Paul Tucker
Bank of England
Track record: No forecast checked yet (60 not due, 20 being checked).
80forecasts & commitments on the record
48%can be checked as stated
50average ambiguity (0-100)
0goalpost moves recorded
0confirmed U-turns
Timeline
came true partly did not not due / being checked / too vague
Calibration score: shown after 10 checked forecasts with a stated likelihood (now 0).
How they speak about the future: based on data 40, educated guess 31, stated on authority 9.
Kinds of claim: forecast 43, scenario (if… then) 28, mixed claim 9. · Download this report card as a picture
In the nine words
πρόγνωσιςInference from evidence35 · 44%πρόνοιαPreparing for the future27 · 34%μαντείαInspired knowledge9 · 11%εἰκασίαConjecture5 · 6%φρόνησιςPractical wisdom2 · 2%πρόβλεψιςSeeing the signs2 · 2%
How to read this
Each box is one sentence a public figure or institution said about the future, word for word, with a link to the official text. Can be checked means it names what will happen, by when, and how likely - so it can be compared with official figures later. Too vague to check means it does not. Ambiguity (0-100) is how many different ways the sentence can be read. When the date passes, the forecast is compared with official data and marked came true, partly or did not come true. Labels judge the sentence, never the person. Full guide and glossary.On the record (80)
If, on the other hand, productivity growth remains weak, job creation as the economy recovers could be strong, as it has been on average over the past couple of years.
If we only understood why productivity growth has been so weak, we could be more confident about whether or not it will recover in tandem with a recovery in spending.
But we cannot do that at the expense of price stability -or, more technically, of allowing medium-term inflation expectations to drift away from the target of 2%.
If that does happen, the fall in unemployment could be slow, and monetary stimulus might not need to be withdrawn for some time.
And if banks choose to de-lever, shedding risk to achieve the temporarily higher capital requirement, that action in itself might slow the boom.
Another way might be for banks to issue so-called hightrigger contingent capital instruments (CoCos), ie bonds that convert into equity if a bank's capital ratio falls below a prescribed but reasonably high level.
An action to increase banks' equity base by, say, 10% will increase their loss-absorbing capacity by 10%.
In steady state, for a bank with a minimum equity ratio of 10%, that trigger might be, say, 8%: sufficiently below the required level for the insurance provided by these CoCos not to be prohibitively expensive, but sufficiently high that the bonds would convert to equity while the bank was still able to fund itself in the market. 8
Fewer, if any, banks will fail; a tightening in credit supply is therefore less likely to become a full-blown credit crunch; the resulting slowdown in output growth should be less severe; the default rate on bank loan portfolios lower; and so on.
We are constrained by a clear medium-term objective (2% CPI target), but do not use a set of supposedly fool-proof core intermediate indicators.
Meanwhile, the FSB will, over the next month or so, be publishing a consultative paper on resolution-strategy planning.
If the risk in banking is not incorporated into the yields of bonds issued by banks themselves, then it will be reflected in higher sovereign borrowing costs.
Meanwhile, monetary policy will underpin the recovery so long as that remains consistent with anchoring inflation expectations in line with achieving the 2% target over the medium run.
As I have said before, easily the Committee's biggest judgment in recent years has been that inflation will gradually fall back to the 2% target - initially as the effects of higher VAT, energy
Big picture, that view on the growth outlook still looks broadly on track, but it is not always going to seem like that over the next few weeks and months as the ONS data for the first half of the year are published.
I think inflation might remain above 3% throughout the second quarter of this year, and possibly into the second half of the year.
That stimulus can be sustained only so long as medium-term inflation expectations remain anchored to our target of 2%.
In the Committee's latest forecasts, the central projection is for inflation to be under the 2% target in two-to-three year's time.
Meanwhile the MPC will continue to underpin demand, consistent with getting back to the 2% inflation target and so with sound money.
We will all discover whether inflation declines rapidly from 5% towards 3% as the effects of the price level shocks wane.
That was one of the reasons why, at the beginning of this year, I had expected to vote for an increase in Bank Rate at our February meeting.
In case that sounds odd given that Bank Rate has been at 0.5% for over two years, I should underline that, even in normal circumstances, monetary policy works through the expected path of our policy rate.
That measure is being taken in order to make the UK banking system more resilient, and so better able to maintain credit supply, in the face of threats that could crystallise any time over the next year or so.
Next month, the G20 Financial Stability Board will publish a consultative document on the resolution of systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs).
Next month the G20 Financial Stability Board will publish two consultative papers: one on the greater loss absorbing capacity needed by systemically important financial institutions, and the other on overhauling resolution regimes to cope with distress at SIFIs.
For example, it is said that public sector pension funds in the USA aim to achieve returns of around 8%. 22 This kind of thing, which I would guess has global effects, distorts the appetite for risk in our capital markets, especially when current and expected policy rates are low.
If the FPC requires lenders to carry higher capital, liquidity or collateral, that will affect credit conditions and so the outlook for aggregate demand and inflation.
