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THE ORACLE HUNTERS • EVERY PROPHECY ON THE RECORD 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Oracle HuntersEvery prophecy, on the record. · Οἱ Κυνηγοὶ τῶν ΧρησμῶνUnder development

← Tracking the Prophets

Stefan Gerlach

Central Bank of Ireland

Track record: No forecast checked yet (18 not due, 14 being checked).
32forecasts & commitments on the record
84%can be checked as stated
34average ambiguity (0-100)
0goalpost moves recorded
0confirmed U-turns

Timeline

20112011: Due - being checked2011: Due - being checked2011: Due - being checked20122012: Not due yet2012: Not due yet2012: Not due yet2012: Due - being checked2012: Due - being checked2012: Not due yet2012: Not due yet2012: Not due yet (+6 more)20132013: Not due yet2013: Not due yet2013: Not due yet2013: Not due yet2013: Due - being checked2013: Not due yet2013: Due - being checked201420152015: Due - being checked2015: Due - being checked2015: Due - being checked2015: Due - being checked2015: Due - being checked2015: Due - being checked2015: Not due yet2015: Not due yet
came true partly did not not due / being checked / too vague

Calibration score: shown after 10 checked forecasts with a stated likelihood (now 0).
How they speak about the future: based on data 21, educated guess 9, stated on authority 2.
Kinds of claim: forecast 18, scenario (if… then) 10, mixed claim 4. · Download this report card as a picture

In the nine words

πρόγνωσιςInference from evidence19 · 59%πρόνοιαPreparing for the future10 · 31%μαντείαInspired knowledge2 · 6%εἰκασίαConjecture1 · 3%
How to read this Each box is one sentence a public figure or institution said about the future, word for word, with a link to the official text. Can be checked means it names what will happen, by when, and how likely - so it can be compared with official figures later. Too vague to check means it does not. Ambiguity (0-100) is how many different ways the sentence can be read. When the date passes, the forecast is compared with official data and marked came true, partly or did not come true. Labels judge the sentence, never the person. Full guide and glossary.

On the record (32)

