Randall S Kroszner
Federal Reserve
Track record: No forecast checked yet (26 not due, 15 being checked).
41forecasts & commitments on the record
56%can be checked as stated
44average ambiguity (0-100)
0goalpost moves recorded
0confirmed U-turns
Timeline
came true partly did not not due / being checked / too vague
Calibration score: shown after 10 checked forecasts with a stated likelihood (now 0).
How they speak about the future: based on data 22, educated guess 10, stated on authority 9.
Kinds of claim: forecast 21, scenario (if… then) 12, mixed claim 7, commitment 1. · Download this report card as a picture
In the nine words
πρόγνωσιςInference from evidence18 · 44%πρόνοιαPreparing for the future12 · 29%μαντείαInspired knowledge8 · 20%εἰκασίαConjecture2 · 5%προαναγγελίαPublic pre-announcement1 · 2%
How to read this
Each box is one sentence a public figure or institution said about the future, word for word, with a link to the official text. Can be checked means it names what will happen, by when, and how likely - so it can be compared with official figures later. Too vague to check means it does not. Ambiguity (0-100) is how many different ways the sentence can be read. When the date passes, the forecast is compared with official data and marked came true, partly or did not come true. Labels judge the sentence, never the person. Full guide and glossary.On the record (41)
This work will be a major focus during the next few months and over the course of 2009.
An article reviewing the highlights of the data is expected to be published in the Federal Reserve Bulletin in the first quarter of 2009.
Based on a sample of banks of all sizes that report weekly to the Federal Reserve, the dollar volume of outstanding C&I loans at both large and small U.S. commercial banks expanded robustly over the first four months of this year, increased moderately over the months of May through August, and surged dramatically in September.
The FOMC's cumulative 1 percentage point reduction in the federal funds rate in October, combined with previous reductions between September 2007 and May 2008, should lower lending costs and stimulate economic activity in coming quarters.
We will continue to use all the tools at our disposal to improve market functioning and liquidity, to reduce pressures in key credit and funding markets, and to complement the steps the Treasury and foreign governments will be taking to strengthen the financial system.
Over the same period, U.S. net liabilities increased by only $600 billion, which is $3.2 trillion less than the cumulated current account deficits.3 (See figure 4.) So it might seem that the United States has been able to borrow large amounts from abroad while accumulating few additional liabilities.
This rate of return differential does not, by itself, lead to positive net income on a negative net position: If the U.S. net liability position of $2.5 trillion were the result of more modest gross positions, then U.S. net income might not be positive.
(3) prepayment penalties would only be permitted if certain conditions are met, including the condition that no penalty will apply for at least 60 days before any possible payment increase; and (4) creditors would have to establish escrow accounts for taxes and insurance.
These efforts will be supported by the new system for registering and tracking mortgage brokers that the CSBS and the AARMR launched earlier this year.
(3) prepayment penalties would only be permitted if certain conditions are met, including the condition that no penalty will apply for at least sixty days before any possible payment increase; and (4) creditors would have to establish escrow accounts for taxes and insurance.
Our hope is to provide a bit more information in the next month or so about our expectations for these plans, so I will only provide high-level comments here.
In its ICAAP, for example, an institution may choose a solvency standard for overall capital adequacy that is higher than the 99.9 percent implied by the AMA--for example, a solvency standard of 99.95 or 99.97 associated with a certain credit rating.
Beginning next month, the Community Affairs function will host a series of System-wide forums in order to further examine the impact foreclosures have on neighborhoods in both weak and strong housing markets, as well as the tools available to address the impacts of foreclosures.
The latest International Monetary Fund (IMF) forecast, however, continues to project solid rates of growth this year and next in most Latin American countries.
Specifically, a penalty would be prohibited where the borrower's debt-to-income ratio exceeds 50 percent, and a penalty would have to expire before a loan's payment could increase.
For example, we will respond if we see unreasonable declines in capital requirements at individual institutions that do not appear to be supported by either those banks' own internal capital-adequacy assessments or by our supervisory view of those institutions' risks and how well those risks are managed.
If current conditions persist in mortgage markets, the demand for homes could weaken further, with possible implications for the broader economy.
We expect to propose rules under HOEPA later this year.
Throughout the pilot period and after launch of the full program in early 2008, the Federal Reserve will continue to work with the industry and interagency partners to identify ways to increase the training's responsiveness.
By the end of the year, we will propose changes to TILA rules concerning mortgage loan advertisements and solicitations.
If a bank increases the credit risk of its portfolio, its regulatory capital requirements will also increase, and vice versa.
We must also remain mindful of areas of the proposals that could unfairly tilt either the domestic or international competitive playing field if some banks have higher or lower capital requirements for certain activities or in the aggregate.
My view and, it seems, the view of many private forecasters is that economic growth will pick up as we move through the year, with the rate of expansion close to potential by 2008.
The most recent consensus forecast for total CPI inflation (on a fourth-quarter to fourth-quarter basis) is 3.0 percent in 2007 and 2.4 percent in 2008.2 The anticipated moderation in inflation apparently reflects the expectation that the impetus from energy and other commodity prices will wane.
