V K Sharma
Reserve Bank of India
Track record: No forecast checked yet (8 not due, 2 being checked).
10forecasts & commitments on the record
40%can be checked as stated
46average ambiguity (0-100)
0goalpost moves recorded
0confirmed U-turns
Timeline
came true partly did not not due / being checked / too vague
Calibration score: shown after 10 checked forecasts with a stated likelihood (now 0).
How they speak about the future: based on data 9, educated guess 1.
Kinds of claim: forecast 6, scenario (if… then) 3, mixed claim 1. · Download this report card as a picture
In the nine words
πρόγνωσιςInference from evidence6 · 60%πρόνοιαPreparing for the future2 · 20%φρόνησιςPractical wisdom1 · 10%εἰκασίαConjecture1 · 10%
How to read this
Each box is one sentence a public figure or institution said about the future, word for word, with a link to the official text. Can be checked means it names what will happen, by when, and how likely - so it can be compared with official figures later. Too vague to check means it does not. Ambiguity (0-100) is how many different ways the sentence can be read. When the date passes, the forecast is compared with official data and marked came true, partly or did not come true. Labels judge the sentence, never the person. Full guide and glossary.On the record (10)
If one looks at the recent readings, there is incontrovertible evidence that there is yet again a huge under-pricing of risks in the financial system and, therefore, it is not a question of if, but when, generic asset bubble caused by manifold increases in balance sheets of central banks will burst.
On the other hand, if they speculate in IRS market without any underlying exposure in the fixed rate long-term loans, then they will obviously be paying overnight and receiving OIS fixed rates and, therefore, they lose both on the floating rate side as also on the fixed rate side because during the same period, five year OIS rates also increased, …
As regards 'liquidity' risk, banks have never so far experienced this and will not as their deposits have grown by 18%-plus every year.
And, significantly, considering that IRS trades about 140 to 150 basis points below sovereign yield, it is win-win for both banks and infrastructure companies who, even after bankers' spreads/ margins, will be able to borrow at around 5/10 year Govt. bond yield (currently 8.40%).
As you may perhaps be aware, the United Nations has declared the year 2012 as the International Year of Cooperatives and, to my mind, this is precisely what makes today's Central Zone Cooperative Conference, both contextually and topically, very relevant and it will culminate, I am sure, in most desired outcomes going forward !
It is expected that a large number of co-operative banks will be licensed by 2012.
There is thus incontrovertible evidence that there is yet again a huge under-pricing of risks in the financial system and, therefore, it is not a question of if, but when, generic asset bubble caused by manifold increases in balance sheets of central banks will burst.
If, by now, I have been persuasive enough to disarm and convert lenders to the above proposition, I must still answer the legitimate question that lenders would logically have as to how then to make a long-term fixed-rate loan, whether for housing, or for infrastructure, without creating any serious asset-liability mismatch in their balance sheets.
And, significantly, considering that IRS trades about 50 to 80 basis points below sovereign yield, it is win-win for both banks and long-term fixed rate mortgage borrower who, even after bankers' spreads/margins, will be able to borrow at a reasonable spread over 10 year G-Sec yield (currently 7.55%).
Inevitably, the fiscal policy had to respond commensurately and Government delivered three fiscal stimulus packages, as a result of which the fiscal deficit rose from 2.7% of GDP in 2007-08 to 6.2% of GDP in 2008-09 and is projected to rise to 6.8% in 2009-10.
Also said - not checkable as stated (12 newest)
Remarks about the future with no date, figure or likelihood that could be checked. They are kept on the record and shown here, but not scored.
For if the surplus/creditor 'core' exit the euro, value of what is left of the euro will be worth much less in terms of national currencies of the exiting surplus/creditor countries.
On the other hand, if the deficit/debtor 'periphery' exit, they will simply default on their euro-denominated debt owed to the surplus/creditor 'core' because of the collapse of their national currencies against the euro!
Here, I hasten to caution that the totally misplaced temptation, and impatience, to introduce/launch 'cash-settled' IRF, any how, some how, and at any cost, must be firmly, and decisively, resisted for such medicine will be worse than the disease!
- (iv) What also must certainly not be done is allocate specific government securities to different Primary Dealers for market making as this will be a 'triple whammy' in that this will straight away fragment/segment market, lead to concentration of risk and militate against portfolio diversification.
A typical, but fallacious, and vacuous, rationalization offered of this counter-intuitive, warped, weird and preposterous feature is that while IRS yields are influenced by expected path of future interest rates, those of G-Secs are influenced by their supply!!
It is the possibility of this two-way arbitrage, working in the opposite directions, that, like a 'good conductor' of 'heat' and 'electricity' in physics, will seamlessly conduct/transmit liquidity from the relatively more liquid (the mostexpensive-to-deliver) benchmark government bonds to the so-called illiquid (the cheapest-todeliver) bonds in the deliverable basket!
In fact, in my speech 'Genesis, Diagnosis and Prognosis of the Current Global Financial Crisis', published in BIS Review 34/2009, I had mentioned that there was significant risk that the then monetary policy environment of very low interest rates and unprecedented deluge of liquidity may yet again engender another bubble in the not too distant future!
At the risk of being repetitive, it must be noted that even if global imbalances and accommodative monetary policy provided an enabling environment for excessive leverage and risk taking, it was still the responsibility of regulators and supervisors to have taken appropriate counter-cyclical macro-prudential measures, pre-emptively, decisively and proactively, rather than reactively.
(In fact, in India the Committee on Financial Sector Assessment almost presciently focused on this critical risk in the month of May itself, much before the liquidity and credit crunch of August 2007).
I am convinced that once the modified version of the Taylor rule is in place, it will provide the much-needed conceptually robust, and technically rigorous, analytics content to monetary policy making with a view to pre-emptively , pro-actively and decisively addressing potential asset bubbles.
So I would urge business and industry to fully provide domestic rupee/foreign currency resources to meet potential liability under FCCBs, rather than hope that FCCBs will be converted which, in fact, if anything, can be the case of overseas investors, but certainly not, of issuers of FCCBs!
Of course, when this starts getting done on a large scale as it indeed should, but has not so far happened, such negative yield spreads will automatically be arbitraged away.