The share expecting prices to rise in Dublin over the next three years is down over 17 percentage points.
Central Bank of Ireland · said 15 Oct 2015 (date) · The Central Bank of Ireland's macro prudential policy · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidencePartly checkableForecastbased on dataambiguity 36/100below the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2018Due - being checkedinflation
For example, the percentage of respondents expecting national house prices to increase over the next three years has declined by 14 percentage points.
Central Bank of Ireland · said 15 Oct 2015 (date) · The Central Bank of Ireland's macro prudential policy · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidencePartly checkableForecastbased on dataambiguity 36/100below the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2018Due - being checkedinflationhousing
According to the findings of the CBI/SCSI's (2015Q2) survey of individuals employed in the property market, while a majority of respondents expect residential property prices to increase over the next year and next three years, the percentage doing so has fallen in recent quarters, particularly so in Dublin.
Central Bank of Ireland · said 15 Oct 2015 (date) · The Central Bank of Ireland's macro prudential policy · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedForecastbased on dataambiguity 0/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablemeets the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2016Due - being checkedinflation
Second, banks' compliance with the measures will only be assessed after lending data for the period to end-December 2015 has been submitted.
Central Bank of Ireland · said 15 Oct 2015 (date) · The Central Bank of Ireland's macro prudential policy · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidencePartly checkableForecastbased on dataambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partbelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2015Due - being checkedfinance
Therefore, any data concerning new lending in H1 2015 will mostly contain mortgages that were approved prior to the introduction of the regulations, given that banks allow approvals to last up to nine months.
Central Bank of Ireland · said 15 Oct 2015 (date) · The Central Bank of Ireland's macro prudential policy · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidencePartly checkableForecastbased on dataambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partbelow the RIM-1 standarddue 30 Jun 2015Due - being checkedfinancehousing
Nonetheless, it is important to note that at 5 per cent, house prices are expected to grow faster than inflation generally in the next year, implying that there is still plenty of demand for housing.
Central Bank of Ireland · said 15 Oct 2015 (date) · The Central Bank of Ireland's macro prudential policy · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedForecastbased on dataambiguity 0/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablemeets the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2016Due - being checkedinflationtradehousing
Indeed, 29 per cent of tenants say that they would be more likely to rent long term if there was the possibility of a longer term lease. 14 Lengthening rental contracts therefore seems desirable. 15
Central Bank of Ireland · said 08 Jun 2015 (date) · Making residential rental markets work for financial stability · evidence & why
In Ireland, it is estimated that 36 per cent of landlords are 'accidental landlords' who found themselves with a property that they could not sell as a result of the housing market crash. 7 Rent received on these properties has enabled landlords to meet outstanding mortgage repayments, and thus helped them avoid falling into mortgage arrears.
Central Bank of Ireland · said 08 Jun 2015 (date) · Making residential rental markets work for financial stability · evidence & why
If for some reason these institutions decide to limit their exposures by reducing their positions, by selling collectively they might cause the market to become one sided and prices to fall rapidly.
Central Bank of Ireland · said 19 Sep 2013 (date) · Macroprudential policy in Ireland · evidence & why
πρόνοια · Preparing for the futurePartly checkableScenario (if… then)educated guessambiguity 71/100implied call / likelihood: No · 35% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetinflation
While real GDP growth has been very weak, it was positive in both 2011 and 2012, and is forecasted to increase to a little over 1 per cent in 2013.
Central Bank of Ireland · said 14 Jan 2013 (date) · Ireland - from crisis to recovery · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidencePartly checkableForecastbased on dataambiguity 56/100below the RIM-1 standardNot due yetgrowth
Although this is less than the target of 8.6 per cent, public debt is continuing to accumulate rapidly and is expected to peak in 2013 at 121 per cent of GDP.
Central Bank of Ireland · said 14 Jan 2013 (date) · Ireland - from crisis to recovery · evidence & why
The most recent forecasts suggest that the deficit in 2012 will be somewhat below 8 per cent of GDP.
Central Bank of Ireland · said 14 Jan 2013 (date) · Ireland - from crisis to recovery · evidence & why
With the ending of the programme later this year, the Irish Government will be relying again on funding from the private debt markets.
Central Bank of Ireland · said 14 Jan 2013 (date) · Ireland - from crisis to recovery · evidence & why
μαντεία · Inspired knowledgePartly checkableForecaststated on authorityambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partbelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2013Due - being checkedfiscal
If financial markets believe that the Government will not have any problem rolling over its debt in future years, interest rates will be lower and it will be easier for the Government to service the debt.
Central Bank of Ireland · said 14 Jan 2013 (date) · Ireland - from crisis to recovery · evidence & why
εἰκασία · ConjecturePartly checkableMixed claimeducated guessambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partbelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetinterest ratesfiscal
This has increased the likelihood that the improvement will be both structural and lasting in nature, and that as a result the Irish Government will be able to access debt markets on a sustainable basis from this year onwards.
Central Bank of Ireland · said 14 Jan 2013 (date) · Ireland - from crisis to recovery · evidence & why
μαντεία · Inspired knowledgeCan be checkedForecaststated on authorityambiguity 0/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partmeets the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2013Due - being checkedfiscal
If public debts are large, monetary policy makers may worry that higher interest rates will worsen the fiscal situation by increasing the cost of debt service and by slowing the economy and therefore dampening tax revenues.
Central Bank of Ireland · said 28 Sep 2012 (date) · Fiscal imbalances and monetary stability · evidence & why
πρόνοια · Preparing for the futurePartly checkableScenario (if… then)educated guessambiguity 56/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partbelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetinterest ratesfiscal
Similarly, the ECB and the Swiss National Bank have announced that price stability is the overriding target for monetary policy and defined it numerically. 8 Since the inflation objective is public knowledge, public scrutiny will force central banks to tighten monetary policy if inflation rises above target for a protracted period.
Central Bank of Ireland · said 28 Sep 2012 (date) · Fiscal imbalances and monetary stability · evidence & why
