Paul Beaudry
Bank of Canada
Track record: No forecast checked yet (25 not due, 4 being checked).
29forecasts & commitments on the record
79%can be checked as stated
45average ambiguity (0-100)
0goalpost moves recorded
0confirmed U-turns
Timeline
came true partly did not not due / being checked / too vague
Calibration score: shown after 10 checked forecasts with a stated likelihood (now 0).
How they speak about the future: based on data 20, educated guess 6, stated on authority 3.
Kinds of claim: forecast 12, mixed claim 9, scenario (if… then) 6, commitment 2. · Download this report card as a picture
In the nine words
πρόγνωσιςInference from evidence19 · 66%πρόνοιαPreparing for the future6 · 21%προαναγγελίαPublic pre-announcement2 · 7%εἰκασίαConjecture1 · 3%μαντείαInspired knowledge1 · 3%
How to read this
Each box is one sentence a public figure or institution said about the future, word for word, with a link to the official text. Can be checked means it names what will happen, by when, and how likely - so it can be compared with official figures later. Too vague to check means it does not. Ambiguity (0-100) is how many different ways the sentence can be read. When the date passes, the forecast is compared with official data and marked came true, partly or did not come true. Labels judge the sentence, never the person. Full guide and glossary.On the record (29)
As a result, if we want to make sense of the downward trends I just highlighted, it's important to understand how the real neutral rate is determined and what sort of structural forces could have caused it to drift lower over the 25 years before the pandemic.
If instead you were borrowing at a 3% real rate, then the real rate would reflect how much purchasing power you'd have to give up to service your debt.
If the nominal interest rate is 5% and the rate of inflation is 2%, then in three years your $2,000 trip will cost you about $2,120, but your savings will have grown to a bit over $2,300.
To sum up, when we looked at the recent dynamics in core inflation combined with ongoing excess demand, we agreed the likelihood that total inflation could get stuck well above the 2% target had increased.
We still expect headline inflation to have eased in May and to be near 3% later this summer, but this is largely due to lower energy prices and what we call base-year effects-the comparison of current price gains with the very large gains a year ago.
On the one hand, as I mentioned, lower Canadian prices could improve our competitiveness if exchange rates don't adjust.
If inflation stays above target for a significant amount of time, then high and variable inflation will likely go hand in hand with a less efficient, more distorted economy.
By the end of 2021, Canadian employment was 250,000 jobs above its pre-pandemic level, and the unemployment rate had fallen to 6%.
Returning to the 2% inflation target will bring back the stability Canada has known for the past 30 years, to the benefit of all Canadians.
If people start to base their expectations for inflation on the high inflation numbers they've been seeing lately rather than on the 2% inflation target, high inflation will become more persistent, volatile and self-perpetuating.
Canada lost over 3 million jobs, and the unemployment rate rose to 14% in May 2020.
We at the Bank will continue to listen to Canadians, analyze the situation and grow our knowledge in order to best respond to downturns in the economy.
And, most importantly, we will continue to take whatever actions are necessary to restore price stability for households and businesses and to maintain Canadians' confidence that we can deliver on our mandate of bringing inflation back to 2%.
At close to 7% today, inflation is well above our most recent forecast, and it is likely to move even higher in the near term before beginning to ease.
Indeed, National Accounts data for the first quarter of 2022, published earlier this week, show gross domestic product (GDP) growth of 3.1%, in line with the forecast in our April Monetary Policy Report .
If inflation pressures were more persistent, we would likely need to move the policy rate somewhat above neutral to bring inflation back to the target.
Based on the maturity profile of our portfolio, we expect these holdings to fall from around $440 billion at the end of 2021 to about $280 billion by the end of 2023-a further decline of more than 35%.
Given this, some may ask why we didn't start raising interest rates until March of this year.
1 In the Bank's latest Business Outlook Survey , published in April, the share of businesses saying they face labour shortages that restrict their ability to meet demand remained high, and most businesses expected labour shortages to persist until at least 2023.
Indeed, the economy grew rapidly, at close to 9 percent in the third quarter, just a bit below the 10 percent growth we had expected in our October Monetary Policy Report (MPR).
This will weigh on economic activity in the first quarter of 2021 and represents an important downside risk further out, if the situation becomes much worse.
We have been clear that we will hold our policy rate at its effective lower bound until economic slack is absorbed, so that the 2 percent inflation target is sustainably achieved.
But rest assured we will not overuse QE and overshoot our 1 to 3 percent target range for inflation.
That indicates that bad outcomes-if they arise-will tend to be worse when debt is growing.
If the initial impulse is positive, it will never directly cause below-normal economic activity later.
Climate risk could also give rise to a risk allocation vulnerability if people have a poor understanding of which assets are likely to perform badly as climate-related events become more frequent and we transition to a lower-carbon economy.
We know from experience that inflation will tend to stay close to our 2 percent target if the economy is close to its potential.
As you may know, since the 1990s, the Bank of Canada has conducted monetary policy with the aim of keeping inflation close to 2 percent.
We will also see this at play when I discuss our growth-at-risk framework.
Also said - not checkable as stated (7 newest)
Remarks about the future with no date, figure or likelihood that could be checked. They are kept on the record and shown here, but not scored.
If we want to understand these trends, we need to consider the structural forces that could have led to upward pressure on global saving or downward pressure on global investment.
Against this backdrop, a lot of discussion involves what monetary policy should do to minimize the risk that inflation expectations will drift persistently above our target.
This is a process known as 'de-anchoring,' and it can be associated with the self-fulfilling wage-price spirals that I warned against in my last speech. 7 To avoid this and bring inflation sustainably back to target, some have suggested that policy-makers may need to engineer a substantial slowdown-or even a recession.
We will work with our international partners to continuously improve how we respond as a group to shocks like the pandemic that have implications far beyond our own country's borders.
Yellen also urged G20 countries to 'avoid withdrawing support too early,' stressing that '[t]ogether, our efforts will be greater than the sum of our individual responses.'
I should note that QE operations may result in a profit or loss for the Bank because of the difference in interest rates between our borrowing cost and the return on government bonds.
In that context, we may need to re-examine the amount of stimulus needed to achieve our inflation target.