Randal K Quarles
Federal Reserve
Track record: No forecast checked yet (13 not due, 54 being checked).
67forecasts & commitments on the record
54%can be checked as stated
38average ambiguity (0-100)
0goalpost moves recorded
0confirmed U-turns
Timeline
came true partly did not not due / being checked / too vague
Calibration score: shown after 10 checked forecasts with a stated likelihood (now 0).
How they speak about the future: based on data 42, stated on authority 20, educated guess 5.
Kinds of claim: forecast 41, mixed claim 24, scenario (if… then) 1, commitment 1. · Download this report card as a picture
In the nine words
πρόγνωσιςInference from evidence41 · 61%μαντείαInspired knowledge19 · 28%εἰκασίαConjecture3 · 4%πρόβλεψιςSeeing the signs2 · 3%προαναγγελίαPublic pre-announcement1 · 1%πρόνοιαPreparing for the future1 · 1%
How to read this
Each box is one sentence a public figure or institution said about the future, word for word, with a link to the official text. Can be checked means it names what will happen, by when, and how likely - so it can be compared with official figures later. Too vague to check means it does not. Ambiguity (0-100) is how many different ways the sentence can be read. When the date passes, the forecast is compared with official data and marked came true, partly or did not come true. Labels judge the sentence, never the person. Full guide and glossary.On the record (67)
Indeed, when we finalized our leverage requirements for the largest banks, staff projected the amount of reserves in the system would decline to $25 billion by year end 2021.12 The current total of approximately $4.16 trillion in reserves is about 165 times that amount.
Second, if we recognize that much of the excessive inflation we are seeing this year is directly attributable to disruptions that, like the COVID event, will end, then monetary policy often can look through those types of disruptions to consider what inflation will be in the future when this episode passes.
I expect that these developments, however, have for the most part simply postponed activity temporarily and that robust growth will return in the coming months.
Recent data suggest that growth in the third quarter is likely to be lower than we had expected, but the foundations remain in place for strong economic growth over the remainder of this year and next.
And, if the broadly held expectation that inflation will recede next year turns out to be wrong or if inflation expectations show signs of becoming unanchored to the upside, I am confident that the monetary policy tools at our disposal can bring inflation down toward our 2 percent goal.
I am among those who see a good chance that inflation will remain above 2 percent next year, but I am not quite ready to conclude that this "transitory" period is already "too long." We haven't yet met the more stringent tests for liftoff that we have laid out in forward guidance about the federal funds rate.
Therefore, we will remain outcome based, waiting to see further improvements in employment and the evolution of inflation pressures in coming months.
Two things happened which together make clear that LIBOR will no longer be available for any new contracts after the end of this year, just 86 days from now.
Reviewing banks' cessation of LIBOR use after year-end will be one of the highest priorities of the Fed's bank supervisors in the coming months.
But a bank will not find LIBOR available after year-end, even if it doesn't want to use SOFR for loans and hasn't chosen a different alternative reference rate.
There is no more time, and banks will not find LIBOR available to use after year-end no matter how unhappy they may be with their options to replace it.
To conclude, I emphasize that market participants should be ready to stop using LIBOR by the end of 2021.12 One-week and two-month USD LIBOR will end in only 12 weeks.
To be ready for year-end, lenders will have to pick up the pace, and our examiners expect to see supervised institutions accelerate their use of alternative rates.
In addition, through May 2021, more than $2.2 trillion of central bank reserves and roughly $3.7 trillion of deposits had been absorbed by banks.
This supervisory framework, which we plan to publish for public comment later this year, will describe our tailored expectations for these firms, how we will rate them, and how we rely on the work of state insurance supervisors to avoid duplication and undue burden.
If these shortages persist into 2022, people may adjust their expectations higher for future inflation, which could make above-target inflation more persistent than we currently expect.
So, while labor shortages could weigh on job creation in coming months, I don't yet perceive this development as significantly slowing the U.S. economy beyond the next few months.
Although I expect employment to rise significantly in coming months, the picture is more mixed for the labor market than it is for spending.
With the service sector reopening while other household and business spending remains strong, I expect rapid growth to continue for some time before slowing to a still robust pace next year.
While prices will run above our 2 percent target this year, I believe most of this increase will be transitory.
I expect inflation to begin subsiding at some point over the next several months and to be running close to 2 percent again at some point during 2022.
The ARRC also estimated that more than 80 percent of those contracts would mature by the end of this year.
IBA will no longer have the necessary panel bank submissions to continue publishing overnight, one-month, three-month, six-month, or one-year USD LIBOR after June 30, 2023.
The ARRC's updated estimates indicate that 67 percent of current LIBOR exposures will mature before mid-2023.i Although more would roll off if the end date was further off, the IBA has stated clearly that it will not have sufficient panel bank submissions after June 2023 to publish LIBOR on a representative basis.
The original version of this speech stated that “The ARRC’s updated estimates indicate that 60 percent of current LIBOR exposures will mature before mid-2023” and was updated to 67 percent; and “Of course, we will also be left with the 40 percent of contracts that will not mature before mid-2023, an estimated $90 trillion in financial contracts” was updated to …
While we will examine against all of these points, what is most important this year is that firms should end new use of LIBOR.
Of course, we will also be left with the 33 percent of contracts that will not mature before mid-2023, an estimated $74 trillion in financial contracts.i Some of these contracts should already have workable fallback language, but many still have no effective means to replace LIBOR upon its cessation.
An example: after we emerge from the COVID event, we will no longer need to maintain temporary limitations on capital distributions by large banks and can instead rely on the regulatory capital framework that the Board established earlier this year—the SCB.
See International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Update (Washington: International Monetary Fund, June 2020); global growth is projected at -4.9 percent in 2020, which would leave 2021 GDP some 6-1/2 percentage points lower than in the pre-COVID-19 projections of January 2020.