πρόνοια · Preparing for the futurePartly checkableScenario (if… then)based on dataambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partbelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetinflationinterest ratesfinance
If inflation rises, the central bank must determine whether the increase is likely to be lasting or temporary. 9 In the latter case, there is no need to increase interest rates since inflation will return to the previous level on its own.
Central Bank of Ireland · said 28 Sep 2012 (date) · Fiscal imbalances and monetary stability · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidencePartly checkableMixed claimbased on dataambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetinflationinterest ratesfinance
13% of GDP. 2 Therefore, unfortunately, in spite of nearly 16% of GDP in budgetary adjustment measures undertaken since 2008, a deficit of 8.3% is projected for this year, falling slightly to 7.5% for 2013.
Central Bank of Ireland · said 28 Sep 2012 (date) · Fiscal imbalances and monetary stability · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedForecastbased on dataambiguity 0/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablemeets the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2013Due - being checkedgrowthfiscal
Specifically, Irish general government debt rose from below 25% of GDP in 2007, which was much below the 60% limit of the Maastricht Treaty, to over 106% of GDP in 2011, and is projected to rise until 2013.
Central Bank of Ireland · said 28 Sep 2012 (date) · Fiscal imbalances and monetary stability · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedForecastbased on dataambiguity 0/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablemeets the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2013Due - being checkedgrowthfiscal
For example, banks that hold large quantities of domestic sovereign debt could be exposed to renewed funding stress if there was a further deterioration in the euro area sovereign crisis.
Central Bank of Ireland · said 08 Sep 2012 (date) · Monetary policy after the crisis · evidence & why
πρόνοια · Preparing for the futurePartly checkableScenario (if… then)educated guessambiguity 56/100implied call / likelihood: No · 35% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetfiscalfinance
Indeed, raising the inflation objective is likely to trigger expectations of higher inflation and increase long-term interest rates precisely at a moment when economies remain vulnerable to contractionary shocks. 19 Moreover, if inflation objectives were changed once, they could surely be changed again.
Central Bank of Ireland · said 08 Sep 2012 (date) · Monetary policy after the crisis · evidence & why
πρόνοια · Preparing for the futurePartly checkableScenario (if… then)based on dataambiguity 56/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetinflationinterest rates
If the central bank maintains its low inflation polices, ex post real interest rates will rise, slowing economic activity and raising unemployment.
Central Bank of Ireland · said 08 Sep 2012 (date) · Monetary policy after the crisis · evidence & why
πρόνοια · Preparing for the futurePartly checkableScenario (if… then)educated guessambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partbelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetinflationinterest ratesgrowthlabourfinance
Thus, the debt-to-GDP ratio will grow whenever the interest rate exceeds the growth rate of the economy - both measured either in real or in nominal terms - and unless the government is running a sufficiently large primary surplus.
Central Bank of Ireland · said 08 Sep 2012 (date) · Monetary policy after the crisis · evidence & why
πρόνοια · Preparing for the futurePartly checkableScenario (if… then)educated guessambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partbelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetgrowthfiscal
Will inflation objectives be increased to allow central banks more leeway to cut interest rates if another shock occurs?
Central Bank of Ireland · said 08 Sep 2012 (date) · Monetary policy after the crisis · evidence & why
πρόνοια · Preparing for the futurePartly checkableScenario (if… then)educated guessambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partbelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetinflationinterest ratesfinance
Indeed the OECD forecasts unemployment in the US to decline very gradually over the next two years, falling to 7.6 per cent in 2013, while euro area unemployment is expected to continue to rise in 2012 and 2013 (see Figure 3).
Central Bank of Ireland · said 08 Sep 2012 (date) · Monetary policy after the crisis · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedForecastbased on dataambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2013Due - being checkedlabour
It doesn't take too much imagination to conclude that in this situation a large fall in property prices, if it were to happen, could have a devastating effect on banks' balance sheets.
Central Bank of Ireland · said 29 Feb 2012 (date) · Macro prudential policy in Ireland · evidence & why
πρόνοια · Preparing for the futurePartly checkableScenario (if… then)educated guessambiguity 56/100implied call / likelihood: No · 35% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetinflationfinance
For instance, if economic conditions are weak, an increase in long bond yields arising from concerns, warranted or not, about a government's creditworthiness will make it more difficult
Central Bank of Ireland · said 29 Feb 2012 (date) · Macro prudential policy in Ireland · evidence & why
πρόνοια · Preparing for the futurePartly checkableScenario (if… then)educated guessambiguity 56/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partbelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetfinance
Thus, the tripling of the price-rent ratio in the residential property market between 1995 and 2007, and the 50% increase of the same ratio in the commercial property market between 2003 and 2007, ought to have struck observers as out of line and as not unlikely to be reversed.
Central Bank of Ireland · said 29 Feb 2012 (date) · Macro prudential policy in Ireland · evidence & why
The consensus view, including that of the Troika, is that, on current projections, the debt-to-GDP ratio will peak in 2013 before gradually beginning to decline thereafter.
Central Bank of Ireland · said 08 Dec 2011 (date) · Ireland's road out of the crisis · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedForecastbased on dataambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partbelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2013Due - being checkedgrowthfiscal
In this regard, it is encouraging to see that the scale of planned fiscal adjustment in 2012 and 2013 has been increased slightly to ensure that the agreed deficit targets in those years will be reached, despite the projected slowdown in growth.
Central Bank of Ireland · said 08 Dec 2011 (date) · Ireland's road out of the crisis · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedForecastbased on dataambiguity 0/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablemeets the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2012Due - being checkedgrowthfiscal
Having stabilised this measure of the deficit, the aim now is to implement a medium-term programme of measures which will reduce the deficit to below 3 per cent of GDP by 2015.
Central Bank of Ireland · said 08 Dec 2011 (date) · Ireland's road out of the crisis · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedForecastbased on dataambiguity 0/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partmeets the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2015Due - being checkedgrowthfiscal

