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THE ORACLE HUNTERS • EVERY PROPHECY ON THE RECORD 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Oracle HuntersEvery prophecy, on the record. · Οἱ Κυνηγοὶ τῶν ΧρησμῶνUnder development

← Tracking the Prophets

Sayuri Shirai

Bank of Japan

Track record: 1 forecast checked: 0 came true, 0 partly, 1 did not.
121forecasts & commitments on the record
92%can be checked as stated
34average ambiguity (0-100)
0goalpost moves recorded
0confirmed U-turns

Timeline

20112011: Due - being checked2011: Not due yet2011: Not due yet2011: Not due yet2011: Due - being checked2011: Due - being checked20122012: Did not come true2012: Due - being checked2012: Not due yet2012: Due - being checked2012: Due - being checked2012: Due - being checked2012: Not due yet2012: Not due yet (+16 more)20132013: Due - being checked2013: Due - being checked2013: Due - being checked2013: Due - being checked2013: Due - being checked2013: Due - being checked2013: Due - being checked2013: Due - being checked (+21 more)20142014: Due - being checked2014: Due - being checked2014: Due - being checked2014: Due - being checked2014: Due - being checked2014: Due - being checked2014: Not due yet2014: Not due yet (+24 more)20152015: Due - being checked2015: Due - being checked2015: Due - being checked2015: Due - being checked2015: Due - being checked2015: Due - being checked2015: Not due yet2015: Not due yet (+22 more)
came true partly did not not due / being checked / too vague

Calibration score: shown after 10 checked forecasts with a stated likelihood (now 1).
How they speak about the future: based on data 116, educated guess 3, stated on authority 2.
Kinds of claim: forecast 103, mixed claim 14, scenario (if… then) 3, commitment 1. · Download this report card as a picture

In the nine words

πρόγνωσιςInference from evidence114 · 94%πρόνοιαPreparing for the future3 · 2%μαντείαInspired knowledge2 · 2%πρόβλεψιςSeeing the signs1 · 1%προαναγγελίαPublic pre-announcement1 · 1%
How to read this Each box is one sentence a public figure or institution said about the future, word for word, with a link to the official text. Can be checked means it names what will happen, by when, and how likely - so it can be compared with official figures later. Too vague to check means it does not. Ambiguity (0-100) is how many different ways the sentence can be read. When the date passes, the forecast is compared with official data and marked came true, partly or did not come true. Labels judge the sentence, never the person. Full guide and glossary.

Checked

With the PSI and additional international financial assistance, Greece's general government debt ratio is expected to decline to below 120 percent of GDP by 2020.
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedForecastbased on dataambiguity 0/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablemeets the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2020Did not come truegrowthfiscal
Did not come true. Said: government debt below 120% of GDP in 2020. Official figure for Greece: 209.4% of GDP (Eurostat - government deficit and debt). Missed. Off by 89.4 points. official data · checked 17 Nov 2026 · automatic check against official data (rules v4)

On the record (121)

