Sonia Farrey
Foreign & Commonwealth Office · GBR
Track record: No forecast checked yet (0 not due, 1 being checked).
1forecasts & commitments on the record
0%can be checked as stated
56average ambiguity (0-100)
0goalpost moves recorded
0confirmed U-turns
Timeline
came true partly did not not due / being checked / too vague
Calibration score: shown after 10 checked forecasts with a stated likelihood (now 0).
How they speak about the future: based on data 1.
Kinds of claim: forecast 1.
In the nine words
How to read this
Each box is one sentence a public figure or institution said about the future, word for word, with a link to the official text. Can be checked means it names what will happen, by when, and how likely - so it can be compared with official figures later. Too vague to check means it does not. Ambiguity (0-100) is how many different ways the sentence can be read. When the date passes, the forecast is compared with official data and marked came true, partly or did not come true. Labels judge the sentence, never the person. Full guide and glossary.On the record (1)
The UK is proud to provide financial support, $1.6 million in 2019 to next year, for the International Commission for Missing Persons’s efforts towards the immense task of accounting for missing persons in Syria.
Also said - not checkable as stated (12 newest)
Remarks about the future with no date, figure or likelihood that could be checked. They are kept on the record and shown here, but not scored.
We remain committed to combating human trafficking and migrant smuggling, through victim-centred and gender-responsive approaches.
We will update the Board again about recent developments under Any Other Business.
We will continue our open and transparent engagement on AUKUS, update the Board under “Any Other Business”, and welcome further reports from the Director General when he considers them appropriate.
We must not normalise a situation that Russia created, sustains, and refuses to resolve.
No amount of rhetoric can obscure the reality: Russia created this risk, and Russia must end it by withdrawing from ZNPP and returning the plant to Ukrainian control.
In June, one year after Iran was found in non-compliance with its NPT Safeguards Agreement, this Board adopted a resolution that urged Iran to fulfil its legal obligations and restore full cooperation with the IAEA.
It should be of concern to all Members of this Board that for over a year, the Agency has lost all visibility over Iran’s stockpile of High Enriched Uranium.
To quote the DG’s report, the Agency’s lack of access to verify this material “is a matter of proliferation concern and of compliance with Iran’s NPT Safeguards Agreement, and needs to be addressed with the utmost urgency”.
No State under the NPT should be allowed to stonewall the IAEA and to disregard the numerous resolutions adopted by this Board and the Security Council.
The UK will continue taking close interest in the Agency’s ongoing verification activities and we look forward to further updates, including on the origin of the material in Syria.
Such information will be important to understanding how these activities occurred and helping to ensure they cannot be repeated.
That a strike of this nature could occur without immediate radiological consequences should not reassure us; it underlines how narrow the safety margins have become, and how dependent they now are on circumstance rather than control.