Nigel Jenkinson
Central bank (via BIS)
Track record: No forecast checked yet (1 not due, 0 being checked).
1forecasts & commitments on the record
0%can be checked as stated
71average ambiguity (0-100)
0goalpost moves recorded
0confirmed U-turns
Timeline
came true partly did not not due / being checked / too vague
Calibration score: shown after 10 checked forecasts with a stated likelihood (now 0).
How they speak about the future: based on data 1.
Kinds of claim: forecast 1.
In the nine words
How to read this
Each box is one sentence a public figure or institution said about the future, word for word, with a link to the official text. Can be checked means it names what will happen, by when, and how likely - so it can be compared with official figures later. Too vague to check means it does not. Ambiguity (0-100) is how many different ways the sentence can be read. When the date passes, the forecast is compared with official data and marked came true, partly or did not come true. Labels judge the sentence, never the person. Full guide and glossary.On the record (1)
- The outstanding value of interest rate swaps and other derivatives reached almost $600 trillion or some 11 times annual global GDP by the end of 2007, according to the BIS.
Also said - not checkable as stated (12 newest)
Remarks about the future with no date, figure or likelihood that could be checked. They are kept on the record and shown here, but not scored.
So any investor trying to estimate the distribution of likely future delinquency rates amongst sub-prime borrowers would not only have to consider the range of macroeconomic outcomes but also how much this effect would be amplified by poor credit risk screening.
But it must also be borne in mind that imperfections within financial markets will affect the performance of these innovative financial products, that may in turn limit their availability.
Simpler products should be easier to understand and therefore less prone to radical changes in expectations of their likely performance.
An investor wanting to make an inter-temporal transfer without taking on any credit risk, for example, could then buy a bond and purchase credit default swap protection, thus retaining exposure to the cash flows on the risk free component of the underlying instrument.
- Furthermore, because credit default swaps have different maturities, investors could, for example, buy the corporate bond and retain the resulting exposure to default risk in the near term.
Furthermore, banks and supervisors should analyse in far greater depth how the wide range of liquidity risks may crystallise, separately or conjointly, in a stressed market environment.
For example, a bank revealing a weak funding position could precipitate an adverse reaction, although that should of course lead to stronger risk management as a precaution against that risk.
Finally, testing should consider longer horizons, to cater for the possibility that a liquidity crisis could persist for some time.
A bank may be well-capitalised and profitable with a sound loan book, but if depositors lose confidence in the bank's ability to provide their funds as and when they request them, the crystallisation of liquidity risk can bring down an otherwise viable institution in short order.
Many banks took advantage of new sources of wholesale funding available from securitisation - the packaging of loans into instruments which could be sold on in financial markets.
Banks originated large volumes of long-term loans in the expectation that they could be quickly and readily sold on, but leaving them with additional funding risks if they could not.
As new products and players emerge in the commercial sector, they may also need to adapt the scope of their oversight and regulatory response.