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THE ORACLE HUNTERS • EVERY PROPHECY ON THE RECORD 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Oracle HuntersEvery prophecy, on the record. · Οἱ Κυνηγοὶ τῶν ΧρησμῶνUnder development

← Tracking the Prophets

Per Jansson

Sveriges Riksbank

Track record: No forecast checked yet (50 not due, 21 being checked).
71forecasts & commitments on the record
90%can be checked as stated
43average ambiguity (0-100)
0goalpost moves recorded
0confirmed U-turns

Timeline

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came true partly did not not due / being checked / too vague

Calibration score: shown after 10 checked forecasts with a stated likelihood (now 0).
How they speak about the future: based on data 51, educated guess 15, stated on authority 5.
Kinds of claim: forecast 40, mixed claim 15, scenario (if… then) 15, commitment 1. · Download this report card as a picture

In the nine words

πρόγνωσιςInference from evidence48 · 68%πρόνοιαPreparing for the future15 · 21%μαντείαInspired knowledge4 · 6%εἰκασίαConjecture2 · 3%προαναγγελίαPublic pre-announcement1 · 1%πρόβλεψιςSeeing the signs1 · 1%
How to read this Each box is one sentence a public figure or institution said about the future, word for word, with a link to the official text. Can be checked means it names what will happen, by when, and how likely - so it can be compared with official figures later. Too vague to check means it does not. Ambiguity (0-100) is how many different ways the sentence can be read. When the date passes, the forecast is compared with official data and marked came true, partly or did not come true. Labels judge the sentence, never the person. Full guide and glossary.

On the record (71)

