Patrick Honohan
Central Bank of Ireland
Track record: No forecast checked yet (46 not due, 24 being checked).
70forecasts & commitments on the record
69%can be checked as stated
45average ambiguity (0-100)
0goalpost moves recorded
0confirmed U-turns
Timeline
came true partly did not not due / being checked / too vague
Calibration score: shown after 10 checked forecasts with a stated likelihood (now 0).
How they speak about the future: based on data 54, educated guess 10, stated on authority 6.
Kinds of claim: forecast 43, scenario (if… then) 14, mixed claim 12, commitment 1. · Download this report card as a picture
In the nine words
πρόγνωσιςInference from evidence48 · 69%πρόνοιαPreparing for the future14 · 20%μαντείαInspired knowledge5 · 7%προαναγγελίαPublic pre-announcement1 · 1%εἰκασίαConjecture1 · 1%πρόβλεψιςSeeing the signs1 · 1%
How to read this
Each box is one sentence a public figure or institution said about the future, word for word, with a link to the official text. Can be checked means it names what will happen, by when, and how likely - so it can be compared with official figures later. Too vague to check means it does not. Ambiguity (0-100) is how many different ways the sentence can be read. When the date passes, the forecast is compared with official data and marked came true, partly or did not come true. Labels judge the sentence, never the person. Full guide and glossary.On the record (70)
What factors, if implemented differently by partner countries, could have eased the situation and allowed a more gradual adjustment, without damaging longer term growth prospects?
Under such a counterfactual, mechanically and assuming all other things equal, by the end of the three years of the programme the deficit would have been running at 6 percent of the baseline GDP more than it was and the debt ratio at that point would have been 12 percentage points higher.
That may be the case, but it can also be argued that attempting to struggle on with bond yields at 7 or 8 per cent (because of the remaining concerns of the market about Government debt sustainability) would not ultimately have reduced the burden on the average Irish citizen even if the Government had indeed followed the same tightening of …
In the end, less than half of this €35 billion was needed - and much of what was injected in this phase will eventually be recovered by the Government as it sells off its stake in the three surviving banks.
The Irish tax-and-welfare system held relative poverty rates to levels comparable to those of the UK, for example, despite a much steeper increase in comparable market divergences in Ireland (likely reflecting the much steeper jump in unemployment to almost 15 per cent in Ireland by 2012.)
20 For example, the lower figure might correspond to a scenario where all attempts to get some cost-sharing failed and it was decided to go ahead nevertheless with covering all senior creditors; the higher sum might possibly have been attained if a very favourable risk-sharing deal had been negotiated.
All in all, a possible net economic saving in the area of €2-€10bn could be imagined, but surely no more than that. 20 If so, by September 2008, well over 90 per cent of the net economic cost to Ireland of the boom and bust had become unavoidable.
Failing that, if Anglo and INBS were put into liquidation, over €30 billion in guarantee-related outlays might have been saved, but these fiscal savings would have been substantially offset by the wider economic disruption costs which would have been triggered and which could, to take a phrase from my 2010 Report (albeit there relating to a slightly different scenario), 'have …
19 The large crisis and post-crisis period profits of the Central Bank (€8 bn between 2009 and 2014) could also be considered an additional offset to the net fiscal costs.
The Central Bank shared the view of other Irish officials that, if €35 billion were really needed for that purpose, debt sustainability of the Irish government would be likely unattainable. 12
The new and more onerous capital requirements that were set for the banks gave rise to a government cash injection as high as the €35 billion projected by the Troika staff.
Even now a precise estimate is not yet possible: current valuations of the State's banking shares suggesting a figure for the net long-term fiscal costs of bank recapitalisation of the order of 22 per cent of 2008 GDP may be compared to the 'in excess of 15 per cent' mentioned in the report.
We at the Central Bank cannot attempt to oversee each case - though we are shortly embarking on a further probe to detect any systematic deviations from this code and we will continue to hold regulated lenders to account for any deficiencies in their policies and practices in this regard.
Helping build the lenders' capacity in this regard will be the Central Credit Register, now in preparation at the Central Bank (though this is an inherently slow-burning project which is not due to go live until early 2016).
The Central Bank's recent consultation paper pointedly raises the question of whether adequately insured mortgages should be allowed to exceed the general 80 per cent rule which has been proposed - this might cover up to 90 per cent, for example.
