The public record of what the powerful say about the futureAll times UTCYour time ATHENA News Room is liveSealed daily · anchored in BitcoinΕλληνικά A Tekmerion product
THE ORACLE HUNTERS • EVERY PROPHECY ON THE RECORD •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The Oracle HuntersEvery prophecy, on the record. · Οἱ Κυνηγοὶ τῶν ΧρησμῶνUnder development

← Tracking the Prophets

Shyamala Gopinath

Reserve Bank of India

Track record: No forecast checked yet (2 not due, 7 being checked).
9forecasts & commitments on the record
33%can be checked as stated
40average ambiguity (0-100)
0goalpost moves recorded
0confirmed U-turns

Timeline

20052005: Due - being checked20062006: Not due yet2006: Due - being checked2006: Due - being checked20072007: Due - being checked20082008: Due - being checked20092009: Due - being checked2009: Due - being checked2009: Not due yet
came true partly did not not due / being checked / too vague

Calibration score: shown after 10 checked forecasts with a stated likelihood (now 0).
How they speak about the future: based on data 6, stated on authority 2, educated guess 1.
Kinds of claim: forecast 8, mixed claim 1. · Download this report card as a picture

In the nine words

πρόγνωσιςInference from evidence5 · 56%μαντείαInspired knowledge2 · 22%εἰκασίαConjecture1 · 11%πρόβλεψιςSeeing the signs1 · 11%
How to read this Each box is one sentence a public figure or institution said about the future, word for word, with a link to the official text. Can be checked means it names what will happen, by when, and how likely - so it can be compared with official figures later. Too vague to check means it does not. Ambiguity (0-100) is how many different ways the sentence can be read. When the date passes, the forecast is compared with official data and marked came true, partly or did not come true. Labels judge the sentence, never the person. Full guide and glossary.

On the record (9)

The Thirteenth Finance Commission (ThFC) since constituted in November 2007 is expected to submit its report by October 2009.
Reserve Bank of India · said 29 Apr 2009 (date) · Sub-national fiscal reforms and debt management - Indian experience · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidencePartly checkableForecastbased on dataambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2009Due - being checked
The ThFC may also suggest a roadmap for 2010 to 2015 with a view to maintaining the gains of fiscal consolidation after bringing the liabilities of the Central Government on the deficit targets.
Reserve Bank of India · said 29 Apr 2009 (date) · Sub-national fiscal reforms and debt management - Indian experience · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidencePartly checkableForecastbased on dataambiguity 56/100implied call / likelihood: No · 40% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2010Due - being checkedfiscal
If some fiscally weak States were unable to raise funds from the market, the Centre could borrow for the purpose of on-lending to such States, but the interest rates should remain aligned to the marginal cost of borrowing for the Centre.
Reserve Bank of India · said 29 Apr 2009 (date) · Sub-national fiscal reforms and debt management - Indian experience · evidence & why
εἰκασία · ConjecturePartly checkableMixed claimeducated guessambiguity 71/100implied call / likelihood: No · 35% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetfiscal
It is our vision that electronic products reach 50% of volume and 95% of value by the end of March 2009.
Reserve Bank of India · said 08 Apr 2008 (date) · Banks' relationship with customers - evolving perspectives · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidencePartly checkableForecastbased on dataambiguity 56/100below the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2009Due - being checked
The economies of the Asian region are emerging as the new engines of growth in the global economy and I am sure in this year's conference many speakers will focus on the theme of the conference.
Reserve Bank of India · said 06 Apr 2007 (date) · Special features of financial sector reforms in India · evidence & why
μαντεία · Inspired knowledgeCan be checkedForecaststated on authorityambiguity 0/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partmeets the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2007Due - being checkedgrowth
Thereafter, the borrowers are expected to approach the rating agencies for getting themselves rated, failing which banks would be constrained to assign 100% risk weight at the minimum for unrated borrowers.
Reserve Bank of India · said 12 May 2006 (date) · Approach to Basel II · evidence & why
Accordingly, it was decided that all scheduled commercial banks in India, both big and small, shall implement the standardised approach for credit risk and the basic indicator approach for operational risk with effect from March 31, 2007.
Reserve Bank of India · said 12 May 2006 (date) · Approach to Basel II · evidence & why
πρόβλεψις · Seeing the signsPartly checkableForecastbased on dataambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partbelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2007Due - being checkedfinance
Commercial banks in India will start implementing Basel II with effect from March 31, 2007 though, as indicated by Governor, a marginal stretching beyond this date cannot be ruled out in view of latest indications of the state of preparedness.
Reserve Bank of India · said 12 May 2006 (date) · Approach to Basel II · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidencePartly checkableForecastbased on dataambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partbelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2007Due - being checkedfinance
We expect it to be ready by early this year.
Reserve Bank of India · said 17 Jan 2005 (date) · Issues in strengthening commercial paper market · evidence & why
μαντεία · Inspired knowledgePartly checkableForecaststated on authorityambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2005Due - being checked