If inflation could stay below the target for a long time, why couldn't it also stay above it for a long time?
Sveriges Riksbank · said 13 Feb 2025 (date) · Credibility and flexibility going forward · evidence & why
πρόνοια · Preparing for the futurePartly checkableScenario (if… then)educated guessambiguity 56/100implied call / likelihood: No · 35% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetinflation
If, for example, inflation were to be above the target for an extended period, it is of course highly likely that demands would increase for wages to be based on the higher inflation rather than on the inflation target.
Sveriges Riksbank · said 13 Feb 2025 (date) · Credibility and flexibility going forward · evidence & why
πρόνοια · Preparing for the futurePartly checkableScenario (if… then)educated guessambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 90% · for the most partbelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetinflationlabour
Average nominal wage increases of only just over 2 per cent could be regarded as an indication that there was a lack of confidence in the inflation target.
Sveriges Riksbank · said 13 Feb 2025 (date) · Credibility and flexibility going forward · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidencePartly checkableForecastbased on dataambiguity 56/100implied call / likelihood: No · 35% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetinflationlabour
It can perhaps be seen as a mitigating circumstance that all Swedish forecasters at the beginning of 2022 expected that the rise in inflation would be highly temporary and that inflation would be back on target at the end of the year — and this without any policy rate increases to speak of.'° Another mitigating circumstance is
Sveriges Riksbank · said 12 Dec 2023 (date) · The gap in the monetary policy debate · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedForecastbased on dataambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2023Due - being checkedinflationinterest rates
The interpretation that the Riksbank met the inflation target may seem a bit generous, since inflation averaged at almost 8 per cent, but the reasoning illustrates in any case that an evaluation of policy must be based on
Sveriges Riksbank · said 12 Dec 2023 (date) · The gap in the monetary policy debate · evidence & why
The longer-term inflation expectations will thus remain anchored at 2 per cent.
If average inflation is below 2 per cent, then a zero or negative interest rate will inevitably become even more common.
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidencePartly checkableMixed claimbased on dataambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partbelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetinflationinterest rates
And only a few expected modest increases in 2023.
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidencePartly checkableForecastbased on dataambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2023Due - being checked
The increases in the policy rate that the Riksbank has made, and expects to make, contribute to the fact that inflation will start to decline in 2023.
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedForecastbased on dataambiguity 0/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablemeets the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2023Due - being checkedinflationinterest rates
In September this year, an ESO report on the division of roles between fiscal and monetary policy was published; see Calmfors, Hassler and Seim (2022). 3 The spread in the inflation forecasts for 2023 was relatively large, from Nordea's 1.2 per cent to Swedbank's 1.9 per cent.
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidencePartly checkableForecastbased on dataambiguity 36/100below the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2023Due - being checkedinflationinterest ratesfiscal
But they all also expected that this effect would be temporary and that inflation in 2023 would again be below the target on average (Figure 1). 3 The forecasters judged that these developments would be compatible
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedForecastbased on dataambiguity 0/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablemeets the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2023Due - being checkedinflation
But if the budget process works poorly and higher public expenditure is routinely financed by the government raising even more loans, then the economic agents will not expect a tighter fiscal policy, at least not until the government, at some point in the future, will perhaps find itself absolutely forced to pursue such a policy.
πρόνοια · Preparing for the futurePartly checkableScenario (if… then)educated guessambiguity 71/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetfiscal
Similarly, if inflation rises because confidence in the inflation target has been eroded, it may lead to significantly higher interest rates, which, in turn, will
πρόνοια · Preparing for the futurePartly checkableScenario (if… then)educated guessambiguity 56/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partbelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetinflationinterest rates
For example, if public finances are perceived as unsustainable, the expectation may easily arise that monetary policy will eventually allow inflation to rise in order to reduce the real value of public debt, that is, inflate it away.
πρόνοια · Preparing for the futurePartly checkableScenario (if… then)educated guessambiguity 71/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partbelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetinflationinterest ratesfiscal
If monetary policy can be made expansionary without this causing economic actors to fear that inflation will rise sharply, their expectations of what inflation will be in the longer term will not be affected either.
πρόνοια · Preparing for the futurePartly checkableScenario (if… then)educated guessambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partbelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetinflationinterest rates
It is about 40 percent of GDP, and is projected to fall over the coming years.
For example, if the policy becomes too extensive or if it is not sufficiently explained and followed up, investors may nevertheless begin to fear that the government will not be able to manage its debt and may therefore demand a higher risk compensation for lending.
εἰκασία · ConjecturePartly checkableMixed claimeducated guessambiguity 71/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partbelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetfiscal
In practice, this means that low unemployment or high employment as such will not trigger monetary tightening, unless inflation picks up at the same time.
