Richard H Clarida
Federal Reserve · USA
Track record: No forecast checked yet (68 not due, 40 being checked).
108forecasts & commitments on the record
83%can be checked as stated
46average ambiguity (0-100)
0goalpost moves recorded
0confirmed U-turns
Timeline
came true partly did not not due / being checked / too vague
Calibration score: shown after 10 checked forecasts with a stated likelihood (now 0).
How they speak about the future: based on data 96, stated on authority 10, educated guess 2.
Kinds of claim: forecast 85, mixed claim 19, scenario (if… then) 3, commitment 1. · Download this report card as a picture
In the nine words
πρόγνωσιςInference from evidence93 · 86%μαντείαInspired knowledge9 · 8%πρόνοιαPreparing for the future3 · 3%εἰκασίαConjecture1 · 1%φρόνησιςPractical wisdom1 · 1%προαναγγελίαPublic pre-announcement1 · 1%
How to read this
Each box is one sentence a public figure or institution said about the future, word for word, with a link to the official text. Can be checked means it names what will happen, by when, and how likely - so it can be compared with official figures later. Too vague to check means it does not. Ambiguity (0-100) is how many different ways the sentence can be read. When the date passes, the forecast is compared with official data and marked came true, partly or did not come true. Labels judge the sentence, never the person. Full guide and glossary.On the record (108)
This asymmetry of policy effectiveness caused by the ELB imparts a secular downward bias to inflation that, if not offset, could de-anchor inflation expectations below the central bank's price-stability objectives.
Under these projections, GDP growth steps down from 5.9 percent this year to 3.8 percent in 2022 and further to 2.5 percent and 2 percent in 2023 and 2024, respectively.
That said, under the median projection for GDP growth in the September Summary of Economic projections, the level of real GDP will have returned to its pre pandemic trend growth trajectory by the fourth quarter of 2021, which if realized would represent one of the most rapid such recoveries in 50 years.3
Moreover, my inflation projections for 2023 and 2024, which forecast inflation rates similar to the SEP medians, would by year-end 2022, to me, satisfy the "on track to moderately exceed 2 percent for some time" threshold specified in the statement.
Under the projected SEP path for inflation, core PCE inflation surges to at least 3.7 percent this year before reverting back to 2.3 percent in 2022, 2.2 percent in 2023, and 2.1 percent in 2024.
Not surprisingly, the projected path of above-trend GDP growth in 2021 and 2022 translates into rapid declines in the projected path for the unemployment rate, which is projected to fall to 3.8 percent by the end of 2022 and 3.5 percent by the end of 2023.
However, it must be noted that the course of the economy this year and beyond will depend on the course of this virus.
If so, GDP growth this calendar year could be the fastest since 1983.
As we reaffirmed in September, we continue to expect that it will be appropriate to maintain the current 0 to 1/4 percent target range for the federal funds rate until labor market conditions have reached levels consistent with the Committee's assessment of maximum employment and inflation has risen to 2 percent and is on track to moderately exceed 2 percent …
While no decisions were made, participants generally view that, so long as the recovery remains on track, a gradual tapering of our asset purchases that concludes around the middle of next year may soon be warranted.
Real gross domestic product (GDP) rose at a strong 6.4 percent pace in the first half of the year, and growth is widely expected to continue at a robust, if perhaps somewhat slower, pace in the second half of the year.
But I continue to believe that the underlying rate inflation in the U.S. economy is hovering close to our 2 percent longer-run objective and, thus, that the unwelcome surge in inflation this year, once these relative price adjustments are complete and bottlenecks have unclogged, will in the end prove to be largely transitory.
In our December 2020 FOMC statement, we indicated, and have reaffirmed since then, that we will maintain the pace of Treasury and MBS purchases at $80 billion and $40 billion per month, respectively, until "substantial further progress" has been made toward our maximum-employment and price-stability goals.
Moreover, my inflation projections for 2022 and 2023, which forecast somewhat higher inflation than do the SEP medians, would also, to me, satisfy the "on track to moderately exceed 2 percent for some time" threshold specified in the statement.
Under the projected SEP path for inflation, core PCE inflation surges to at least 3 percent this year before reverting back to 2.1 percent for the next two years.
Not surprisingly, the projected path of robust GDP growth in the SEP translates into rapid declines in the projected SEP path for the unemployment rate, which is projected to fall to 4.5 percent by the end of this year, 3.8 percent by the end of 2022, and 3.5 percent by the end of 2023.
Under the projections, GDP growth does step down to 3.3 percent in 2022 and further to 2.4 percent in 2023, but to a pace that still exceeds the projected pace of long-run trend growth in all three years of the projection window.