In fiscal 2017, the rate of economic growth is likely to decelerate significantly mainly due to the effects of the planned consumption tax hike and cyclical deceleration in business fixed investment - but is still likely to remain positive (Chart 1).
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedForecastbased on dataambiguity 0/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablemeets the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2017Due - being checkedgrowthfiscal
In the Bank's baseline scenario of the outlook for economic activity, the projected growth rate for fiscal 2015 was revised considerably downward while the projections for fiscal 2016 and 2017 were more or less unchanged, compared with those in the July 2015 interim assessment.
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedForecastbased on dataambiguity 0/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablemeets the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2016Due - being checkedgrowthfiscalfinance
However, given that it assessed that risks to prices are skewed to the downside, it may be appropriate for the Bank to use an expression that allows for a wider time span to reach around 2 percent, such as 'from around the second half of fiscal 2016 to around the first half of fiscal 2017' - instead of 'around the …
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedForecastbased on dataambiguity 71/100implied call / likelihood: No · 40% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2016Due - being checkedinflationfiscalfinance
My outlook for fiscal 2017 as a whole is that the average rate of core CPI inflation will decline somewhat and reach around a little over 1.5 percent - slightly below my July assessment - mainly due to the effects of the decline in demand following the frontloaded increase and a decline in real income.
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedForecastbased on dataambiguity 56/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partbelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2017Due - being checkedinflationfiscal
Currently, my projection is that the rate of increase in the core CPI is likely to rise closer to around 2 percent 'from the end of fiscal 2016 to early fiscal 2017' - a delay of about a quarter from my previous projection of 'toward the end of fiscal 2016.' Let me explain my outlook in some detail.
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedForecastbased on dataambiguity 56/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2016Due - being checkedinflationfiscal
Although the timing of reaching around 2 percent depends on developments in crude oil prices, this is projected to happen around the second half of fiscal 2016, assuming that crude oil prices will rise moderately from the recent
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedForecastbased on dataambiguity 71/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2016Due - being checkedinflationfiscalenergy
In detail, looking at the percentage share of the number of respondents, 60 percent of firms answered 'around 0 percent,' reaching about 80 percent if those that answered 'will decline' and 'don't know' are included.
If so, it will be important for the BOJ to promote public understanding that its objective is to achieve a moderate price rise associated with a wage hike and a sustainable increase in household spending, to improve households' tolerance to price rises.
πρόνοια · Preparing for the futurePartly checkableScenario (if… then)educated guessambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partbelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetlabourtrade
We can do so by paying attention to expected price DI (one year ahead in Japan and over the next year in the United States) and corresponding expected income DI .
μαντεία · Inspired knowledgePartly checkableForecaststated on authorityambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2016Due - being checked
Under the presence of such a bias, households in Japan may perceive that a rate of actual inflation is much higher than 2 percent in the process of approaching the 2 percent price stability target, and regard such a price rise as unacceptable.
At that time, until around 1983 economic recession caused a continuous decline in households' expected income DI over the next year.
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedForecastbased on dataambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2016Due - being checkedgrowth
Moreover, in the United States, the year-on-year rate of change in (household) expected income over the next year (median) has started to improve since around 2013 and since early 2015 has risen to around 1.5 percent - after having dropped from around 2.5 percent before the global financial crisis to a low of around 0.5 percent in 2009-2012 (Chart 6).
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidencePartly checkableForecastbased on dataambiguity 83/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2016Due - being checked
Once the rising trend of the core CPI becomes stable, inflation expectations are projected to rise gradually toward around 2 percent.
Banks may be unable to pass the increased cost (caused by the negative interest rate) on their retail depositors by lowering the deposit interest rate (which, at around 0 percent, is already low).
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidencePartly checkableForecastbased on dataambiguity 71/100implied call / likelihood: No · 40% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetinterest ratesfinance
Forward guidance is expressed mainly according to the following outcomebased statement: The Bank will continue with QQE, aiming to achieve the price stability target of 2 percent, as long as it is necessary for maintaining that target in a stable manner.
The BOJ projects that the rate of change in the core CPI will begin to rise from the second half of fiscal 2015.
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedForecastbased on dataambiguity 0/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partmeets the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2015Due - being checkedinflationfiscal
After a temporary deterioration projected for the April-June quarter, the output gap is expected to gradually improve in positive territory from the July-September quarter this year and increase its upward pressure on prices.
μαντεία · Inspired knowledgeCan be checkedForecaststated on authorityambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2015Due - being checkedinflationgrowth
The ECB also adopted forward guidance in March 2015 to signal its future stance over combined monthly asset purchases of about 60 billion euros with the following remark: 'Intended to be carried out until the end of September 2016 and will, in any case, be conducted until we see