Sveriges Riksbank · said 16 Dec 2020 (date) · Some thoughts on the need for changes to inflation targeting · evidence & why
πρόνοια · Preparing for the futurePartly checkableScenario (if… then)educated guessambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partbelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetinflationlabour
Moreover, as I mentioned earlier, structural forces that have been pushing down inflation for a long time may turn and start having the opposite effect, and central banks can be the driving force behind creating consensus on the benefits to the economy of slightly higher inflation, perhaps around 3 per cent on average.
Sveriges Riksbank · said 16 Dec 2020 (date) · Some thoughts on the need for changes to inflation targeting · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidencePartly checkableForecastbased on dataambiguity 83/100implied call / likelihood: No · 40% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetinflationfinance
First, monetary policy shall aim to overshoot 2 per cent for a period of time if inflation has previously undershot 2 per cent.
Sveriges Riksbank · said 16 Dec 2020 (date) · Some thoughts on the need for changes to inflation targeting · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidencePartly checkableForecastbased on dataambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partbelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetinflationinterest rates
instead of being at the target of 2 per cent on average, interest rates will also, on average, be about 2 percentage points lower. 4
Sveriges Riksbank · said 16 Dec 2020 (date) · Some thoughts on the need for changes to inflation targeting · evidence & why
We will no doubt be able to slow the increase in asset prices and credit growth by raising the policy rate, but we will not be able to counteract declines with any great strength, neither in asset prices nor in the economy as a whole, as the interest rate on average is too low and will regularly hit its lower …
Sveriges Riksbank · said 16 Dec 2020 (date) · Some thoughts on the need for changes to inflation targeting · evidence & why
προαναγγελία · Public pre-announcementPartly checkableCommitmentstated on authorityambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partbelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetinflationinterest ratesgrowthfinance
The Federal Reserve (Fed) made certain changes to its strategy in August, and the European Central Bank (ECB) and Bank of Canada, for example, are carrying out reviews that will be completed in 2021.
Sveriges Riksbank · said 16 Dec 2020 (date) · Some thoughts on the need for changes to inflation targeting · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidencePartly checkableForecastbased on dataambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partbelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2021Due - being checkedfinance
Assume that inflation, for reasons we cannot currently identify, will be, say, 4 per cent a few years ahead.
Sveriges Riksbank · said 03 Dec 2019 (date) · Contemplations of an interest-rate dove and inflation hawk · evidence & why
Economic agents may start to expect lower inflation than 2 per cent even in the long term, and ultimately also begin to incorporate this into their economic decisions.
Sveriges Riksbank · said 03 Dec 2019 (date) · Contemplations of an interest-rate dove and inflation hawk · evidence & why
A necessary condition for maintaining confidence in the inflation target is, as I see it, that the monetary policy we conduct and plan to conduct means that we anticipate inflation being 2 per cent at least at the end of the forecast period we are considering.
Sveriges Riksbank · said 03 Dec 2019 (date) · Contemplations of an interest-rate dove and inflation hawk · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidencePartly checkableForecastbased on dataambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetinflationinterest rates
3 During the first half of 2013, for example, the average of Swedish forecasters expected inflation to barely reach 1.5 per cent in 2014.
Sveriges Riksbank · said 03 Dec 2019 (date) · Contemplations of an interest-rate dove and inflation hawk · evidence & why
If the inflation forecast is not 2 per cent even in this time perspective, the monetary policy, on which our inflation forecast is based, is wrong and we must adjust it.
Sveriges Riksbank · said 03 Dec 2019 (date) · Contemplations of an interest-rate dove and inflation hawk · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidencePartly checkableMixed claimbased on dataambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetinflationinterest rates
First, our forecast was that inflation would remain below the target in the near term, and was not expected to stabilise at 2 per cent until late 2022.
Sveriges Riksbank · said 03 Dec 2019 (date) · Contemplations of an interest-rate dove and inflation hawk · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedForecastbased on dataambiguity 0/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablemeets the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2022Due - being checkedinflation
But even if this was not the case then, secondly, a very probable scenario would be that inflation nevertheless fell substantially, perhaps down to 1 per cent or lower, that is, to the level it was at some years ago.
Sveriges Riksbank · said 04 Dec 2018 (date) · Monetary policy in less favourable times - what are the options? · evidence & why
In the United States, which has a longer history of a floating exchange rate, it is usually estimated that the policy rate is cut by around 5 percentage points in economic downturns. 5 It is reasonable to assume that in Sweden, which is a small open economy, a larger share of the adjustment in an economic downturn will come through …
Sveriges Riksbank · said 04 Dec 2018 (date) · Monetary policy in less favourable times - what are the options? · evidence & why
Neither is it possible for anyone to say how soon after 2021 a downturn may occur.
Sveriges Riksbank · said 04 Dec 2018 (date) · Monetary policy in less favourable times - what are the options? · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidencePartly checkableForecastbased on dataambiguity 56/100implied call / likelihood: No · 40% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2021Due - being checked
Most Swedish forecasters, including the Riksbank, are expecting the repo rate to be 0.5-0.75 per cent at the end of 2020.
Sveriges Riksbank · said 04 Dec 2018 (date) · Monetary policy in less favourable times - what are the options? · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidencePartly checkableForecastbased on dataambiguity 56/100below the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2020Due - being checked