Under the "median of modes" outlook in the SEP, GDP growth this year is projected to be 7 percent on a Q4-over-Q4 basis, which, if realized, would represent the fastest four-quarter GDP growth since the 1980s.
We also expect it will be appropriate to maintain the current target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent until labor market conditions have reached levels consistent with the Committee's assessments of maximum employment, until inflation has risen to 2 percent, and until inflation is on track to moderately exceed 2 percent for some time.
Readings on inflation on a year-over-year basis have recently increased and are likely to rise somewhat further before moderating later this year.
With timely support from monetary and fiscal policy—unprecedented in both scale and scope—and the rapid development and deployment of several effective vaccines, the economy stabilized and began a robust recovery in the second half of 2020 that both we and outside forecasters expect to pick up steam this year.
We indicated that we will continue to increase our holdings of Treasury securities by at least $80 billion per month and our holdings of agency mortgage-backed securities by at least $40 billion per month until substantial further progress, measured relative to the December 2020 announcement, has been made toward our maximum-employment and price-stability goals.
However, under my baseline outlook, these one-time increases in prices are likely to have only transitory effects on underlying inflation, and I expect inflation to return to—or perhaps run somewhat above—our 2 percent longer-run goal in 2022 and 2023.
Over the next few months, 12-month measures of inflation are expected to move above our 2 percent longer-run goal, largely reflecting, I believe, transitory factors such as a run of year-over-year comparisons with depressed service-sector prices recorded last spring as well as the emergence of some supply bottlenecks that may limit how quickly production can rebound in certain sectors.
With inflation running persistently below this longer-run goal, the Committee will aim to achieve inflation moderately above 2 percent for some time so that inflation averages 2 percent over time and longer-term inflation expectations remain well anchored at 2 percent.
The FOMC statements starting with September 2020 read: "With inflation running persistently below this longer-run goal, the Committee will aim to achieve inflation moderately above 2 percent for some time so that inflation averages 2 percent over time and longer-term inflation expectations remain well anchored at 2 percent" (paragraph 4).
Indeed, in our September and subsequent FOMC statements, we indicated that we expect it will be appropriate to keep the federal funds rate in the current 0 to 25 basis point target range until inflation has reached 2 percent (on an annual basis) and labor market conditions have reached levels consistent with the Committee's assessment of maximum employment.
Fourth, policy will aim over time to return inflation to its longer-run goal, which remains 2 percent, but not below, once the conditions to commence policy normalization have been met.7
Second, with inflation having run persistently below 2 percent, the Committee will aim to achieve inflation moderately above 2 percent for some time in the service of keeping longer-term inflation expectations well anchored at the 2 percent longer-run goal.5
First, the Committee expects to delay liftoff from the ELB until PCE inflation has risen to 2 percent and other complementary conditions, consistent with achieving this goal on a sustained basis, have also been met.4
In particular, the median FOMC participant now projects the unemployment rate to reach 4.5 percent at the end of this year and 3.5 percent by the end of 2023.
And, as this is a virtual meeting of the IIF, I would be remiss if I did not highlight that if these projections for U.S. economic activity are realized, rising U.S. imports will serve as an important source of external demand to the rest of the world this year and beyond.
We indicated that we will continue to increase our holdings of Treasury securities by at least $80 billion per month and our holdings of agency mortgage-backed securities by at least $40 billion per month until substantial further progress has been made toward our maximum-employment and price-stability goals.
However, I expect most of this increase to be transitory and for inflation to return to—or perhaps run somewhat above—our 2 percent longer-run goal in 2022 and 2023.
Over the next few months, 12-month measures of inflation are expected to move temporarily above our 2 percent longer-run goal, owing to a run of year-over-year comparisons with depressed service-sector prices recorded in the spring of 2020 and supply bottlenecks limiting how quickly production can respond in the near term.
GDP grew by almost 8 percent at an annual rate in the second half of last year, and private forecasters project that GDP will grow roughly 6 percent—and possibly 7 percent—this year.
As announced in the September statement and reiterated in the following statements, with inflation running persistently below 2 percent, our policy will aim to achieve inflation outcomes that keep inflation expectations well anchored at our 2 percent longer-run goal.3 We expect to maintain an accommodative stance of monetary policy until these outcomes—as well as our maximum-employment mandate—are achieved.
And while the economy might not continue to grow at the once-in-a-century 33 percent annualized rate of growth reported in the third quarter of 2020, it is clear that the economy has turned out to be more resilient in adapting to the virus, and more responsive to monetary and fiscal policy support, than many predicted.
