Roger W Ferguson
Central bank (via BIS)
Track record: No forecast checked yet (59 not due, 69 being checked).
128forecasts & commitments on the record
48%can be checked as stated
43average ambiguity (0-100)
0goalpost moves recorded
0confirmed U-turns
Timeline
came true partly did not not due / being checked / too vague
Calibration score: shown after 10 checked forecasts with a stated likelihood (now 0).
How they speak about the future: based on data 91, educated guess 21, stated on authority 16.
Kinds of claim: forecast 83, scenario (if… then) 21, mixed claim 20, commitment 4. · Download this report card as a picture
In the nine words
πρόγνωσιςInference from evidence78 · 61%πρόνοιαPreparing for the future20 · 16%μαντείαInspired knowledge13 · 10%εἰκασίαConjecture7 · 5%πρόβλεψιςSeeing the signs4 · 3%προαναγγελίαPublic pre-announcement4 · 3%φρόνησιςPractical wisdom2 · 2%
How to read this
Each box is one sentence a public figure or institution said about the future, word for word, with a link to the official text. Can be checked means it names what will happen, by when, and how likely - so it can be compared with official figures later. Too vague to check means it does not. Ambiguity (0-100) is how many different ways the sentence can be read. When the date passes, the forecast is compared with official data and marked came true, partly or did not come true. Labels judge the sentence, never the person. Full guide and glossary.On the record (128)
Given the considerable uncertainties facing the economy and the outlook for policy, policy decisions in coming months will depend heavily on the implications of incoming economic data for future growth and inflation.
The model suggests the subtraction this year will be about a 1/2 percentage point.
All told, increases in energy prices over the past couple of years probably added about 1/2 percentage point to core inflation in 2005, and the lagged pass-through of past increases in energy prices appears likely to add roughly the same amount this year, provided that energy prices do not rise significantly further.
Conversely, if credibility is lacking and inflation expectations are high, firms will be raising prices, and workers will be demanding large wage increases, making it more costly, in terms of jobs and output, for the central bank to tighten policy sufficiently to achieve low inflation.
Following seminal work by Stanley Fischer, researchers seem to agree that extreme inflation rates, say above 40 percent per year, are associated with reduced economic growth. 8 Such high rates of inflation are often a sign of an economy in or approaching crisis, and once inflation crosses the threshold of 40 percent, inflation is considerably more unstable and likely to …
According to the latest World Economic Outlook from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), consumer price inflation in the advanced economies over the decade beginning in 1997 and ending next year looks set to come in at an average annual rate of less than 2 percent, down from 31/2 percent for the previous ten years.
Given the lags in the inflation process, core PCE inflation rises a bit further relative to baseline next year.
The drag on real GDP growth next year would be comparable to that in 2004.
But, I think that the bulk of the disruptions from the storms will be felt in the second half of this year.
On net, real gross domestic product (GDP) looked likely to accelerate somewhat in the third and fourth quarters from the 3-1/2 percent annual rate registered in the first half of the year.
Consumer energy prices are projected to rise substantially in the second half of this year, and some spillover into the prices of non-energy goods and services looks likely as well.
In 2006, the recovery process is expected to contribute to the growth of real GDP.
(I might add that the correlation with real house prices also holds even if M3 is normalized by prices or gross domestic product.
I should note, however, that just as a decline in the budget deficit is desirable even if it would not substantially reduce the trade deficit, a rise in private saving rates also would be helpful because it would strengthen private balance sheets and provide additional resources for investment and growth.
I will not discuss yet another factor that undoubtedly has contributed to the widening of the deficit - the rise in oil prices but it is worth noting that our oil import bill has risen by about $110 billion, from $68 billion in 1999 to $180 billion in 2004, and most of this increase reflects higher oil prices.
In that case, if the expected productivity boom does not subsequently materialize, asset prices will fall.
But this criticism has faded with better understanding of the structure of the U.S. banking system: More than two-thirds of the assets of U.S. banking organizations are likely to be covered by Basel II, as well as more than 99 percent of the foreign claims held by U.S. banking organizations.