Until then, almost all analysts believe that growth will slow down, but not to the extent that the Swedish economy will enter a regular economic downturn before 2021.
Sveriges Riksbank · said 04 Dec 2018 (date) · Monetary policy in less favourable times - what are the options? · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedForecastbased on dataambiguity 0/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partmeets the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2021Due - being checkedgrowth
3 One example from the central bank world is that Wilkins (2018) indicates that this will be an issue the next time the Bank of Canada's monetary policy framework is evaluated, in 2021.
Sveriges Riksbank · said 04 Dec 2018 (date) · Monetary policy in less favourable times - what are the options? · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidencePartly checkableForecastbased on dataambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partbelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2021Due - being checkedinterest ratesfinance
Thinking about it, it would be quite strange if the main way of preventing financial crises was to hold monetary policy tighter than could be justified by basic economic prospects.
πρόνοια · Preparing for the futurePartly checkableScenario (if… then)educated guessambiguity 56/100implied call / likelihood: No · 35% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetinterest rates
This will cause a rise in the real interest rate, i.e. the interest rate corrected for inflation expectations, if the nominal interest rate remains unchanged.
πρόνοια · Preparing for the futurePartly checkableScenario (if… then)educated guessambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partbelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetinflationinterest rates
One reservation here, of course, is that we still cannot be certain that inflation will really remain around the target, even if this is what the Riksbank expects.
πρόνοια · Preparing for the futurePartly checkableScenario (if… then)educated guessambiguity 56/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetinflation
There are, of course, no guarantees that inflation will stay at around 2 per cent going forward.
There is an international discussion, mostly on an academic level, about monetary policy becoming more effective if the central banks' policy rates were to be made very negative - that is, if the lower bound could in principle be eliminated entirely. 10 But personally I do not regard this as a practically implementable solution.
Sveriges Riksbank · said 07 Dec 2016 (date) · Time to scrap the inflation target? · evidence & why
πρόνοια · Preparing for the futurePartly checkableScenario (if… then)based on dataambiguity 56/100implied call / likelihood: No · 35% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetinterest ratesfinance
As I see it, it is not reasonable given this to advocate that the Riksbank shall sacrifice its main task - to maintain confidence in the inflation target - to perhaps attain some easing with regard to housing prices and debt, which would in any case only be temporary unless other measures were taken.
Sveriges Riksbank · said 07 Dec 2016 (date) · Time to scrap the inflation target? · evidence & why
πρόνοια · Preparing for the futurePartly checkableScenario (if… then)educated guessambiguity 71/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partbelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetinflationfiscalhousing
I would like to emphasise, to avoid any misunderstanding, that I still count on inflation developing in line with the Riksbank's forecast and attaining 2 per cent safely within the current forecast period.
Sveriges Riksbank · said 07 Dec 2016 (date) · Time to scrap the inflation target? · evidence & why
During summer 1994, inflation and inflation expectations began to rise. 7 Most analysts' forecasts pointed to inflation overshooting the target by a broad margin, and various indicators showed that the long-term expected inflation rate, which had never been close to 2 per cent, was now above 4 per cent.
Sveriges Riksbank · said 07 Dec 2016 (date) · Time to scrap the inflation target? · evidence & why
A potentially more serious problem is that even if CPIF inflation were reasonably close to 2 per cent, the formal target variable, CPI inflation, could be relatively far from the target for fairly long periods of time.
Sveriges Riksbank · said 03 Dec 2015 (date) · Time to improve the inflation target? · evidence & why
The long-run average of the two inflation measures will be the same, and if the Riksbank aims to stabilise CPIF inflation around 2 per cent then CPI inflation will on average also end up at the target.
Sveriges Riksbank · said 03 Dec 2015 (date) · Time to improve the inflation target? · evidence & why
6 When the inflation target is very low, say, 1 or 0 per cent, inflation will vary around that level.
Sveriges Riksbank · said 03 Dec 2015 (date) · Time to improve the inflation target? · evidence & why
The idea that many commentators seem to have is that a target range would mean the Riksbank would feel less forced to bring inflation up to 2 per cent, which in turn would mean that monetary policy would not need to be as expansionary and the risks linked to such a policy could be mitigated.
Sveriges Riksbank · said 03 Dec 2015 (date) · Time to improve the inflation target? · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidencePartly checkableMixed claimbased on dataambiguity 56/100implied call / likelihood: No · 35% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetinflationinterest rates
13 It could be argued that wage formation should be based on inflation always being 2 per cent, as periods below and above the target should cancel each other out in the long term.
Sveriges Riksbank · said 03 Dec 2015 (date) · Time to improve the inflation target? · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidencePartly checkableMixed claimbased on dataambiguity 56/100implied call / likelihood: No · 35% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetinflationlabour
If we assume in Figure 4 that CPIF inflation will continue to be around 2 per cent after 2018, then CPI inflation would overshoot the target for a long time, based on reasonable assumptions about the development of the repo rate.
Sveriges Riksbank · said 03 Dec 2015 (date) · Time to improve the inflation target? · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedMixed claimbased on dataambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partbelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2018Due - being checkedinflation
The National Institute of Economic Research's forecast refers to the repo rate at the end of the year.
μαντεία · Inspired knowledgePartly checkableForecaststated on authorityambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2014Due - being checked

