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THE ORACLE HUNTERS • EVERY PROPHECY ON THE RECORD 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Oracle HuntersEvery prophecy, on the record. · Οἱ Κυνηγοὶ τῶν ΧρησμῶνUnder development

← Tracking the Prophets

Shinichi Uchida

Bank of Japan

Track record: No forecast checked yet (16 not due, 14 being checked).
30forecasts & commitments on the record
87%can be checked as stated
35average ambiguity (0-100)
0goalpost moves recorded
0confirmed U-turns

Timeline

20232023: Not due yet2023: Due - being checked2023: Due - being checked2023: Due - being checked2023: Due - being checked2023: Due - being checked20242024: Not due yet2024: Not due yet2024: Due - being checked2024: Due - being checked2024: Due - being checked2024: Due - being checked2024: Not due yet2024: Not due yet (+4 more)20252025: Not due yet2025: Not due yet2025: Not due yet2025: Not due yet2025: Not due yet2025: Not due yet2025: Not due yet2025: Not due yet (+4 more)
came true partly did not not due / being checked / too vague

Calibration score: shown after 10 checked forecasts with a stated likelihood (now 0).
How they speak about the future: based on data 26, stated on authority 3, educated guess 1.
Kinds of claim: forecast 26, mixed claim 3, commitment 1. · Download this report card as a picture

In the nine words

πρόγνωσιςInference from evidence25 · 83%μαντείαInspired knowledge3 · 10%εἰκασίαConjecture1 · 3%προαναγγελίαPublic pre-announcement1 · 3%
How to read this Each box is one sentence a public figure or institution said about the future, word for word, with a link to the official text. Can be checked means it names what will happen, by when, and how likely - so it can be compared with official figures later. Too vague to check means it does not. Ambiguity (0-100) is how many different ways the sentence can be read. When the date passes, the forecast is compared with official data and marked came true, partly or did not come true. Labels judge the sentence, never the person. Full guide and glossary.

On the record (30)

