Tony Latter
Hong Kong Monetary Authority
Track record: No forecast checked yet (11 not due, 2 being checked).
13forecasts & commitments on the record
77%can be checked as stated
55average ambiguity (0-100)
0goalpost moves recorded
0confirmed U-turns
Timeline
came true partly did not not due / being checked / too vague
Calibration score: shown after 10 checked forecasts with a stated likelihood (now 0).
How they speak about the future: based on data 10, educated guess 3.
Kinds of claim: forecast 7, mixed claim 4, scenario (if… then) 2. · Download this report card as a picture
In the nine words
πρόγνωσιςInference from evidence10 · 77%πρόνοιαPreparing for the future2 · 15%εἰκασίαConjecture1 · 8%
How to read this
Each box is one sentence a public figure or institution said about the future, word for word, with a link to the official text. Can be checked means it names what will happen, by when, and how likely - so it can be compared with official figures later. Too vague to check means it does not. Ambiguity (0-100) is how many different ways the sentence can be read. When the date passes, the forecast is compared with official data and marked came true, partly or did not come true. Labels judge the sentence, never the person. Full guide and glossary.On the record (13)
If there is a suspicion whether or not well founded - that a public sector deficit is inclined to the former category, it will be judged less helpful to the long-term health of the economy and thus tend to weaken
At the same time, if nominal wages remain unchanged, workers will have a gain in real income.
Hong Kong's deflation, of some 12% in CPI terms over four years, seems, however, to be considerably more than could be accounted for by the above list of essentially non-cyclical factors.
The US inflation rate in the early 1980s was averaging some 4% pa and, not possessing any special forecasting capability in this field, we must have reckoned that it would remain near that figure.
Even some people who have had to suffer small cuts in pay may still be better off than previously; after all, the prices which they face, as measured by Hong Kong's consumer price index, are currently some 14% below their peak.
Behaviour should be no different when interest rates are zero and inflation (or, strictly speaking, projected inflation) minus 2%, than when interest rates are 5% and inflation plus 3%; the real rate is the same in each case.
If governments wish, for political or humanitarian reasons, to ease further the contractual debt burden of an indebted country, this should be carried forward as a conscious and transparent policy decision, which would surely involve usage of taxpayers' money unless it was reliant on coercion of banks.
For example, in January the US Treasury projected buy-backs of $30 billion this year, and some observers now expect that figure to be exceeded.
In addition, the marginal/average adjustment may now have turned the corner, since business decision-takers may be facing prices that will rise by more than the recorded CPI, in which case real interest rates will now be perceived as lower than 5.6%.
But because expectations are that prices are now going to move up rather than down, the forward-looking measure, based on consensus forecasts (from the private sector) of what the published CPI will show, yields much less, 5.6%.
But that forecast of inflation turned out to be wildly wrong; the actual outturn for the 12 months April 1998 to April 1999 was minus 2.6%, which means that the real rate actually realised, and thus experienced by someone borrowing or lending for twelve months at HIBOR, was, on the CPI basis, 10.6%.
A more sophisticated method would have been to take the forecast for inflation over the coming year (April 1998 to April 1999), which was then 4.2% (I have based this on an interpolation from the annual figures from the consensus of private sector forecasters at that time), yielding a somewhat lower real rate of 3.8%.
At the other extreme, my opening remark could also be taken as confirmation that th of the euro was of no direct importance to the man in the street, who may never e seen a European currency; even if he has, he will not have to confront the euro i form until the banknotes appear in 2002.
Also said - not checkable as stated (12 newest)
Remarks about the future with no date, figure or likelihood that could be checked. They are kept on the record and shown here, but not scored.
To be fair, however, it should be noted that the dollar tended to remain as firm during the years of deficit reduction in the late 1990s as it had when the deficit was rising in the early 1980s, and that, on balance, there may not be a very clear long-term relationship in either direction between the US deficit and the …
Each sector may be in financial surplus or deficit, but the surpluses and deficits must, in accounting terms, sum to zero (although in terms of available statistics they may not, because of errors and omissions); every piece of deficit is necessarily matched by a piece of surplus.
- First, when assessing the impact of different deficits one may need to look behind them, to associated developments in the real economy.
- Sixth, there may be a consequential fear that, as a means to that end, the government will seek to monetise its debt - "printing money" to fund the deficit.
Given the careful steps which were taken before the advent of the euro to ensure the insulation of monetary from fiscal policy and to outlaw monetary financing of budget deficits, we might wonder why the news of impending budget overruns should cause the euro to weaken.
This may explain why some price surprises on the macro-policy front in the recent past have been on the downside, but if central banks can digest this ingredient there is no reason why they should be more than temporarily knocked off course by it.
In the absence of a liquidity trap (possibly a significant proviso in this age), it should be possible to choose a policy which could succeed in the narrow objective of eliminating deflation, at whatever cost or benefit in terms of other policy objectives.
It may serve as a harsh signal of the need to restructure or diversify.
longer term, while we must accept that what delivers long-term stability may not continuously deliver results to everyone's liking in the short term.
Article 110 of the Basic Law - often referred to as Hong Kong's constitution - includes the statement that "The Government of Hong Kong shall, on its own, formulate monetary and fiscal policies".
The distinction may be less important under our firmly rule-based currency board system than it might be in other circumstances.
Although, as noted already, the Basic Law clearly states that the Hong Kong government shall determine its own monetary policy, it also sets some very important parameters within which that freedom can be exercised.