πρόβλεψις · Seeing the signsPartly checkableForecastbased on dataambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partbelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2016Due - being checked
My outlook for real GDP growth is in the range of around 1.5-2.0 percent for fiscal 2015, around 1.5 percent for fiscal 2016, and slightly above 0 percent for fiscal 2017.
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidencePartly checkableForecastbased on dataambiguity 71/100below the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2016Due - being checkedgrowthfiscal
In fiscal 2017, the pace of economic growth is likely to decline to around a level below the potential growth rate - mainly due to the effects of the planned next consumption tax hike and cyclical deceleration - although the positive rate of growth is still likely to be maintained.
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedForecastbased on dataambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2017Due - being checkedgrowthfiscal
According to the Bank's baseline scenario of the outlook for economic activity , Japan's economy is likely to continue growing at a pace above its potential growth rate from fiscal 2015 through fiscal 2016 (Chart 2-2).
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedForecastbased on dataambiguity 0/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablemeets the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2016Due - being checkedgrowthfiscalfinance
My outlook for fiscal 2016 is that the average rate of CPI inflation will reach around 1.5 percent and thus be lower than the median.
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedForecastbased on dataambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partbelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2016Due - being checkedinflationfiscal
Regarding my outlook for prices, although the mechanism of price increase is the same with the Bank's baseline scenario, I project that the rate of increase in the CPI is likely to rise closer to around 2 percent toward the end of fiscal 2016; thereafter, it will remain somewhat lower than 2 percent in fiscal 2017.
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedForecastbased on dataambiguity 56/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2016Due - being checkedinflationfiscalfinance
The rate of increase is projected to accelerate from around the second half of fiscal 2015 and reach about 2 percent around the first half of fiscal 2016 (Chart 2-2).
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedForecastbased on dataambiguity 56/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2016Due - being checkedfiscal
Therefore, it is essential for the Bank to boost the effectiveness of its communication strategy by explaining more clearly why it aims to achieve the 2 percent target and how this will improve people's lives in the medium to long term.
The forecast for fiscal 2016 thus remains largely unchanged with the rate of increase in the core CPI exceeding 2 percent.
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedForecastbased on dataambiguity 0/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablemeets the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2016Due - being checkedinflationfiscal
It is expected that these forces will generate sufficient upward pressures on prices such that the rate of inflation will accelerate to around 2 percent by the end of fiscal 2015.
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedForecastbased on dataambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2015Due - being checkedinflationfiscal
Subsequently, the rate of inflation is projected to accelerate sharply from around the second half of fiscal 2015 and approach close to around 2 percent by the end of the fiscal year for several reasons.
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedForecastbased on dataambiguity 56/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2015Due - being checkedinflationfiscal
I project that the potential growth rate will rise gradually toward somewhat below 1 percent by the end of fiscal 2016.
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedForecastbased on dataambiguity 56/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partbelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2016Due - being checkedgrowthfiscal
forecast on economic growth for fiscal 2016 was also revised upward to 1.6 percent, partly because of a shift of the front-loaded increase in spending from fiscal 2015 to fiscal 2016 as a result of the postponement of the second round of the tax hike.
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedForecastbased on dataambiguity 0/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablemeets the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2016Due - being checkedgrowthfiscal
Alternatively, since I personally viewed that the 2 percent target would likely be reached by fiscal 2016, another possibility would be a greater focus on the continuation of monetary easing until around then, with potential modification of the composition of asset purchases.
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedForecastbased on dataambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2016Due - being checkedfiscal
This time-line seemed appropriate, since the doubling of the monetary base - as clearly stipulated in the Bank's public statement released on April 4, 2013 - was expected to be achieved only by around April 2015 under the annual pace of increase of about 60-70 trillion yen.
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedForecastbased on dataambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2015Due - being checkedfinance
And as my outlook for prices, I have stated that the rate of CPI inflation will rise closer to 2 percent toward the end of fiscal 2015 .
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedForecastbased on dataambiguity 0/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partmeets the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2015Due - being checkedinflationfiscal
As a result of the revision, the rate of inflation will likely remain more or less at around 1 percent for the time being, then start to pick up gradually toward the first half of fiscal 2015 - suggesting some delay in the timing of a pick-up in inflation.
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedForecastbased on dataambiguity 71/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2015Due - being checkedinflationfiscal
In other words, after achieving inflation of around 2 percent in or around fiscal 2015, Japan's economy is projected to shift to a growth path that sustains such inflation in a stable manner .
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedForecastbased on dataambiguity 56/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2015Due - being checkedinflationgrowthfiscal