The Bank will conduct an interim assessment of the plan at the June 2026 MPM.
Bank of Japan · said 23 Jul 2025 (date) · Japan's economy and monetary policy · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidencePartly checkableForecastbased on dataambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partbelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2026Not due yetfinance
- Until January-March 2026 : about 400 billion yen (the reduction plan decided in July 2024 will be maintained)
Bank of Japan · said 23 Jul 2025 (date) · Japan's economy and monetary policy · evidence & why
That is to say, if an exceptional case, such as a rapid rise in long-term interest rates, should take place, the Bank will make nimble responses by, for example, increasing the amount of JGB purchases.
Bank of Japan · said 23 Jul 2025 (date) · Japan's economy and monetary policy · evidence & why
εἰκασία · ConjecturePartly checkableMixed claimeducated guessambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partbelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetinterest ratesfinance
As a result, flow-based monthly purchases in January-March 2027 will be about 2 trillion yen, which is equivalent to about one-third of monthly purchases before the start of reductions.
Bank of Japan · said 23 Jul 2025 (date) · Japan's economy and monetary policy · evidence & why
items less fresh food) could fall below 2 percent at some point through fiscal 2026.
Bank of Japan · said 23 Jul 2025 (date) · Japan's economy and monetary policy · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedForecastbased on dataambiguity 56/100implied call / likelihood: No · 35% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2026Not due yetfiscal
The Bank expects to achieve the price stability target of 2 percent sometime during the second half of the projection period of its latest Outlook for Economic Activity and Prices -- namely, the period from the second half of fiscal 2026 through fiscal 2027.
Bank of Japan · said 23 Jul 2025 (date) · Japan's economy and monetary policy · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedForecastbased on dataambiguity 0/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablemeets the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2026Not due yetinflationgrowthfiscalfinance
It is true that when interest rates are already close to zero, lowering them further will not make firms want to invest, and only around 30 percent of the policy effect was transmitted through the lending channel.
Bank of Japan · said 05 Mar 2025 (date) · Japan's economy and monetary policy · evidence & why
In other words, the Bank expects that the year-on-year rate of increase in the CPI will decline toward 2 percent as the effects of the cost-push wane, while underlying inflation will rise toward 2 percent, accompanied by wage increases.
Bank of Japan · said 05 Mar 2025 (date) · Japan's economy and monetary policy · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidencePartly checkableForecastbased on dataambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetinflationlabourfinance
In this regard, the key point of the outlook is that the Bank expects the 2 percent price stability target to be achieved.
Bank of Japan · said 05 Mar 2025 (date) · Japan's economy and monetary policy · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidencePartly checkableForecastbased on dataambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetinflationfinance
The answer is that (1) the current price rises still reflect the cost-push caused by global inflation, and this will eventually wane, and that (2) underlying inflation, where prices rise accompanied by wage increases, has not yet reached 2 percent.
Bank of Japan · said 05 Mar 2025 (date) · Japan's economy and monetary policy · evidence & why
As a result, both actual inflation and underlying inflation are expected to be at around 2 percent in the second half of the projection period of the January Outlook Report (sometime during the period from the second half of fiscal 2025 to fiscal 2026).
Bank of Japan · said 05 Mar 2025 (date) · Japan's economy and monetary policy · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedForecastbased on dataambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2025Due - being checkedinflationfiscal
It is likely to be in the range of 2.5-3.0 percent for fiscal 2024, at around 2.5 percent for fiscal 2025, and at around 2 percent for fiscal 2026.
Bank of Japan · said 05 Mar 2025 (date) · Japan's economy and monetary policy · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedForecastbased on dataambiguity 56/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2026Not due yetfiscal
As shown by the left-hand graph, actual inflation has been above 2 percent for more than two years and is projected to continue doing so for fiscal 2024.
Bank of Japan · said 07 Aug 2024 (date) · Japan's economy and monetary policy · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidencePartly checkableForecastbased on dataambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetinflationfiscal
However, at the pace decided at the July MPM, I believe that the reduction of the amount of JGBs purchases will not change significantly the effects of monetary easing, as the reduction in the Bank's JGB holdings will be limited to roughly 7-8 percent over 18 months.
Bank of Japan · said 07 Aug 2024 (date) · Japan's economy and monetary policy · evidence & why
Various survey results indicate that this year's summer bonus payments are likely to exceed those of last year.
Bank of Japan · said 07 Aug 2024 (date) · Japan's economy and monetary policy · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidencePartly checkableForecastbased on dataambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2024Due - being checked
The Bank will conduct an interim assessment of the plan at the June 2025 MPM .
Bank of Japan · said 07 Aug 2024 (date) · Japan's economy and monetary policy · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidencePartly checkableForecastbased on dataambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partbelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2025Due - being checkedfinance
As for the outlook, the year-on-year rate of increase in the CPI for all items excluding fresh food is likely to be 2.5 percent for fiscal 2024 and thereafter is projected to remain at around 2 percent for fiscal 2025 and 2026.
Bank of Japan · said 07 Aug 2024 (date) · Japan's economy and monetary policy · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedForecastbased on dataambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2025Due - being checkedinflationfiscal
As the left-hand graph shows, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) projects that the global economy will grow at 3.2 percent for 2024 and 3.3 percent for 2025, which is broadly in line with past average growth rates.
Bank of Japan · said 07 Aug 2024 (date) · Japan's economy and monetary policy · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedForecastbased on dataambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partbelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2025Due - being checkedgrowth
In this situation, business fixed investment plans indicate that the year-on-year rate of increase in investment will be 12 percent for fiscal 2023, mainly led by investment to address labor shortages, that related to decarbonization, and digital-related investment.
Bank of Japan · said 08 Feb 2024 (date) · Japan's economy and monetary policy · evidence & why
On this basis, if sustainable and stable achievement of the 2 percent target comes in sight, the large-scale monetary easing will have fulfilled its role and the Bank will explore whether it should be revised.
Bank of Japan · said 08 Feb 2024 (date) · Japan's economy and monetary policy · evidence & why
In the outlook I described earlier, it is expected that the year-on-year rates of increase in the CPI both for all items less fresh food and for all items less fresh food and energy will be at around 2 percent through fiscal 2025.
Bank of Japan · said 08 Feb 2024 (date) · Japan's economy and monetary policy · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedForecastbased on dataambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2025Due - being checkedinflationfiscalenergy
With such a switching of the main driving force, the year-on-year rate of change in the CPI for all items less fresh food is likely to be 2.8 percent for fiscal 2023 and thereafter is projected to be at around 2 percent; specifically, 2.4 percent for fiscal 2024 and 1.8 percent for fiscal 2025.
Bank of Japan · said 08 Feb 2024 (date) · Japan's economy and monetary policy · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedForecastbased on dataambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2025Due - being checkedinflationfiscal
Through fiscal 2025, underlying inflation is likely to increase gradually toward 2 percent, supported by a virtuous cycle between wages and prices.
Bank of Japan · said 08 Feb 2024 (date) · Japan's economy and monetary policy · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedForecastbased on dataambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2025Due - being checkedinflationlabourfiscal
It is expected to grow at a pace above its potential growth rate, with the projected growth rates being at 1.8 percent for fiscal 2023, 1.2 percent for fiscal 2024, and 1.0 percent for fiscal 2025.
Bank of Japan · said 08 Feb 2024 (date) · Japan's economy and monetary policy · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedForecastbased on dataambiguity 0/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablemeets the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2025Due - being checkedgrowthfiscal
Specifically, the Bank will continue to allow 10-year JGB yields to fluctuate in the range of around plus and minus 0.5 percentage points from the target level while regarding the upper and lower bounds of the range as references, not as rigid limits, in its market operations.
Bank of Japan · said 02 Aug 2023 (date) · Japan's economy and monetary policy · evidence & why
On the other hand, one highly plausible explanation regarding corporate strategies is that firms may have started to consider setting prices in view of potential future wage hikes, mainly on the back of higher-than-expected results of this year's annual spring labor-management wage negotiations and a rise in hourly wages of part-time workers.
Bank of Japan · said 02 Aug 2023 (date) · Japan's economy and monetary policy · evidence & why
μαντεία · Inspired knowledgeCan be checkedForecaststated on authorityambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2023Due - being checkedinflationlabour
My assessment is that the basic structure of the labor market will be unchanged next year and beyond.
Bank of Japan · said 02 Aug 2023 (date) · Japan's economy and monetary policy · evidence & why
μαντεία · Inspired knowledgeCan be checkedForecaststated on authorityambiguity 0/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partmeets the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2024Due - being checkedlabour
Therefore, the Bank needs to patiently continue with monetary easing in the current phase and support Japan's economy so that wages continue to rise steadily next year.
Bank of Japan · said 02 Aug 2023 (date) · Japan's economy and monetary policy · evidence & why
μαντεία · Inspired knowledgePartly checkableMixed claimstated on authorityambiguity 36/100below the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2024Due - being checkedlabourfinance
In the Outlook Report, the year-on-year rate of change in the CPI is projected to be 2.5 percent for fiscal 2023, 1.9 percent for fiscal 2024, and 1.6 percent for fiscal 2025 (Chart 8).
Bank of Japan · said 02 Aug 2023 (date) · Japan's economy and monetary policy · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedForecastbased on dataambiguity 0/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablemeets the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2024Due - being checkedinflationfiscal
In the Bank's Outlook for Economic Activity and Prices (Outlook Report) released last week, it is projected that the economic growth rates will be in the range of 1.0-1.5 percent for fiscal 2023 and 2024 and around 1 percent for fiscal 2025 (Chart 1).
Bank of Japan · said 02 Aug 2023 (date) · Japan's economy and monetary policy · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedForecastbased on dataambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2024Due - being checkedinflationgrowthfiscalfinance

