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THE ORACLE HUNTERS • EVERY PROPHECY ON THE RECORD 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Oracle HuntersEvery prophecy, on the record. · Οἱ Κυνηγοὶ τῶν ΧρησμῶνUnder development

← Tracking the Prophets

Naoki Tamura

Bank of Japan

Track record: No forecast checked yet (28 not due, 8 being checked).
36forecasts & commitments on the record
97%can be checked as stated
30average ambiguity (0-100)
0goalpost moves recorded
0confirmed U-turns

Timeline

20232023: Not due yet2023: Not due yet2023: Not due yet2023: Not due yet2023: Due - being checked2023: Due - being checked20242024: Not due yet2024: Not due yet2024: Not due yet2024: Due - being checked2024: Due - being checked2024: Not due yet2024: Not due yet2024: Not due yet (+4 more)20252025: Not due yet2025: Not due yet2025: Not due yet2025: Not due yet2025: Not due yet2025: Not due yet2025: Not due yet2025: Not due yet (+4 more)20262026: Not due yet2026: Not due yet2026: Not due yet2026: Not due yet2026: Not due yet2026: Not due yet
came true partly did not not due / being checked / too vague

Calibration score: shown after 10 checked forecasts with a stated likelihood (now 0).
How they speak about the future: based on data 33, educated guess 2, stated on authority 1.
Kinds of claim: forecast 26, mixed claim 9, commitment 1. · Download this report card as a picture

In the nine words

πρόγνωσιςInference from evidence33 · 92%εἰκασίαConjecture2 · 6%προαναγγελίαPublic pre-announcement1 · 3%
How to read this Each box is one sentence a public figure or institution said about the future, word for word, with a link to the official text. Can be checked means it names what will happen, by when, and how likely - so it can be compared with official figures later. Too vague to check means it does not. Ambiguity (0-100) is how many different ways the sentence can be read. When the date passes, the forecast is compared with official data and marked came true, partly or did not come true. Labels judge the sentence, never the person. Full guide and glossary.

On the record (36)