According to the Bank's baseline scenario of the outlook for prices , the year-on-year rate of increase in the CPI (excluding the direct effects of the consumption tax hikes) is likely to be at around the current level for the time being, and subsequently accelerate gradually and reach around 2 percent around the middle of the projection period; that is, …
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedForecastbased on dataambiguity 71/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2015Due - being checkedinflationfiscalfinance
Similarly, Australia's inflation target range of 2-3 percent is also defined as a medium-term average .
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidencePartly checkableForecastbased on dataambiguity 56/100below the RIM-1 standardNot due yetinflation
Consequently, New Zealand decided to increase flexibility over time by allowing a deviation from the inflation target range of 1-3 percent and meeting the target range on average over the medium term .
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidencePartly checkableForecastbased on dataambiguity 71/100below the RIM-1 standardNot due yetinflation
The inflation target range in the Philippines is set at 4 percent ±1 percentage point for 2011-2014 and at 3 percent ±1 percentage point for 2015-2016 under a medium-term inflation-target setting system adopted in 2010 (prior to that, it set an inflation target annually).
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidencePartly checkableForecastbased on dataambiguity 36/100below the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2015Due - being checkedinflation
At the same time, an economic growth rate exceeding the potential growth rate will expand the output gap into the positive territory, mainly in fiscal 2014 and fiscal 2015.
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedForecastbased on dataambiguity 0/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partmeets the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2015Due - being checkedgrowthfiscal
My aforementioned outlook for economic activity and prices assumes that quantitative and qualitative monetary easing (QQE) will continue during and beyond 2015 under the current framework.
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedForecastbased on dataambiguity 0/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partmeets the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2015Due - being checkedinflationgrowth
Regarding the latter, the median of the Policy Board members' forecasts of the inflation rate is 1.9 percent for fiscal 2015 and 2.1 percent for fiscal 2016; so the projected year of achieving '2 percent' is fiscal 2016.
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedForecastbased on dataambiguity 0/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablemeets the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2015Due - being checkedinflationfiscal
My outlook for the period during and beyond fiscal 2015 is that the year-on-year rate of increase in the CPI will reach an average of approximately 1½ percent or a little higher in fiscal 2015, and the inflation rate of 2 percent is likely to be reached toward the end of the projection period .
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedForecastbased on dataambiguity 0/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablemeets the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2015Due - being checkedinflationfiscal
Regarding my own outlook for prices for fiscal 2014 , I project that the year-on-year rate of increase in the CPI may somewhat decelerate by this summer owing to the declining impact of energy prices and the base effect from fiscal 2013, although it should remain at above 1 percent.
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidencePartly checkableMixed claimbased on dataambiguity 71/100implied call / likelihood: No · 40% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetinflationfiscalenergy
However, with the projection period extended to fiscal 2016, I considered that the description of the price outlook should clarify the timing when the Bank's 'price stability target of 2 percent' will be achieved, rather than providing an expression - namely, 'around 2 percent' - that contains a degree of latitude. 2
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedMixed claimbased on dataambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partbelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2016Due - being checkedinflationfiscalfinance
As mentioned earlier, according to the Bank's baseline scenario, the core CPI inflation ( excluding the direct effects of the consumption tax hikes) is projected to reach around 2 percent toward the latter half of the projection period of fiscal 2013-15.
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidencePartly checkableForecastbased on dataambiguity 56/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetinflationfiscalfinance
Based on the framework I have described, the Bank holds the baseline scenario that core CPI inflation (CPI for all items less fresh food; excluding the direct effects of the consumption tax hikes) is expected to reach around 2 percent toward the latter half of the projection period of fiscal 2013-15. 4
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidencePartly checkableForecastbased on dataambiguity 56/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetinflationfiscalfinance
As shown in Chart 9, the median of the Policy Board members' forecasts is 0.7 percent for fiscal 2013, 1.3 percent for fiscal 2014 (3.3 percent including the effects of the tax hike), and 1.9 percent for fiscal 2015 (2.6 percent including the effects of the tax hike). 7
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidencePartly checkableForecastbased on dataambiguity 36/100below the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2015Due - being checkedfiscal
The Bank will continue with QQE, aiming to achieve the 2% target, as long as necessary for maintainingitin a stable manner (based on examining risks to economic activity and prices).
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidencePartly checkableMixed claimbased on dataambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partbelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetinflationgrowthfinance
This is particularly important given that a consumption tax hike is scheduled in April this year, and the inflation rate may temporarily exceed 2 percent, together with the effects of monetary easing.
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedForecastbased on dataambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: No · 40% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2014Due - being checkedinflationfiscaltrade