Getting the euro area inflation rate back up closer to 2 per cent, in line with the medium term target of the European Central Bank (ECB) is technically quite a tricky challenge.
Finally, as someone who studied macroeconomic dynamics in graduate school, I was very struck by the neglected relevance of the r - g dynamic (i.e. the dominance and concentration wealth will grow in the economy if the average rate of return on capital continues to exceed the rate of growth of economic activity) for interpreting and predicting trends in the …
The cumulative change in GDP, consumption and employment over the three years may have been as much as 2 percentage points lower than projected (though GNP did not undershoot by much), and we end with an unemployment rate at around 12½ per cent instead of coming in below 12 per cent as was expected.
If the banks can manage to accelerate their processing of the large backlog of troubled legacy debt into sustainable solutions, much of what is needed to restore their health will have been achieved.
A community bank may be able to offer the range of retail services that low or middle-income households and small and micro enterprises require even if operating on a scale well below €1 billion - and do it professionally and efficiently, and with sensitivity to local conditions.
None of the Irish banks ever got to the €3 trillion scale of the largest European megabanks, but even at €200 billion in total assets for each of the top two - well in excess of national GDP - and €100 billion for the third, each of the largest nationally-controlled Irish banks was on a scale that could and did …
Banking in 2020 will have to be composed of entities that are financially solid and profitable, delivering the services needed for strong performance of the non-financial economy.
The growth in the activity of the Icelandic banks was extraordinary: little more than 100 per cent of GDP in 2004, the consolidated total assets of the three main banks reached about 10 times that by end-2007.
House prices are an important determinant of predicted loan losses in most models; having fallen during 2011 faster than we had expected, the average price of Irish residential property then stabilised and now stands well above (about 10% more than) where we expected it to be.
sheet assessment, inclusive of macroeconomic stress tests, expected to be completed by mid-2014.
How this trend will map into future loan losses is one of the key questions that need to be answered for the 2014 exercise.
If this proportion is, say 30-50 per cent, it could leave the borrower with enough equity to purchase step-down accommodation.
It is now expected to apply from January 2014.
It was passed by Referendum in Ireland in May 2012 with 60% of the vote.
(Perhaps this reminds us that not all of his long-term forecasts have worked out as expected.) Back in the 1970s of course, Ireland was part of another currency union, that with Britain, from which we imported the rapid inflation (peaking at well over 20 per cent) of those years.
A reversal of some of the loss of competitiveness that was incurred in earlier years has contributed here, though more is needed if the return to growth in private sector employment is to be accelerated to the point where overall employment is growing again on a sustainable basis which our forecasters believe could happen during the course of this year.
Irish Sovereign spreads may no longer be bloated by redenomination risk, but at 300 basis points at the long-end, they do seem to reflect a credit risk premium that is poor reward, so far, for what has been a sizable fiscal adjustment effort.
The first of these is in full active preparation; draft legislation is expected to be complete by the end of 2012 with an implementation phase during 2013.
Actually, were it not overshadowed by that of Ireland, the recent economic performance of Scotland, might be characterised in much the same language, if I am to look at the latest GDP figures which show Scotland's economy to be still 3 per cent below its 2007 peak, with construction - 15 per cent below peak - the weakest sector.
Though the deficiency of Irish Shipping - probably well under €0.5 billion in today's money - may seem dwarfed by the banking losses of recent years, it was too much for the Government to take on (even though it owned the firm) and Irish Shipping was liquidated.
In addition, some of the banks' non-core assets were slated for deleveraging: projected realisations for these entailed further losses which could have been avoided if funding had been available to hold these to maturity.
3 Projecting macroeconomic variables following such a deep decline was already a challenge, but even if they could be known, attempting to map macro forecasts into loan-losses brought any existing models (the banks had some) well beyond the range within which they could be relied upon.
Previously, though, the discovery in September 2010 that AIB's losses on the property developer loans transferred to NAMA were going to be €3 billion more than had been implied by the haircuts on the first tranche of NAMA transfers re-opened a capital deficiency in that bank and highlighted the 'just enough' capitalisation approach that had been used in March 2010.