Nearly 95 percent of all small and medium-sized banks have regulatory capital ratios of at least 10 percent, and thus it is likely that their current ratios would essentially meet or surpass proposed requirements under Basel II.
Clearly, if evidence of that hesitancy remains - for example, if the labor market were to remain sluggish - that might be one indication that the return of the equilibrium rate to its longer-run level is likely to be relatively gradual.
However, the outlook for outlays on office buildings, which tend to be correlated with activity and hiring in the business services sectors as well as in the finance and insurance industries, is less upbeat: Office rents have continued to fall, and the vacancy rate, at 15 percent, remains elevated.
The partial-expensing provision, which provides an incentive to invest in new capital goods, will expire at the end of this year.
The evidence that partial expensing is having an effect is not clear-cut, but my view is that capital spending is probably being influenced by the tax law and that its expiration in January will probably damp outlays in the early part of next year.
Shipments of long-lived equipment (which should be more favorably affected than demand for short-lived equipment) have increased more than overall capital spending since the passage of the most recent version of the partial-expensing law - the pattern we would expect to see if businesses were taking advantage of the tax incentive.
In contrast, a recent special question in the Philadelphia Fed's Business Outlook Survey showed that about one-quarter of respondents thought that the tax provision was likely to boost their spending this year.
The impending expiration is probably boosting investment spending in the second half of this year as firms rush to take the tax advantage before it disappears; however, at this point the evidence is not conclusive.
Moreover, the declining share of manufacturing in U.S. employment most likely stems less from import competition than it does from the rapid pace of productivity growth in manufacturing; this growth outpaced the productivity growth of the overall economy by about 1-1/4 percentage points annually from 1973 to 1994 and by 1-1/2 percentage points from 1994 to 2000.
18 This is based on widely cited results from the technology research firm Forrester, which predicts that 3.4 million U.S. service jobs will have been moved offshore by 2015.
In addition, if policymakers are particularly concerned about improbable but highly costly events, they might well wish to consider market stress in their monetary policy deliberations even when the modal forecasts for macroeconomic variables such as inflation and economic growth have not changed much.
For example, recognizing that the central bank will seek to counter adverse demand shocks, investors will anticipate an easing in monetary policy if they observe aggregate demand weakening; in turn, that anticipation would soon be reflected in lower long-term interest rates that would cushion the drop in demand even before a change in policy is made.
And in Asia, a revival of domestic demand could give the authorities confidence that, if they allow capital inflows to strengthen their currencies and narrow their current account surpluses, high rates of economic growth will be maintained.
The consensus in the forecasting community is that GDP growth will not continue at the 6 percent pace posted in the second half of last year.
Using the Kendrick data as a guide and recognizing that the choice of any particular period is somewhat subjective, we take as the first episode of strong productivity growth - or productivity boom, if you will - roughly the period from 1873 to 1890.
But if a bank chooses not to meet this test or not to adopt Basel II, it will remain under the current, unchanged, capital regime.
Nearly 95 percent of U.S. small and medium-sized banks have capital ratios in excess of 10 percent and most likely would not be required to hold more under Basel II.
In addition, any banking organization with consolidated assets of at least $250 billion will similarly be required to adopt Basel II.
Specifically, the argument goes, Basel II will give the largest banks, if not a lower overall capital requirement, then lower capital charges on certain credits with which banks not adopting Basel II will have to compete.
Even if the growth is sufficient to make meaningful progress in reducing the slack in our nation's labor and capital resources, that pool of underutilized resources is large and it will take some time to be worked off completely.
While the consensus forecast for next year calls for a growth rate of 4 percent (on a fourth-quarter-to-fourth-quarter basis), which seems reasonable, a weaker outcome than that is not hard to imagine.
By way of illustration, the pickup in productivity growth from an average of just under 1-1/2 percent from 1973 to 1995 to about 2-3/4 percent from 1995 to 2002, if maintained, suggests that living standards could double in twenty-five years rather than fifty years at the lower rate.