Consistent with our new framework, the relevant policy rule benchmark I will consult once the conditions for liftoff have been met is an inertial Taylor-type rule with a coefficient of zero on the unemployment gap, a coefficient of 1.5 on the gap between core PCE inflation and the 2 percent longer-run goal, and a neutral real policy rate equal to …
Fourth, policy will aim over time to return inflation to its longer-run goal, which remains 2 percent, but not below, once the conditions to commence policy normalization have been met.8
Second, with inflation having run persistently below 2 percent, the Committee will aim to achieve inflation moderately above 2 percent for some time in the service of keeping longer-term inflation expectations well anchored at the 2 percent longer-run goal.6
First, the Committee expects to delay liftoff from the ELB until PCE (personal consumption expenditures) inflation has risen to 2 percent and other complementary conditions, consistent with achieving this goal on a sustained basis, have also been met.5
In January 2012, the median FOMC participant projected a long-run r* of 2.25 percent, which, in tandem with the inflation goal of 2 percent, indicated a neutral setting for the federal funds rate of 4.25 percent.
As announced in the September statement and reiterated in November and December, with inflation running persistently below 2 percent, our policy will aim to achieve inflation outcomes that keep inflation expectations well anchored at our 2 percent longer-run goal.3 We expect to maintain an accommodative stance of monetary policy until these outcomes—as well as our maximum-employment mandate—are achieved.
For example, under TPLT with a three-year memory, if inflation instead equaled 1.8 percent, 2 percent, and 2.2 percent for three consecutive years, then liftoff ex post could not occur until inflation hit 2.2 percent for one year.
Policy will aim over time to return inflation to its longer-run goal, which remains 2 percent, but not below, once the conditions to commence policy normalization have been met.7
With inflation having run persistently below 2 percent, the Committee will aim to achieve inflation moderately above 2 percent for some time in the service of having inflation average 2 percent over time and keeping longer-term inflation expectations well anchored at the 2 percent longer-run goal.5
The Committee expects to delay liftoff from the ELB until PCE (personal consumption expenditures) inflation has risen to 2 percent on an annual basis and other complementary conditions, consistent with achieving this goal on a sustained basis and to be discussed later, are met.4
In these versions of TPLT, inflation would likely have to moderately exceed 2 percent for some time before the condition for liftoff is met.
In our September FOMC statement, we communicated that, along with other complementary conditions, inflation must have risen to 2 percent before we expect to lift off from the ELB.
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Remarks about the future with no date, figure or likelihood that could be checked. They are kept on the record and shown here, but not scored.
The GFC emergency lending facilities that were stood up under this authority were designed to support short-term funding markets and to provide loans to nonbank financial firms, which in turn could then continue to intermediate credit to the private sector.10 The Federal Reserve also made section 13(3) loans to individual distressed nonbank firms, like Bear Stearns and the American International …
"Wall Street and Main Street: The Macroeconomic Consequences of New York Bank Suspensions, 1866-1914," Cliometrica, vol. 7 (May), pp. 99-130.
First Meeting on the Conduct of Monetary Policy: Hearings before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, April 29–30 and May 1, 1975, 94th Cong.
When in the next year the global financial system stabilized, the Federal Reserve reversed those actions and returned the federal funds rate to the level prevailing before those events.
Cooperative policies defined this way will, in general, differ from noncooperative policies—in the sense of the Nash equilibrium concept—designed to achieve domestic mandates assigned by sovereign institutions while taking other central bank policies as given.
In these remarks, I will draw on perspectives informed not only by economic analysis—including my own academic research on the theory and empirics of central banks' policymaking—but also by my observations and experiences serving as Vice Chair of the Federal Reserve Board during what has certainly been an eventful three years.
Today I will make a somewhat different, and less often discussed, case questioning formal global monetary policy cooperation—that, in practice, adopting it could plausibly erode central bank credibility and public support for central bank instrument independence.
But while international monetary policy coordination may enhance the efficiency of monetary policy execution, I am skeptical that in practice there are additional material, reliable, and robust gains that would flow from a formal regime of binding monetary policy cooperation, at least among major G-7 economies with flexible exchange rates, open capital accounts, and central bank mandates that include price …
It is important to note that any future decision the Committee might make with regard to the pace of asset purchases will not be intended to carry a signal about the timing of a future decision to raise the target range for the federal funds rate, a policy decision for which we have articulated a different and substantially more stringent …
As the title of my talk suggests, my remarks today will focus on the importance of some specific global financial linkages that are relevant to the execution and communication of U.S. monetary policy aimed at achieving our domestic mandates.
First, yield curves for nominal and inflation-indexed bonds provide useful—if also noisy—information about the expected future path of the policy rate, inflation, the business cycle, and the term premium required to hold sovereign bonds.
Plausibly, the global level factor embedded in these three sovereign yield curves reflects the contribution of possibly several global macro fundamental drivers—including global productivity growth, the balance between global saving and investment, and longer-term inflation expectations—and likely also other "market" or "technical" factors specific to the trading of these sovereigns in the global bond market.