Next month, when the FSB delivers our NBFI report and proposals to the G20 Summit, we will be doing what the FSB does best: leveraging the strength of our broad and diverse membership to provide a clear path forward to strengthen the resilience of the global financial system.
One might look to the emergence of strains in short-term funding markets in March of this year as an indication that previous reform efforts fell short.
The lessons we draw from this year's events as we seek to strengthen our regulatory framework will leave us better positioned for the next shock and thereby support financial stability and sustained economic growth.
This will provide a basis for a work plan for 2021, focused on better understanding this critical sector, vulnerabilities related to it, and how we might take a more macroprudential approach to supervising and regulating at least some parts of this sector.
According to our weekly bank credit data, commercial and industrial loans increased $715 billion between the week of February 26th and their peak on May 13th.2 For millions of struggling households, banks have agreed to forbear interest and principal payments on their loans.
The Federal Reserve is currently conducting another round of stress tests, using two new severe downside scenarios published last month, and will release bank-specific results from both scenarios before the end of the year.6
Going forward, we will want to be sure that banks remain a source of strength and support for the economy.
We will provide to the G20 Summit next month our holistic review of the turmoil and a concrete set of proposals for follow-up work on NBFI.
Although consumer confidence remains lower than early this year, the resilience in big-ticket purchases indicates some underlying confidence among households that the economy will continue to improve.
The momentum is feeding into many private-sector forecasts that suggest prospects are good for strong economic growth in the United States and other advanced economies over the rest of this year and next.
Although the recovery since then has helped prices retrace some of those declines, PCE inflation was still only 1 percent for the 12 months ended in July and is likely to end 2020 well below our 2 percent longer-run target.11
The median of projections for 2020 by FOMC participants in September showed that both gross domestic product (GDP) and inflation had been revised up significantly from the median in the June projections.3 I expect that robust GDP growth over the rest of this year and in 2021 will lead to strong employment gains and move inflation closer to 2 percent.
Last week, we released a baseline and two hypothetical recession scenarios that will be used by banks and the Fed to assess the resilience of the sector, and we will release bank-specific results from our independent assessment before the end of the year.18
5 Accounting for employees who still were being paid but not working during April, the Bureau of Labor Statistics believes that the peak unemployment rate may have been about 5 percentage points higher than 14.7 percent.
The momentum is feeding into many private-sector forecasts that suggest prospects are good for strong economic growth in the United States and other advanced economies over the rest of this year and
The Committee will seek to achieve inflation that averages 2 percent over time, which means that we will aim to achieve inflation moderately above 2 percent for some time following periods when inflation has been persistently below 2 percent.
Although the recovery since then has helped prices retrace some of those declines, PCE inflation was still only 1 percent for the 12 months ended in July and is likely to end 2020 well below our 2 percent longer-run target. 11
The median of projections for 2020 by FOMC participants in September showed that both gross domestic product (GDP) and inflation had been revised up significantly from the median in the June projections. 3 I expect that robust GDP growth over the rest of this year and in 2021 will lead to strong employment gains and move inflation closer to 2 …
Last week, we released a baseline and two hypothetical recession scenarios that will be used by banks and the Fed to assess the resilience of the sector, and we will release bankspecific results from our independent assessment before the end of the year. 18
In order to give all banks subject to this year's exercise sufficient time to understand their stress test results and make any necessary changes to their capital plans, we expect banks to wait until after U.S. markets close on June 29, 2020, to publicly disclose any information about their planned capital actions and stress capital buffer requirements.
Once the banks have determined their final capital plans, the Board will publicly release the final capital requirements for each individual firm later this year, before they take effect in the fourth quarter, as planned.2
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Remarks about the future with no date, figure or likelihood that could be checked. They are kept on the record and shown here, but not scored.
I had hoped that the US would have led the world in setting out a concrete proposal to implement the Basel III endgame by the end of last year, but the intervention of COVID set back that timetable, and although we are working hard with the other banking agencies to iron out the last issues, our proposal will have to …
In May 2018, I spoke about the vital importance of cross-border banking to global financial stability and prosperity.17 The Fed's work internationally on pre-positioning, ring-fencing, and market fragmentation is still vital, and we should continue efforts to find the right balance between flexibility for the parent bank and certainty for host country authorities.
But if the shock is one—like the COVID event—that requires real economy credit support to address its root causes, the Fed can use 13(3) to provide the same rapid and forceful response (with appropriate Treasury equity for credit protection), but we should establish the expectation that this credit support will be moved into a separate, non-Fed structure as quickly as …
Adoption of such a framework would also reduce the attraction of the Fed as a general purpose funder of credit-intensive political projects—we would have established that the piper will not only always have to be paid, but paid promptly.
But there is room for adjustment of this typology: certain features of both the TALF and PPPLF programs might indicate that they should fall in the credit facility category.
Some evidence suggests that banks may have been hesitant to use their regulatory capital buffers to meet credit demand (despite the stated intent from supervisors that banks should use their buffers under stress).
In times of crisis, the warp and woof of policy tools across the globe need to be woven tightly enough for the fabric of our financial system to withstand the stress, but flexibly enough that it will not tear.
In doing so, we will always strive to consult with a wide variety of stakeholders to help us respond to the most pressing financial vulnerabilities of our time.
And—in light of that—we can then look forward, to see how the FSB will address ongoing and future financial stability challenges.
In five years, the FSB will then do a more thorough assessment across our membership of the effectiveness of the measures in addressing risks to financial stability.
This may be due to uncertainty regarding potential future losses or the wider market stigma that may result if a bank were to use its buffers.
Climate-related risks vary across jurisdictions, and we need to look at how risks might be amplified by feedback loops with the real economy.