Timothy F Geithner
Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Track record: No forecast checked yet (19 not due, 3 being checked).
22forecasts & commitments on the record
77%can be checked as stated
49average ambiguity (0-100)
0goalpost moves recorded
0confirmed U-turns
Timeline
came true partly did not not due / being checked / too vague
Calibration score: shown after 10 checked forecasts with a stated likelihood (now 0).
How they speak about the future: educated guess 12, stated on authority 6, based on data 4.
Kinds of claim: scenario (if… then) 13, forecast 4, commitment 3, mixed claim 2. · Download this report card as a picture
In the nine words
πρόνοιαPreparing for the future13 · 59%πρόγνωσιςInference from evidence3 · 14%προαναγγελίαPublic pre-announcement3 · 14%μαντείαInspired knowledge3 · 14%
How to read this
Each box is one sentence a public figure or institution said about the future, word for word, with a link to the official text. Can be checked means it names what will happen, by when, and how likely - so it can be compared with official figures later. Too vague to check means it does not. Ambiguity (0-100) is how many different ways the sentence can be read. When the date passes, the forecast is compared with official data and marked came true, partly or did not come true. Labels judge the sentence, never the person. Full guide and glossary.On the record (22)
The authority Congress has granted the Fed to pay interest on reserves beginning in 2011 will be very helpful in this regard.
The $29 billion loan will be extended only when and if JPMorgan Chase and Bear merge.
Monetary policy can, of course, play a powerful role in reducing the downside risks to growth, but overall policy will be more effective, particularly given the strains to the financial sector, if
We cannot know with confidence today what level of the short-term real funds rate will be consistent with our objectives of sustainable growth and low inflation, but if turbulent financial conditions and the associated downside risks to growth persist, monetary policy may have to remain accommodative for some time.
And this shift is something that we benefit from, not just in the direct sense that U.S. financial institutions play an important role in those markets, but in the broader sense that we will gain from the improvements in economic growth that come from financial market development around the world.
We will benefit from more rapid growth in the rest of the world, but at the same time we need to be more attentive to addressing a range of challenges that could ultimately damage the prospect for future growth in living standards here at home.
But if monetary policy is calibrated appropriately to keep aggregate demand growing roughly in balance with aggregate supply and to keep inflation low and stable, this reduces the risk that such misalignments will emerge and expand.
If losses in these institutions force them to withdraw from credit markets, credit availability will decline, unless or until other institutions in a stronger financial position are willing to step in.
If they are large enough, they have the potential to alter or distort current decisions about investment and consumption in a way that could be detrimental to our longer-run growth prospects.
For example, the Survey of Professional Forecasters reports that on average 50 economists attach a 90 percent probability to an outcome for real GDP growth for 2007 that ranges from 1.0 percent to 5.0 percent.
If this gap in potential growth were sustained, the United States would be able to sustain a larger external imbalance than we might have thought historically would be the case.
But even if we could be confident that the world would be comfortable financing the United States on these terms for some time, that fact alone does not mean that it is prudent for the United States to continue borrowing on this scale, particularly given that doing so means that the net obligations of the United States to the rest …
If it turns out that the anticipated fall in asset prices does not materialize, the policy constructed under the assumption of a decline will likely have been too easy, and that might itself contribute to further rises in asset prices.
If the central bank's assumption is that asset prices are likely to fall over the forecast horizon, perhaps in the wake of a sustained rise in those prices, then it might in turn forecast a softer path for aggregate demand.
On the other side of the balance is the United States, which is able to sustain higher rates of private spending and larger government deficits than it could if others were not willing to lend us their savings.
One might be less troubled by a fiscal imbalance of this size if it was not accompanied by a substantial increase in our reliance on the savings of the rest of the world.
Dale Jorgenson, Mun Ho, and Kevin Stiroh have concluded in some recent research that there's a reasonable prospect that structural productivity growth will average just over 2.5 percent a year for the next decade.
We can work to keep monetary policy credible, to preserve confidence we will act to keep inflation and inflation expectations stable at moderate levels.
If the economy follows the present forecast of slightly above-trend growth, then it would be appropriate for monetary policy to continue to move the real fed funds rate higher.
The decisions we make this year and over the next few years will be important to building more confidence that we have the will to act in a manner commensurate with the challenge.
But we need to be careful to give the world confidence that we will conduct policy in a manner that will keep inflation expectations stable, at low levels.
We will continue to work closely with the private sector in designing effective ways to deal with the full range of new challenges from increased financial integration and increased concentration, greater complexity, and new threats to operational security and continuity.
Also said - not checkable as stated (12 newest)
Remarks about the future with no date, figure or likelihood that could be checked. They are kept on the record and shown here, but not scored.
And those trade-offs will have to be evaluated against, among other things, the potential distortions created by differential treatment across regulated and unregulated entities, the magnitude of the tax imposed on the overall level of financial intermediation, and the extent of the safety net and the potential for moral hazard.
There is more continuity than change in these suggestions, and they assume, as is the case today, that we will have to work closely with other functional supervisors to make the system work.
These changes in the structure of the financial system were probably not the only causes of the financial boom that preceded this crisis, but they may have amplified the dimension of the boom and they were important to how the crisis unfolded and to how policy has responded.
I want to identify some issues that are critical to our current responsibilities and will be important in defining an appropriate role in the future, with the most effective mix of responsibility and authority.
And, finally, the responsibilities for market and financial stability that are accorded the Fed in current and any future legislation will require that the Fed adopt a more comprehensive
I would like to offer some observations, from my perspective at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, on some of the broad considerations that should guide this process.
And we have to focus on ways regulation can mitigate the moral hazard risk created by the actions central banks and governments have taken and may take in the future to avert systemic financial crises.
And supervision will have to focus more attention on the extent of maturity transformation taking place outside the banking system.
This is hard, but the objective should be to offset the benefits and the moral hazard risk that come from access to central bank liquidity in crises, without setting the constraint at a level that will only result in pushing more capital to the unregulated part of the financial system.
We have to distinguish carefully between problems the markets will solve on
We have to acknowledge not just that regulation comes with costs, but that if not carefully crafted it can distort incentives in ways that may make the system less safe.
And these changes will have to come with a stronger set of incentives and requirements for the management of liquidity risk by financial institutions with access to central bank liquidity.