If no period is specified, the term “fixed” could be used only if the rate cannot increase while the credit plan is open.
The proportion of domestic-currency debt in Mexico maturing within one year was nearly 90 percent in 2002 and is now less than 75 percent.12 The Korean government continues to increase the proportion of its domestic-currency debt in longer maturities, with the one-year-and-under segment falling from roughly one-half in 1999 to less than one-fifth by the end of last year.
The April 2007 issue forecasts inflation in both regions to remain near these recent lows through 2008.
Once we take account of the role of expectations, the stabilizing effects of monetary policy become even greater: If economic decision makers come to realize that the Fed is doing more to stabilize inflation, then shocks that push up inflation will lead to smaller increases in inflation expectations than in the past.
All sorts of expectations will matter, but central among them are inflation expectations: If wages and prices in general are rising over time, then when firms have a chance to reset their prices, they will generally set them higher than they would if the overall price level was holding steady.
The proportion of local-currency debt in Mexico maturing within one year was nearly 90 percent in 2002 and is now less than 75 percent.17 The Korean government continues to increase the proportion of its domestic currency debt in longer maturities, with the one-year-and-under segment falling from roughly one-half in 1999 to one-quarter by the end of last year.
Indeed, few long-term inflation forecasts in any country currently exceed 5 percent, although Venezuela provides one counterexample, with a long-term inflation forecast now of 15 percent.
Second, if foreign economies do not share in the productivity boom, their demand for our exports will not expand in line with the increase in domestic demand.
First, if all of the spending increases are confined to the private sector, then the government budget deficit will shrink, as it did in the late 1990s, which would help narrow the potential saving shortfall.
At this point, you might be saying to yourself, "Hold on; if an increase in the productivity growth trend is supposed to boost real interest rates, why have real rates been falling since around mid-2004 and are low by historical standards?" The answer involves that favorite safety net of economists, the "all else equal" caveat.
If they are myopic in their behavior or tend to discount the future very heavily, then the dynamic response of the economy to a change in the growth rate of productivity will be drawn out.
The change in expectations can be drawn out if households and firms are slow to recognize an inflection point in the productivity growth trend or are highly uncertain about how long any observed change in the data might last.
Recent estimates by a number of economists suggest that the underlying trend in productivity in the nonfarm business sector is about 2-1/2 percent per year, close to the rate of productivity growth achieved during the period from 1995 to 2000.14 I think a good case can be made for the view that the strong productivity growth of the post-1995 era …
The latest observation, in April 2006, for example, is the forecast of a given country’s average consumer price inflation rate from 2012 through 2016.
Later this year the BEA plans to issue a satellite account that will treat scientific R&D as investment.
An error of just 1/10 percentage point in projections of long-term real GDP growth, for instance, can result in an error of approximately $270 billion in a ten-year budget forecast.
Third, if more competitive banking really spurs growth, we would expect particularly large benefits among relatively bank-dependent sectors of the economy, such as small firms or entrepreneurs.
Also said - not checkable as stated (12 newest)
Remarks about the future with no date, figure or likelihood that could be checked. They are kept on the record and shown here, but not scored.
For example, the structures of cash flows from mortgage payments in the pool to the various tranches of MBSs should be much less complex than some of those created in recent years, and securitization contracts will need to be made more homogeneous so as to allow greater comparability of risk profiles across deals and perhaps promote more robust liquidity.
So beyond ensuring that their own individual positions are sound and well protected, banks need to assess whether there is a systematic component to a market that could adversely affect multiple counterparties at the same time, and thereby affect their own risk exposures.
In short, banks and regulators need to understand the type of market conditions that will exist when there is likely to be reliance on collateral, guarantees, or other contract clauses.
Importantly, banks should also conduct stress tests across several markets, since some counterparties are key players across many financial markets and their inability to repay could cascade across those markets.
As a more general step, banks should hold higher liquidity and capital buffers, since the enhancements I just noted are still no guarantee against future market distress that could cause correlated and cascading losses among market participants.
As an aside, I should note that I do not expect a revival for some of the most complex structures that were created in recent years to finance a portion of subprime and alt-A mortgages.
In addition, a number of aspects of the securities themselves will probably need to be changed.
Second, securitization contracts will need to be made more homogeneous so as to allow greater comparability of risk profiles across deals and perhaps promote more robust liquidity.
Third, securitizations should involve fewer and larger tranches of MBS, which, in addition to further promoting liquidity, could also reduce the exposure of some securities to certain tail risks and model uncertainty.
In sum, an improved infrastructure for non-agency MBS should include comprehensive, loan-by-loan data that are available in a standardized format that is readily accessible, but a robust data platform will not be sufficient.
Indeed, the latest information suggests that, on net, home mortgage debt may not have increased at all since the spring.
For those who may not be familiar with the Federal Reserve System's Community Affairs function, this report illustrates one of the many ways in which it supports the System's objectives for economic growth by promoting community development and fair and impartial access to credit.