The other large going concern entity Bank of Ireland loss rate had to meet €11.4 billion of additional capital requirements, which may be compared with its pre-crisis total assets of €197.4 billion.
GNP by 13.9%) and employment and the steady decline in house prices both actual and forecast, there was very little in historical experience - either in Ireland or in other advanced economies with large financial sectors - to guide those attempting to estimate the range of plausible outcomes for a bank lending portfolio which had clearly been inadequately underwritten.
The projected loss rates that were chosen varied widely across the different categories (for example the stress-loss rate on Irish commercial development property non-NAMA for Bank of Ireland was 60%; for Irish retail mortgages it was 5.6%), and to a lesser extent across the banks.
And, alas, markets will demand higher interest rates if debt does not appear tolerable.
Meanwhile, given the final view of the Troika lenders that only the holders of subordinated debt - and not of senior debt - could be required to share in the losses, these additional capital requirements brought the total state injection from €47bn to €64bn. 3 By now, the Irish Government has provided about a half of the capital requirements generated …
Only in 2013 does the Central Bank expect the domestic demand to stop falling.
Just as economic historians have often castigated the Victorian British banks for contributing little to the growth of British industry, so the Irish banks might have contributed more if they had been geared-up to spotting lending opportunities for budding exporters.
Above all, as has been remarked across the political spectrum in Europe in recent days, that cooperation must emphasise a growth and employment focus which, if successful, could have the effect of dissolving debt and deficit problems faster than anything else.
Even if, on these indicators the turnaround will come in 2013, as is forecast by most analysts, it is not unreasonable to wonder whether more could and should be done to accelerate the correction.
Nevertheless, the labour market situation is deteriorating at a much slower pace than previously and modest employment growth could emerge by the latter part of next year.
Although Ireland could expect to import medium term inflation rates in line with the rest of the euro area, the external weakness of the euro in its early years, combined with the booming national economy meant that inflation in Ireland soared to an annual rate as high as 7 per cent briefly.
First, there is phased deficit reduction projected to bring Government debt under control and declining by 2014.
Showing the newest 50 - the ledger has all 70.
Also said - not checkable as stated (12 newest)
Remarks about the future with no date, figure or likelihood that could be checked. They are kept on the record and shown here, but not scored.
The Irish authorities were not entirely passive in the decisions about the speed of adjustment that would have to be implemented, but (as already indicated) they could not have negotiated a more gradual adjustment than actually happened.
Probably some extensive form of guarantee would still have to have been granted, but it should not have included subordinated debt nor existing senior term debt.
If necessary, drawing on its legislative powers for consumer protection, the Central Bank will codify such a requirement formally, but this should not be necessary.
Since they do not seem to have such a policy, they will need to develop one.
Opening statement by Mr Patrick Honohan, Governor of the Central Bank of Ireland, to the Oireachtas (National Parliament) Joint Committee on Finance, Public Expenditure and Reform, Dublin, 28 May 2015.
Since the crisis, banks' SVR rates have moved higher than previously relative to the banks' cost of funds and arguably higher than a fair-minded customer might have reasonably expected.
Were it not for the firm conviction that the introduction of administrative control on interest rates in Ireland would be bad for the country as a whole in the medium term - notably because of its stultifying effect on bank efficiency and its chilling effect on the entry of other banks - there could be a case for some government …
A different/new contractual arrangement that linked the floating rate on new mortgages to actual funding costs of the banks could be designed in such a way as to achieve the original aims of the tracker without retaining the vulnerability of the ECB policy-rate linked tracker.
With greater prudence by management and boards of the lending banks, this bubble could not have happened.
But redressing the emergent deficit in day-to-day spending was actually going to require a much larger adjustment in government revenue and spending (not least because of the degree to which boom-time tax revenue fell off).
By 2013, the spending and revenue measures that had been adopted totalled almost €30 billion per annum, whereas the total outlay on bank recapitalisation came to a one-off €64 billion, of which at least a third should be recoverable as the banks are sold off again (Figures 2 and 3 shows the relative size of fiscal policy tightening since 2007 …
Partly true 2: 'The European Institutions pushed Ireland into the EU-IMF programme.' An unequivocal public indication by Europe that it would continue to underpin the liquidity needs of the Irish banking system might well have avoided the need for a programme - but it would not have avoided the need for austerity.