Stephen Blake
Competition and Markets Authority · GBR
Track record: No forecast checked yet (0 not due, 3 being checked).
3forecasts & commitments on the record
0%can be checked as stated
36average ambiguity (0-100)
0goalpost moves recorded
0confirmed U-turns
Timeline
came true partly did not not due / being checked / too vague
Calibration score: shown after 10 checked forecasts with a stated likelihood (now 0).
How they speak about the future: based on data 3.
Kinds of claim: forecast 3.
In the nine words
How to read this
Each box is one sentence a public figure or institution said about the future, word for word, with a link to the official text. Can be checked means it names what will happen, by when, and how likely - so it can be compared with official figures later. Too vague to check means it does not. Ambiguity (0-100) is how many different ways the sentence can be read. When the date passes, the forecast is compared with official data and marked came true, partly or did not come true. Labels judge the sentence, never the person. Full guide and glossary.On the record (3)
Moreover, as shown by the conviction in August this year of Tom Hayes on 8 counts of conspiracy to defraud for the manipulation of LIBOR, UK juries are perfectly capable of returning (and are willing to return) guilty verdicts in financial crime cases, albeit that a number of the features of that case, most notably the substantial personal gain by …
In doing so, the CMA will of course be aware of the verdicts in the galvanised steel tanks case and the CMA in fact concluded 2 cases in September of this year where it was not satisfied that the Code test was met.
The Financial Conduct Authority and the new Payment Systems Regulator will also obtain such concurrent competition law powers on 1 April 2015.
Also said - not checkable as stated (9 newest)
Remarks about the future with no date, figure or likelihood that could be checked. They are kept on the record and shown here, but not scored.
For those who have committed the offence, this should act as a powerful incentive to plead guilty and co-operate, particularly where the cartel conduct is on or after 1 April 2014 and the defence that they were not acting dishonestly will no longer be available.
Of course there will be further challenges (the new exclusion and defences in the amended offence still need to be tested) but, given the serious economic damage done by cartels and the important deterrent effect that individual sanctions can be expected to have, the journey is one which in my view (and that of the CMA) is worth making.
On the need to ensure that the offence did not apply to agreements that might have countervailing benefits, making them lawful under the civil competition regime, the government concluded that this could be achieved by the introduction of a number of exclusions and defences (see note 16 below).
In my judgment, the economic damage done by cartels is such that those who involve themselves in them must expect prison sentences to mark the seriousness of these offences and to act as a deterrent to others.
The Chapter I prohibition is based on Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which the CMA must also apply to agreements or concerted practices which may affect trade between EU member states and have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market.
Given the challenges presented by cartel enforcement, a large generalist agency with a broad criminal portfolio is understandably less likely to have a significant appetite for cartel enforcement work, which will invariably have to compete for resources and attention with other types of crime (25).
Specifically, Chapter I of Competition Act 1998 (CA98) prohibits agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings or concerted practices which may affect trade within the UK and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the UK unless they are excluded or exempt.
This is particularly important in the EU context where, in the absence of full EU harmonisation in the area of sanctions or procedures, the scope for the convergence of leniency policies across the EU is limited, necessitating close working relationships between ECN members to resolve any practical difficulties that may arise from differences between their respective regimes.
Cartel activity might also be associated with fraud, such as for example rigging bids or fixing prices and then falsely representing to the purchaser that the bid or price was reached independently.