Also said - not checkable as stated (12 newest)

Remarks about the future with no date, figure or likelihood that could be checked. They are kept on the record and shown here, but not scored.

While the travails of Croatia and Ireland might simply have been due to bad luck, creditfuelled housing bubbles played a big part in both countries' pre-crisis growth and subsequent decline.
Central Bank of Ireland · said 08 Jun 2015 (date) · Making residential rental markets work for financial stability · evidence & why
εἰκασία · ConjecturePartly checkableSpeculationeducated guessambiguity 56/100implied call / likelihood: No · 35% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardgrowthfinancehousing
property is likely to rise, encouraging new landlords into the market and helping to create a floor to house prices.
Central Bank of Ireland · said 08 Jun 2015 (date) · Making residential rental markets work for financial stability · evidence & why
εἰκασία · ConjecturePartly checkableSpeculationeducated guessambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardinflationhousing
Many of these are now left with unsuitable properties for their housing needs (for example, one bedroom apartments that are not satisfactory for growing families), and with debts that they could no longer service when salaries declined and unemployment rose during the economic downturn.
Central Bank of Ireland · said 08 Jun 2015 (date) · Making residential rental markets work for financial stability · evidence & why
εἰκασία · ConjecturePartly checkableSpeculationeducated guessambiguity 56/100implied call / likelihood: No · 35% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardlabourhousing
Moreover, negative equity and mortgage arrears may make it difficult for them to move in pursuit of new, or better paid, employment.
Central Bank of Ireland · said 08 Jun 2015 (date) · Making residential rental markets work for financial stability · evidence & why
εἰκασία · ConjectureToo vague to checkSpeculationeducated guessambiguity 71/100implied call / likelihood: No · 40% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardlabourhousing
This is an area that Fiona Muldoon, who will speak later this afternoon, and her colleagues on the Bank's regulatory side have done much to strengthen in recent years.
Central Bank of Ireland · said 19 Sep 2013 (date) · Macroprudential policy in Ireland · evidence & why
For instance, banks may respond to a downturn in the economy by cutting new lending, reinforcing the downturn.
Central Bank of Ireland · said 19 Sep 2013 (date) · Macroprudential policy in Ireland · evidence & why
Recent research on UK banks (Aiyar et al., 2012), for instance, finds that regulated banks reduce lending, as expected, in response to tighter macroprudential capital requirements aimed at smoothing the credit cycle.
Central Bank of Ireland · said 19 Sep 2013 (date) · Macroprudential policy in Ireland · evidence & why
In addition, there are instruments associated with other policy fields, such as competition policy (either restricting or encouraging competition) or monetary policy (reserve requirements and the level of short-term interest rates), that might be used to support macroprudential policy.
Central Bank of Ireland · said 19 Sep 2013 (date) · Macroprudential policy in Ireland · evidence & why
εἰκασία · ConjectureToo vague to checkSpeculationeducated guessambiguity 71/100implied call / likelihood: No · 35% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardinterest rates
In Spain, the central bank introduced dynamic loss provisioning in 2000 in order to guide banks to build up loss provisions to account for expected losses on new loans and historical average losses on the outstanding stock of loans (Jimenez et al., 2012).
Central Bank of Ireland · said 19 Sep 2013 (date) · Macroprudential policy in Ireland · evidence & why
It is sometimes felt that monetary policy and banking supervision should not be conducted by the same institution to limit the risk of a conflict between policy objectives that could hurt the credibility of monetary policy.
Central Bank of Ireland · said 21 Jan 2013 (date) · Banking and Fiscal Union · evidence & why
πρόνοια · Preparing for the futureToo vague to checkCall for actionstated on authorityambiguity 71/100implied call / likelihood: No · 35% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardinterest ratesfinance
Of course, it is difficult to build consensus in a situation where bank resolutions may become necessary, and deposit insurance schemes could be called on, in the near future.
Central Bank of Ireland · said 21 Jan 2013 (date) · Banking and Fiscal Union · evidence & why
It also seems unlikely that a banking supervisor from, say, Italy or Ireland, sitting in Frankfurt, supervising a bank in Spain or Slovenia will let career considerations influence his or her decisions.
Central Bank of Ireland · said 21 Jan 2013 (date) · Banking and Fiscal Union · evidence & why