Also said - not checkable as stated (6 newest)

Remarks about the future with no date, figure or likelihood that could be checked. They are kept on the record and shown here, but not scored.

If the structural changes in the labor market continue, companies will have to build business models that generate enough profits and wages to keep and attract employees.
Bank of Japan · said 27 May 2024 (date) · Price dynamics in Japan over the past 25 years · evidence & why
In this speech, I will try to give an answer to this important question, which has implications for the future course of our monetary policy as well as Japan's economy.
Bank of Japan · said 27 May 2024 (date) · Price dynamics in Japan over the past 25 years · evidence & why
εἰκασία · ConjectureToo vague to checkSpeculationeducated guessambiguity 56/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partbelow the RIM-1 standardinterest ratestrade
## Decline in Actual and Expected Inflation
Bank of Japan · said 27 May 2024 (date) · Price dynamics in Japan over the past 25 years · evidence & why
Actual and expected inflation declined in the 1990s, stayed low in the 2000s, and then rose somewhat after 2013 (Chart 8).
Bank of Japan · said 27 May 2024 (date) · Price dynamics in Japan over the past 25 years · evidence & why
The growth trend and 𝑟𝑟 ∗ declined, and the Bank of Japan's monetary policy, which was mostly conventional at that time and faced with the zero lower bound constraint, could not sufficiently stimulate demand.
Bank of Japan · said 27 May 2024 (date) · Price dynamics in Japan over the past 25 years · evidence & why
εἰκασία · ConjecturePartly checkableSpeculationeducated guessambiguity 56/100implied call / likelihood: No · 35% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardinterest ratesgrowthfinance
All in all, our monetary policy did not have enough power to lift up the actual and expected
Bank of Japan · said 27 May 2024 (date) · Price dynamics in Japan over the past 25 years · evidence & why
εἰκασία · ConjectureToo vague to checkSpeculationeducated guessambiguity 56/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardinterest rates