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Remarks about the future with no date, figure or likelihood that could be checked. They are kept on the record and shown here, but not scored.

Indonesia's preference for a stable exchange rate may reflect the need to stabilize the prices of imported and exported commodities, as well as to preserve the value of foreign debt denominated in the U.S. dollar.
πρόνοια · Preparing for the futurePartly checkableCall for actionstated on authorityambiguity 56/100implied call / likelihood: No · 40% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardinflationfiscaltrade
In East Asia, South Korea set its inflation target range for 2013-2015 at 2.5-3.5 percent under a medium-term inflation-target setting system adopted in 2004 (prior to that, it set an inflation target annually).
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceToo vague to checkForecastbased on dataambiguity 56/100below the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2015inflation
Namely, monetary policy should be conducted flexibly with the aim of achieving the inflation target by taking into account various possible disturbances and their impacts on economic growth.
πρόνοια · Preparing for the futurePartly checkableCall for actionstated on authorityambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: No · 35% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardinflationinterest ratesgrowth
However, if such an intention is not well received, the Bank may need to seek better communication strategies.
Bank of Japan · said 12 Jan 2013 (date) · Japan's monetary policy in a challenging environment · evidence & why
However, it is increasingly recognized that the very accommodative monetary policy has not promoted active lending activities that would stimulate domestic demand (such as investment and consumption) as much as had been expected (Chart 3).
εἰκασία · ConjectureToo vague to checkSpeculationbased on dataambiguity 56/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardinterest rates
All these data point to the fact that the transmission mechanism of monetary policy to the real economy may have been hampered by the severe distortions prevailing in the sovereign bond markets which are largely caused by the fear premium.
εἰκασία · ConjectureToo vague to checkSpeculationbased on dataambiguity 71/100implied call / likelihood: No · 40% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardinterest rates
made clear that monetary policy could contribute to narrowing the output gaps and preventing disinflation.
εἰκασία · ConjectureToo vague to checkSpeculationeducated guessambiguity 71/100implied call / likelihood: No · 35% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardinflationgrowth
Here, the IMF could play an important role as a third party in the process.
Then, the issues of the longstanding output gap and mild deflation, which are partially influenced by demographic changes, will be discussed in Part IV together with monetary policy management.
εἰκασία · ConjectureToo vague to checkSpeculationeducated guessambiguity 56/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partbelow the RIM-1 standardinterest ratesgrowth
This could be the consequence of such factors as medical advancements, higher living standards, universal public health insurance, and elderly care systems.