The Government expects the legislative process to be complete towards the end of 2012.
The interim FPC will have to advise HMG over the next year or so on which instruments in particular we think we should be granted by Parliament.
If the overpriced securities have led to credit conditions being too loose, then somebody - households, firms, sovereigns, or everyone - will have accumulated too much debt, and so eventually fundamentals assert themselves: defaults rise, and realisation sets in.
They will sustain important parts of the reform programme into next year and beyond.
The BCBS's 'fundamental review' of capital requirements for trading book positions will be one of the most important endeavours of 2011.
I think it will remain part of the G20 and the FSB agenda going into next year.
That's something which I doubt will be completely resolved this year.
The other really key change will come in stages - partly in the package this autumn and partly during next year and beyond - which is reducing the pernicious regulatory arbitrage that has existed between 'banking book' capital requirements and 'trading book' capital requirements.
Chart 6: CPI inflation projection based on market interest rate projections and £200bn asset purchases
Chart 5: Projection of the level of GDP based on market interest rate expectations and £200bn asset purchases
If in the steady-state equilibrium credit spreads were to be higher, then other things being equal there might be a lower equilibrium risk-free interest rate. 6 In plain language, the Bank's policy rate might on average conceivably be lower in future than during the Committee's first decade.
And it will be important soon if there is a persistent rise in the margin that banks charge for credit over and above the risk-free rate.
upside, that we (and our peers) could prove too slow to withdraw monetary stimulus if animal spirits revive across the economy or further spikes in inflation outturns raise medium-term expectations.
After spiking over the next few months, inflation is, we believe, likely to drop below our 2% target due to the downward pressures from a weak level of demand on wages and prices (Chart 6) .
Working with the FSB secretariat, my role, as chairman to the CrossBorder Crisis Management Working Group, will be to help colleagues to flush out the issues, so that they can be properly debated and reviewed by G20 Ministers and Governors later next year.
If so, the damage to financial stability would be reduced, and the eventual economic costs might plausibly be lower than otherwise; especially if those UK banks were able to take up some of the slack created by withdrawal of credit supply by foreign banks to sound UK borrowers.
During that upswing, important contributory factors will typically have included illusions about risk-adjusted returns; underestimating the extent to which buoyant conditions are being driven by falling liquidity premia; and a sense that, if the bubble bursts, the central bank will somehow be able to contain the spillovers.
But I fear, however, that we may not be much clearer about the general trends in demand until at least late spring/early summer next year.
If all banks were to adopt such a strategy, recovery might end up being anaemic at best, which would feed back into the banking system itself - increasing defaults and depleting banks' capital.
Over the next quarter or so, amongst other indicators I will therefore be looking at what happens to firm and household money holdings, as well as credit flows and risk premia.
If the authorities determined that a public equity injection was necessary in order to preserve stability, government could be authorised to provide the support, but with a right to claim back the eventual cost, if any, from an increased 'insurance' levy on the banking system over a period of years beginning after the crisis had clearly passed.
That might involve requiring banks to have credible resolution plans for themselves, with higher regulatory capital and liquidity charges entailed if they do not.
So if they all counted as core-liquidity for regulatory purposes, banks would in effect be liberated from having to hold a buffer of low-yielding assets that they could confidently use in the market before they turned to us.
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We will learn to speak of banks and dealers as either 'SPE groups' or 'MPE groups'.
And even in the US, nearly all 'SPE groups' will need to ensure that there exists intra-group debt, issued by key subsidiaries around the world to the holding company, that can be written down when a distressed subsidiary would otherwise need to be resolved.
The G20 Leaders having mandated that standardised OTC derivatives must be centrally cleared, there is a risk that central counterparties (CCPs) will come to be seen as too important to fail as a matter of policy.
If CCPs are probably the most important example of where resolution regimes need to be extended, they are not the only one.
For example, outside of the US, many 'SPE groups' will need to establish holding companies from which to issue bonds that can absorb losses and be converted into equity through a resolution.
If necessary, there will have to be regulatory changes to induce or require this.
The other element of this policy - which, again, the FSB will be addressing - is where in a group GCLAC should be issued from, ie whether from the group holding company, from intermediate regional or national holding companies, or from operating banks and dealers.
The responsible supervisor supervises each bank on a stand-alone basis and understands its relationship with other members of the group.' Under Principle 16, jurisdictions may - I stress, may - also opt to be assessed by the IMF for compliance with the Principles against the 'additional' criterion 6 that a supervisor should ensure an adequate distribution of capital within a …
The international standards on banking will need to catch up.
The work to produce the reforms has also revealed conceptual gaps and flaws in the inherited regulatory framework that will, sooner or later, need to be addressed.
For example, the FPC will need to be able to defend its choice of stress against questions and criticisms that the scenarios are too extreme or not tough enough.
At the micro-supervisory level, the PRA Board will need to explain some of its remedial measures using the published stress tests.