Pablo Hernández de Cos
BIS
Track record: 4 forecasts checked: 2 came true, 0 partly, 2 did not.
330forecasts & commitments on the record
75%can be checked as stated
32average ambiguity (0-100)
0goalpost moves recorded
0confirmed U-turns
Timeline
came true partly did not not due / being checked / too vague
Calibration score: shown after 10 checked forecasts with a stated likelihood (now 4).
How they speak about the future: based on data 277, stated on authority 30, educated guess 23.
Kinds of claim: forecast 255, mixed claim 53, scenario (if… then) 20, commitment 2. · Download this report card as a picture
In the nine words
πρόγνωσιςInference from evidence270 · 82%μαντείαInspired knowledge28 · 8%πρόνοιαPreparing for the future20 · 6%πρόβλεψιςSeeing the signs5 · 2%εἰκασίαConjecture4 · 1%φρόνησιςPractical wisdom2 · 1%προαναγγελίαPublic pre-announcement1 · 0%
How to read this
Each box is one sentence a public figure or institution said about the future, word for word, with a link to the official text. Can be checked means it names what will happen, by when, and how likely - so it can be compared with official figures later. Too vague to check means it does not. Ambiguity (0-100) is how many different ways the sentence can be read. When the date passes, the forecast is compared with official data and marked came true, partly or did not come true. Labels judge the sentence, never the person. Full guide and glossary.Checked
Overall, inflation is forecast to stand at 5.4% in 2023, to subsequently ease to 3% in 2024 and 2.2% in 2025.
Came true. Said: inflation around 3% in 2024. Official figure for Spain: 2.8% (World Bank open data). On target. Off by 0.2 points. official data · checked 14 Nov 2026 · automatic check against official data (rules v3)
The GDP growth forecast for 2025 is unchanged at 1.6%.
Did not come true. Said: economic growth around 1.6% in 2025. Official figure for Spain: 2.8% (World Bank open data). Missed. Off by 1.2 points. official data · checked 14 Nov 2026 · automatic check against official data (rules v3)
Thus, euro area GDP is projected to grow at 0.5% in 2023 (3.4% in 2022), rising to rates close to 2% in 2024 and 2025.
Did not come true. Said: economic growth around 2% in 2024. Official figure for Euro area: 0.9% (World Bank open data). Missed. Off by 1.1 points. official data · checked 14 Nov 2026 · automatic check against official data (rules v3)
Specifically, the projections envisage that GDP will grow by 4.5% in 2022, 2.9% in 2023 and 2.5% in 2024.
Came true. Said: economic growth around 2.9% in 2023. Official figure for Spain: 2.5% (World Bank open data). On target. Off by 0.4 points. official data · checked 14 Nov 2026 · automatic check against official data (rules v3)
On the record (330)
The design phase will run until early 2028 and will show us what is feasible, how much a second tower would cost the BIS and what benefits it would bring.
The global economy has been surprisingly resilient this year, partly because of optimism that artificial intelligence could increase productivity and boost economic growth.
If these claims on liquidity do not decline proportionally when reserves are reduced, banks might be left more exposed to liquidity risk and contribute to greater financial fragility.
An important takeaway from this exercise is that, even after controlling for the successive upward surprises in energy commodity prices and other technical assumptions underlying the projections, inflation forecast errors have remained positive and account for around 30 % of total forecast errors during the period 2020 Q4-2023 Q3.
Inflation stood at 2.4 % in April 2024 and, based on ECB staff projections, the inflation rate will continue to ease, although with a somewhat bumpy profile in the short term.
It is true that euro area GDP decelerated notably in 2023, growing by an anaemic 0.4%, and that the outlook for this year is also relatively weak.
Indeed, we have responded to this new context by increasing optionality and emphasising that we will act in a data-dependent manner in order to deliver on our mandate of price stability.
Indeed, energy base effects, the unwinding of crisis-related fiscal measures and the relatively slow moderation of services inflation, will cause inflation rates to fluctuate during 2024, before reaching our 2 % target in mid-2025.
Thus we shall be closely monitoring the materialisation of such risks and calibrate accordingly the degree of monetary restriction, in particular in a context in which our staff projections are currently anticipating a gradual return of inflation towards our 2% symmetric target in the medium-run and with the risks to the inflation outlook being, in my view, balanced.
However, the frequency of such events and the size of flood-prone areas could increase in the future if nothing is done to prevent climate change.