Showing the newest 50 - the ledger has all 71.

Also said - not checkable as stated (12 newest)

Remarks about the future with no date, figure or likelihood that could be checked. They are kept on the record and shown here, but not scored.

I believe that inflation should continue to play a role for fiscal policy, even in more normal situations, and that we could thus achieve a better policy mix more generally. 6
Sveriges Riksbank · said 13 Feb 2025 (date) · Credibility and flexibility going forward · evidence & why
πρόνοια · Preparing for the futureToo vague to checkCall for actionbased on dataambiguity 71/100implied call / likelihood: No · 35% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardinflationfiscal
It would therefore be very odd to completely ignore how inflation and inflation expectations can be expected to develop with the alternative monetary policy that one thinks should instead be pursued, or should have been pursued.
Sveriges Riksbank · said 13 Feb 2025 (date) · Credibility and flexibility going forward · evidence & why
πρόνοια · Preparing for the futureToo vague to checkCall for actionstated on authorityambiguity 56/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardinflationinterest rates
If interest rates are set in such a way that inflation can be more or less anything, we will sooner or later end up in a situation where there is no longer a nominal anchor.
Sveriges Riksbank · said 13 Feb 2025 (date) · Credibility and flexibility going forward · evidence & why
εἰκασία · ConjectureToo vague to checkMixed claimeducated guessambiguity 56/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partbelow the RIM-1 standardinflationinterest rates
Whether policy rates will again need to be lowered below zero in the future will thus depend on how the international real interest rate environment develops, which is currently an open question.
Sveriges Riksbank · said 12 Dec 2023 (date) · The gap in the monetary policy debate · evidence & why
21 One example of a criticism on the same playing field is the argument that the policy rate does not need to be raised as much as the Riksbank expects to return inflation to the target.
Sveriges Riksbank · said 12 Dec 2023 (date) · The gap in the monetary policy debate · evidence & why
πρόνοια · Preparing for the futureToo vague to checkCall for actionbased on dataambiguity 56/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardinflationinterest rates
The Riksbank underestimated inflation in the forecasts and should, according to the evaluators, have realised that inflation would also rise in Sweden.
Sveriges Riksbank · said 12 Dec 2023 (date) · The gap in the monetary policy debate · evidence & why
πρόνοια · Preparing for the futurePartly checkableCall for actionstated on authorityambiguity 56/100below the RIM-1 standardinflation
Perhaps we should have realised earlier that such a change was underway, or at least could be.
Sveriges Riksbank · said 12 Dec 2023 (date) · The gap in the monetary policy debate · evidence & why
This means that central banks' policy rates are likely to reach their lower bounds more often and that monetary policy will occasionally have to be conducted using other means than policy rate cuts.
πρόνοια · Preparing for the futurePartly checkableCall for actionstated on authorityambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardinterest ratesfinance
Analysts and observers argued that this development, with inflation persistently below forecast and quite far below the inflation target, indicated that the target was so hard to reach that the Riksbank should abandon the attempt and instead conduct a less expansionary policy aimed at dampening rising household debt and housing prices. 3
πρόνοια · Preparing for the futurePartly checkableCall for actionbased on dataambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardinflationfiscalhousing
It is also worth noting in this context that there is a fairly intensive international discussion on whether negative policy rates should be included in the central banks' normal arsenal going forward, as a weapon that could be used if special needs arise.
Sveriges Riksbank · said 07 Dec 2016 (date) · Time to scrap the inflation target? · evidence & why
εἰκασία · ConjectureToo vague to checkMixed claimeducated guessambiguity 71/100implied call / likelihood: No · 35% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardinterest ratesfinance
One may therefore draw the conclusion that those who say that monetary policy is wrong are arguing one of the following: Either that confidence in the inflation target is not so important, or at least less important than other things, or that the Riksbank should have been able to conduct a less expansionary policy while still being able to safeguard …
Sveriges Riksbank · said 07 Dec 2016 (date) · Time to scrap the inflation target? · evidence & why
πρόνοια · Preparing for the futureToo vague to checkCall for actionstated on authorityambiguity 71/100implied call / likelihood: No · 40% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardinflationinterest ratestrade
But an increasing number have also begun to take the view that monetary policy may need to give macroprudential policy support by, as it is often called, 'leaning against the wind'.
πρόνοια · Preparing for the futurePartly checkableCall for actionstated on authorityambiguity 56/100implied call / likelihood: No · 40% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardinterest rates