But a concern remains about competitive equity in our proposed scope of application, one that could present some difficult trade-offs if the competitive issue is real and significant.
That is why we anticipate that the U.S. authorities would conduct a Quantitative Impact Study (QIS) in 2004 to supplement the one conducted late last year;
Implementation by the end of 2006 would be desirable, but each bank's plan will be based on a joint assessment by the individual bank and its relevant supervisors of a realistic schedule; for some banks the adoption date may be beyond the end of 2006 because of the complexity of the required changes in systems.
As it stands now, core and opt-in banks will be asked by the fall of 2004 to develop an action plan leading up to final implementation.
On a parallel track, core banks and potential opt-in banks in the United States will be having preliminary discussions with their relevant supervisors in 2003 and 2004 to develop a work plan and schedule.
The twenty or so U.S. banks that we expect to operate in the near future under Basel II - the ten mandatory core banks and the ten banks choosing Basel II account today for 99 percent of U.S. bank foreign assets and two-thirds of total domestic consolidated assets of all U.S. banking organizations.
For example, if a central bank tried to cap a longer-term yield below the prevailing market rate, it would, to be most effective, need to convince market participants that it was committed to keeping the short-term policy interest rate low for an extended period.
A central bank could expand its open market purchases of longer-term government securities, in sizable quantities if necessary, to drive term premiums lower.
Even if debtors can refinance existing loans at zero (or very low) nominal interest rates, a sustained fall in prices will transform what might otherwise be a manageable level of nominal debt accumulated by businesses and households into a rising and potentially debilitating level of real debt and real debt service costs.
If this commitment was not viewed as credible, the central bank's purchases of securities to lower longerterm yields would likely have to be massive, given that the term premium component of longer-term interest rates appears rather insensitive to the outstanding supply of various securities.
We do not intend to require the thousands of other banking organizations in the United States, including U.S. subsidiaries of foreign banks that do not meet the mandatory criteria, to adopt Basel II. 1 Unless they choose to adopt Basel II, they will remain under our current regulatory capital rules, which are based on Basel I.
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Also said - not checkable as stated (12 newest)
Remarks about the future with no date, figure or likelihood that could be checked. They are kept on the record and shown here, but not scored.
If inflation seems contained and the prospects for economic growth are good, then it's unclear why the policymaker should set aside these direct signals in preference for signals from asset prices that may or may not be out of line with their historical relationships to fundamentals--the very fundamentals, I should add, that we look at directly in judging the health …
This development should increase financial stability, because market pricing and the management of credit risk via marketable securities would be expected to promote a more robust system for risk management.
I tend to adopt the more optimistic view, but in any case the central bank will need to maintain its focus on markets as more credit is intermediated through them.
Additionally, in the current conjuncture, some have expressed a concern that an unwinding of global imbalances, should it occur, might be disorderly and associated with financial instability.
We must always ask: Do our potential actions credibly mitigate a risk of inflation or a threat to the real economy?
Prudent central bankers must be forward-looking, searching for developments that might become significant problems under some circumstances.
Of course, we should not want to prevent rapid price changes or changes in investment flows, as such changes may be appropriate as new information about fundamentals emerges.
Although counterparties in wholesale markets should generally be expected to demand and obtain the information they need to evaluate their risks, policymakers can no doubt help establish high standards.
In such cases, policymakers may need to work with markets and their participants, and on occasion regulate them, to achieve the desired outcomes.
However, policymakers should, wherever possible, avoid premature regulation that could stifle innovation.
The entry of those new institutions into new markets can, so long as the institutions prove resilient, increase the availability of funds to borrowers in times of stress and may thus reduce the likelihood of credit crunches.
Market participants estimate how prices and investment flows are likely to behave for new instruments, but their understanding becomes more detailed and more accurate only as behavior under a variety of economic conditions is observed, and the development of that understanding obviously takes time.