According to a granular analysis 13 conducted by the Banco de Espaæa, 1.3% of the residential properties used as mortgage collateral in Spain are located in areas at risk of flooding within the next 10 years.
At the same time, export growth in the medium term could be jeopardised if the deterioration in ULCs relative to our main euro area partners observed since the pandemic continues over time.
Other matters will also be examined over the next two years, such as how to ensure the optimal user experience and digital euro access for everyone that wants it, irrespective of their level of financial and digital inclusion.
According to forecasts from the Spanish Statistical Office, only under very optimistic assumptions regarding the recovery of fertility rates and immigrant arrivals would the working-age population (i.e. individuals aged 16 to 67) not decline but hold at around the current level of 32 million,'.
In addition, the average age of the working-age population, currently at 43.7 years, will remain well above 44 years during the period 2035-2072.
Indeed, taking Spain as an example, according to our independent fiscal authority (Airef), total pension expenditure is projected to increase from around 13% of GDP at present to 16.2% by 2050.
These increases could begin to have negative repercussions on the demand for labour, particularly if productivity growth remains low, as in recent years.
This moderation in unit labour costs, along with the expected fall in profit margins, is essential to ensure convergence towards the ECB's 2% inflation target over the medium term.
Overall, population ageing is estimated to have reduced the labour force participation rate by just over 3 pp. 14 According to the projections currently available, by 2030 it will have decreased the participation rate by a further 3 pp.
According to these projections, population ageing will accelerate in Spain over the coming decades, outpacing both the EU and the euro area as a whole. 15 Far from being a temporary phenomenon, this will become a permanent trend, as illustrated by a dependency ratio that is set to remain above 50% from 2045.
Most of the students of this year's class will continue their graduate studies towards a PhD, five of them at CEMFI, while the rest have found or are about to find jobs in accordance with their high qualifications.
Growth is projected to stabilise in the second half of the year, and to remain stable in 2024 and 2025, underpinned by a recovery in real disposable income thanks to the anticipated easing of inflation, rising wages and resilient employment.
According to our projections, headline inflation will average 3.2% this year and increase to 3.6% in 2024, mainly as a result of the expected withdrawal of the measures deployed to combat the effects of inflation.
Similar growth rates are projected for 2024 (2.2%) and 2025 (2.1%), albeit underpinned by the recovery in private consumption and less so by the contribution of net external demand, which was the main growth driver in 2023.
Overall, inflation is forecast to stand at 5.4% in 2023, to subsequently ease to 3% in 2024 and 2.2% in 2025.
Came true. Said: inflation around 3% in 2024. Official figure for Spain: 2.8% (World Bank open data). On target. Off by 0.2 points. official data · checked 14 Nov 2026 · automatic check against official data (rules v3)
The GDP growth forecast for 2025 is unchanged at 1.6%.
Did not come true. Said: economic growth around 1.6% in 2025. Official figure for Spain: 2.8% (World Bank open data). Missed. Off by 1.2 points. official data · checked 14 Nov 2026 · automatic check against official data (rules v3)
All told, GDP is projected to grow by 0.9% in 2023 and by 1.5% in 2024, with both figures revised down by 0.1 percentage points (pp) compared with the March projections.
On balance, it is safe to say that monetary policy is already beginning to pass through to real activity and inflation, though the bulk of the impact will be felt from this year onwards.
10 According to the March projections, the fiscal measures to offset the rise in energy prices and inflation are expected to have a downward impact of 0.3 pp on headline inflation measured by the harmonised index of consumer prices (HICP) in 2023 and, once withdrawn, an upward effect of around 0.5 pp in 2024 and 0.2 pp in 2025.
The March inflation projections assume a gradual recovery in real wages, which are expected to stand at levels similar to their 2022 Q1 levels by the end of 2025.
Lastly, April 2023 saw the longer-term inflation expectations of professional forecasters (relating to 2027) and those in the Consensus Forecasts (referring to the average for 20282032) revised down slightly, to 2.1% and 2%, respectively.
Inflation is projected to gradually fall from 8.4% on average in 2022 to 5.3% in 2023 (2.8% in Q4), then drop to 2.9% in 2024, before drawing close to our medium-term target in 2025, when it will stand at 2.1% (2% in Q3 and Q4 of that year).
The latest projections, published in March, 1 forecast that euro area real GDP growth will slow to 1% in 2023 (down 2.6 percentage points (pp) on 2022), albeit gradually recovering in the second part of the year, with growth of 1.6% expected for 2024 and 2025.
