why
μαντεία · Inspired knowledgePartly checkableForecaststated on authorityambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partbelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2020Due - being checked
34 This is an average of the total customer swaps initial margin for the largest five clearing members as reported to the CFTC at end May 2018.
Bank of England · said 04 Jul 2018 (date) · Prudential bank regulation - present and future · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidencePartly checkableForecastbased on dataambiguity 56/100implied call / likelihood: No · 40% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2018Due - being checked
These are likely to be implemented in around 2020-21.
Bank of England · said 04 Jul 2018 (date) · Prudential bank regulation - present and future · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidencePartly checkableForecastbased on dataambiguity 56/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2020Due - being checked

Also said - not checkable as stated (12 newest)

Remarks about the future with no date, figure or likelihood that could be checked. They are kept on the record and shown here, but not scored.

Of course, the design and calibration of standards needs to be appropriate: excessively high standards might not only hamper economic growth by constraining the provision of financial services to the real economy, but also harm the attractiveness of the UK as a good place to do financial services business.
Bank of England · said 19 Sep 2023 (date) · Competitiveness and growth - continuing the conversation · evidence & why
And once the CBA panel is set up, we will be consulting it on our CBA approach after which we will consult publicly.
Bank of England · said 19 Sep 2023 (date) · Competitiveness and growth - continuing the conversation · evidence & why
We published a discussion paper about financial firms' application of artificial intelligence last year - you can expect to see more from us about this. We will also be proposing rules about issuing and
Furthermore, we will publish our approach to cost-benefit analysis so that everyone can understand how we carry out this important stage in the policymaking process.
This will broaden rule-making powers for the PRA, as requirements which are now in statute will be replaced by new elements of our Rulebook, which we will have the power to change.
We will keep our existing secondary objective to facilitate effective competition in markets for financial services.
Instead, we will make rules that allow the UK economy to benefit the most from the UK's strengths as a leading financial centre without compromising on safety and soundness.
This could have negative impacts on markets and the real economy, and means that central banks may need to intervene faster and to a greater extent than is desirable.
Bank of England · said 14 Jul 2022 (date) · Capital and (for a change) liquidity buffers · evidence & why
This concern was at the forefront of UK and international prudential regulators' minds and motivated the various interventions they made at the time to make clear that regulatory buffers could and should be used. 6
Bank of England · said 21 Jul 2021 (date) · Emerging prudential lessons from the Covid stress · evidence & why
So when we take a step back it suggests something less positive about the non-releasable Capital Conservation Buffer: it indicates that, to be treated as practically useable, regulatory capital buffers may first need to be released into management buffers; and suggests that, despite their purpose, non-releasable regulatory buffers such as the Capital Conservation Buffer may well be unusable in practice.
Bank of England · said 21 Jul 2021 (date) · Emerging prudential lessons from the Covid stress · evidence & why
And, 'reverse stress tests' carried out by the FPC in August 2020 showed that the economic outcome from Covid-19 would need to be much worse than the central projection in order for it to deplete regulatory capital buffers. 21 So while uncertainty was high, banks appeared resilient against scenarios that were materially more adverse.
Bank of England · said 21 Jul 2021 (date) · Emerging prudential lessons from the Covid stress · evidence & why
πρόνοια · Preparing for the futureToo vague to checkCall for actionbased on dataambiguity 83/100below the RIM-1 standardfinance
21 The August 2020 Financial Stability Report (FSR) showed that the cumulative loss of UK economic output associated with the outbreak of Covid-19 would need to be around twice as big as the Monetary Policy Committee's central projection.
Bank of England · said 21 Jul 2021 (date) · Emerging prudential lessons from the Covid stress · evidence & why
πρόνοια · Preparing for the futureToo vague to checkCall for actionbased on dataambiguity 83/100below the RIM-1 standardinterest ratesgrowthfinance