Also said - not checkable as stated (12 newest)

Remarks about the future with no date, figure or likelihood that could be checked. They are kept on the record and shown here, but not scored.

Such capital flows augment growth over the long-run and may help income levels in developing economies converge towards the income levels in advanced economies.
Reserve Bank of India · said 18 Feb 2011 (date) · Approach to capital account management - shifting contours · evidence & why
Second, capital is likely to be attracted towards countries with high productivity growth and higher marginal productivity of capital.
Reserve Bank of India · said 18 Feb 2011 (date) · Approach to capital account management - shifting contours · evidence & why
Growth in bank lending, after the rebound since the crisis lows, is expected to slow down.
Reserve Bank of India · said 18 Feb 2011 (date) · Approach to capital account management - shifting contours · evidence & why
εἰκασία · ConjecturePartly checkableSpeculationeducated guessambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardgrowthfinance
-  Offshore markets for the domestic currency ( e.g. , NDF markets) proved to be an important source of speculation and in some instances control measures could not succeed.
Reserve Bank of India · said 18 Feb 2011 (date) · Approach to capital account management - shifting contours · evidence & why
It does raise certain issues particularly regarding the nature of operations of banks as well as corporates having cross-border presence which may need to be looked into.
Reserve Bank of India · said 18 Feb 2011 (date) · Approach to capital account management - shifting contours · evidence & why
εἰκασία · ConjectureToo vague to checkSpeculationeducated guessambiguity 71/100implied call / likelihood: No · 40% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardfinancemigration
It is argued that rupee invoicing may be a preferred option to help domestic exporters and importers to deal with currency volatility.
Reserve Bank of India · said 18 Feb 2011 (date) · Approach to capital account management - shifting contours · evidence & why
This aspect may have to be considered in framing leverage requirements for banks.
Reserve Bank of India · said 08 Jan 2011 (date) · Centrality of banks in the financial system · evidence & why
For the market discipline to work, increased, granular disclosures of fee based income may have to be looked into.
Reserve Bank of India · said 08 Jan 2011 (date) · Centrality of banks in the financial system · evidence & why
The regulators will need to modulate the risk weights applicable to the external ratings dynamically as per their assessment of systemic risk.
Reserve Bank of India · said 08 Jan 2011 (date) · Centrality of banks in the financial system · evidence & why
A slightest problem with these banks and the entire financial system could come unstuck - this is what precisely happened during the crisis.
Reserve Bank of India · said 08 Jan 2011 (date) · Centrality of banks in the financial system · evidence & why
In the process of providing leverage, banks themselves can become highly leveraged which may result in systemic risk for markets.
Reserve Bank of India · said 08 Jan 2011 (date) · Centrality of banks in the financial system · evidence & why
The Act contains a diluted version of the original Volcker proposal, which will restrict banks' proprietary trading 1 , impose additional capital requirements on shadow banks engaged in proprietary trading, and restrict banks' ownership stakes in hedge funds and private equity funds.
Reserve Bank of India · said 08 Jan 2011 (date) · Centrality of banks in the financial system · evidence & why