The decline in 2022 was on account of the growth in total assets (2.6%) and the increase in risk-weighted asset (RWA) density (53 bp), which could not be offset by the 2.1% rise in CET1 capital.
- -Revenue from the windfall tax on banking sector profits in 2023 is expected to amount to 5% of the 2022 net consolidated profit.
However, faster than expected growth in the first quarter, together with the recent revision of the historical series, suggest that GDP growth this year could exceed the 1.6% envisaged in our most recent projections and outstrip 2% on average in 2024 and 2025.
Specifically, the ECB projections point to inflation averaging 5.3% in 2023, before decreasing to 2.9% in 2024 and to 2.1% in 2025 .
But there are factors affecting underlying inflation that may delay its return to the 2% target in the medium run and that we will therefore monitor closely going forward.
14 According to the ECB's March forecast, nominal wage growth, as measured by compensation per employee, will increase from 4.6% in 2022 to 5,3% in 2023, before declining to 4,4% in 2024 and 3,6% in 2025.
3 In the March projections, the energy and inflation compensatory fiscal measures are expected to have a downward impact of 0.3 percentage points on HICP inflation in 2023, and to have an upward impact of around 0.5 percentage points in 2024 and 0.2 percentage points in 2025 on their withdrawal.
Headline inflation is expected to remain high for the rest of 2023, albeit on a downward path that will take it to 2.8% in the last quarter of the year.
And, in any case, the accumulated growth path expected now for 2022-2024 is significantly lower - around 2.5% lower - than that projected in December 2021, before the war in Ukraine, reflecting the material deterioration of euro area terms of trade.
In particular, according to the flash estimate, 2 inflation was slightly lower than expected and stood at 8.5% in January, down from 10.1% in November.
In a context of lower energy prices, the ceiling on prices may not become operative; the downward impact of these measures in 2023 would therefore be lower and, subsequently, the upward impact of their reversal in 2024 would be lower as well.
Indeed, this is the main reason why our December projections revised inflation upwards in 2024 to 3.4%.
Compared with those published in September, the December staff projections contained an appreciable upward revision in the average inflation rates for 2023 and 2024 to 6.3% and 3.4%, respectively, and also envisaged inflation averaging 2.3% in 2025 (the last year of our projection horizon), above our 2% medium-term target.
More importantly for the purpose of my address today, we also announced that interest rates would still have to rise significantly at a steady pace to reach levels that are sufficiently restrictive to ensure a timely return of inflation to the 2% medium-term target.
The Eurosystem December forecast projected wage growth, as measured by compensation per employee, to increase from 4.5% in 2022 to 5.2% in 2023 before declining to 4.5% in 2024 and 3.9% in 2025 as inflation declines.
And retaining the need for public deficits to stay below the 3% reference value over the medium term, which has proven effective in anchoring Member States' public accounts. 5 .
The current location decisions and choice of providers are the result of long-run economic forces, which might work differently in a deglobalisation phase, especially if this is more abrupt and takes place in a short period of time, which could lead to non-linear effects on growth, inflation or monetary policy transmission.
Showing the newest 50 - the ledger has all 330.
Also said - not checkable as stated (12 newest)
Remarks about the future with no date, figure or likelihood that could be checked. They are kept on the record and shown here, but not scored.
However, the overall economic impact remains highly uncertain, and governments may also need to spend more money to support workers who have lost their jobs.
We must find the political will and consensus to take action.
The latest price surge is still fresh in our minds: companies could raise the prices of their products again, and employees could demand higher wages.
We also need to be alert to the possible short-term inflationary impact of AI.
Unless reserves are supplied ex ante, banks facing reserve shortages may need to borrow from central bank facilities, often at penalty rates and against stringent collateral requirements.
This friction may be particularly severe when banks need to liquidate large volumes of non-reserve HQLA in stress.
To counter this, central banks have to intervene based on forecasts of developments in autonomous factors, which can be challenging.
I will examine the main factors determining the structural level of reserves in the system, the policy choices available to central banks and the trade-offs that those choices entail.
But while the central bank’s cost of supplying large reserves may be small, the costs to the financial system and society may be greater – as argued by Isabel Schnabel (2025) last year.
All in all, a first key lesson from this inflationary episode is that central banks should endeavour to make their forecast machinery better equipped to handle large shocks and project their impact on inflation over the medium run.
Operational Resilience, which establish that banks should assume as a working hypothesis that disruptions will occur and should define their tolerance for disruption.
As does the need to accept that, despite all our preventive efforts, at some point there will be a cyber incident that has an impact.