1 The outlook formulated in April 2026 assumes that, based, for example, on developments in futures markets, Dubai crude oil prices will decline from around 105 U.S. dollars per barrel to the range of around 70-80 dollars per barrel toward the end of fiscal 2028.
Bank of Japan · said 25 Jun 2026 (date) · Economic activity, prices and monetary policy in Japan · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedForecastbased on dataambiguity 56/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partbelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2028Not due yetinflationfiscalenergy
From fiscal 2027 onward, the Bank projects that the real GDP growth rate will rise moderately, as it is expected that the adverse effects of high crude oil prices will wane and that a virtuous cycle from income to spending will gradually intensify.
Bank of Japan · said 25 Jun 2026 (date) · Economic activity, prices and monetary policy in Japan · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedForecastbased on dataambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2027Not due yetinflationgrowthfiscalfinanceenergy
First, the Bank will reduce the planned amount of its monthly purchases of JGBs by, in principle, about 200 billion yen each calendar quarter until JanuaryMarch 2027.
Bank of Japan · said 25 Jun 2026 (date) · Economic activity, prices and monetary policy in Japan · evidence & why
Let me elaborate on the neutral interest rate -- the sum of the natural rate of interest, which is the real interest rate level that is neutral to economic activity and prices, and the expected rate of inflation. 5 As I have previously stated, my sense is that the neutral interest rate should be at least around 1 percent, partly …
Bank of Japan · said 25 Jun 2026 (date) · Economic activity, prices and monetary policy in Japan · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidencePartly checkableMixed claimbased on dataambiguity 56/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetinflationinterest ratesgrowth
average of households' inflation outlook for the next five years is 10.3 percent, up 0.5 percentage points from the December 2025 survey -- although bias in expected price levels should be taken into account.
Bank of Japan · said 25 Jun 2026 (date) · Economic activity, prices and monetary policy in Japan · evidence & why
In this regard, the aggregate results of this year's annual spring labor-management wage negotiations compiled by the Japanese Trade Union Confederation (Rengo), as shown in Chart 5, indicate that both large firms and small and medium-sized firms are expected to maintain solid wage increases, with base pay hikes of around 3.5 percent, exceeding 2 percent.
Bank of Japan · said 25 Jun 2026 (date) · Economic activity, prices and monetary policy in Japan · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedForecastbased on dataambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2026Not due yetlabourtrade
assessment of the plan for the reduction in its JGB purchases decided at the July 2024 MPM, and then decided that (1) the Bank will reduce the planned amount of its monthly purchases of JGBs so that it will be about 2 trillion yen in January-March 2027; and (2) the amount will
Bank of Japan · said 25 Jun 2025 (date) · Economic activity, prices and monetary policy in Japan · evidence & why
The year-on-year rate of increase in the CPI is likely to continue rising at around 2 percent through fiscal 2027, but if global production systems are disturbed and supply chains are disrupted, prices in Japan may be pushed up, mainly through a rise in import prices.
Bank of Japan · said 25 Jun 2025 (date) · Economic activity, prices and monetary policy in Japan · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedForecastbased on dataambiguity 56/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2027Not due yetinflationfiscaltrade
The results of the Bank's Opinion Survey on the General Public's Views and Behavior show that the median of households' inflation outlook for five years ahead has been significantly above 2 percent and the average outlook has recently been rising, although bias in expected price levels should be taken into account.
Bank of Japan · said 25 Jun 2025 (date) · Economic activity, prices and monetary policy in Japan · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidencePartly checkableMixed claimbased on dataambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetinflationfinance
In terms of the medians of the Policy Board members' forecasts presented in the April Outlook Report, the rate of increase is expected to be at 2.2 percent for fiscal 2025, 1.7 percent for fiscal 2026, and 1.9 percent for fiscal 2027 (Chart 2).
Bank of Japan · said 25 Jun 2025 (date) · Economic activity, prices and monetary policy in Japan · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedForecastbased on dataambiguity 0/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablemeets the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2026Not due yetfiscal
In terms of the medians of the Policy Board members' forecasts -- as presented in the April 2025 Outlook for Economic Activity and Prices (Outlook Report) -- Japan's real GDP growth rate is expected to be at 0.5 percent for fiscal 2025, 0.7 percent for fiscal 2026, and 1.0 percent for fiscal 2027 (Chart 1).
Bank of Japan · said 25 Jun 2025 (date) · Economic activity, prices and monetary policy in Japan · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedForecastbased on dataambiguity 0/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablemeets the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2026Not due yetinflationgrowthfiscal
Nevertheless, the year-on-year rate of increase in the CPI is likely to continue rising at around 2 percent through fiscal 2027.
Bank of Japan · said 25 Jun 2025 (date) · Economic activity, prices and monetary policy in Japan · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedForecastbased on dataambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2027Not due yetinflationfiscal
It should be noted, however, that even if people with high inflation expectations, like respondents saying that prices "will go up significantly," have increased their expectations further, they are only able to choose the same response.
Bank of Japan · said 06 Feb 2025 (date) · Economic activity, prices and monetary policy in Japan · evidence & why
εἰκασία · ConjecturePartly checkableMixed claimeducated guessambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partbelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetinflation
In terms of the median of the Policy Board members' forecasts, the CPI (all items less fresh food) is projected to see a yearon-year rate of increase of 2.7 percent for fiscal 2024, 2.4 percent for fiscal 2025, and 2.0 percent for fiscal 2026 (Chart 8).
Bank of Japan · said 06 Feb 2025 (date) · Economic activity, prices and monetary policy in Japan · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedForecastbased on dataambiguity 0/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablemeets the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2026Not due yetinflationfiscal
The results of the Bank's Opinion Survey on the General Public's Views and Behavior show that households' inflation outlook for five years ahead has been significantly above 2 percent, although bias in expected price levels should be taken into account. 3 Considering these factors, I believe that inflation expectations of firms and households have risen steadily and have generally reached …
Bank of Japan · said 06 Feb 2025 (date) · Economic activity, prices and monetary policy in Japan · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidencePartly checkableMixed claimbased on dataambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetinflationfinance
According to the Bank's estimate, the output gap has been at around 0 percent recently, although this rate needs to be viewed with latitude, as estimates may differ depending on the estimation methods and are subject to estimation errors (Chart 6).
Bank of Japan · said 06 Feb 2025 (date) · Economic activity, prices and monetary policy in Japan · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidencePartly checkableMixed claimbased on dataambiguity 83/100implied call / likelihood: No · 40% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetgrowthfinance
In light of these points, I believe solid wage growth that is consistent with the price stability target of 2 percent can be expected at this year's annual spring labor-management wage negotiations.
Bank of Japan · said 06 Feb 2025 (date) · Economic activity, prices and monetary policy in Japan · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedForecastbased on dataambiguity 0/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablemeets the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2025Due - being checkedinflationgrowthlabour
In terms of the median of the Policy Board members' forecasts -- as presented in the January 2025 Outlook for Economic Activity and Prices (Outlook Report) -Japan's real GDP growth rate is expected to be at 0.5 percent for fiscal 2024, 1.1 percent for fiscal 2025, and 1.0 percent for fiscal 2026 (Chart 1).
Bank of Japan · said 06 Feb 2025 (date) · Economic activity, prices and monetary policy in Japan · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedForecastbased on dataambiguity 0/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablemeets the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2026Not due yetinflationgrowthfiscal
Therefore, I think it is necessary for the Bank to raise the short-term interest rate to at least that level by the second half of the projection period that runs through fiscal 2026 to contain upside risks to prices and achieve the price stability target in a sustainable and stable manner.
Bank of Japan · said 12 Sep 2024 (date) · Economic activity, prices and monetary policy in Japan · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidencePartly checkableForecastbased on dataambiguity 36/100below the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2026Not due yetinflationinterest ratesfiscalfinance
If this outlook is realized, I think it will be necessary for the Bank to raise the short-term policy interest rate to a level that is neutral to economic activity and prices -- i.e., the nominal neutral interest rate -- by the second half of the projection period that runs through fiscal 2026.
Bank of Japan · said 12 Sep 2024 (date) · Economic activity, prices and monetary policy in Japan · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidencePartly checkableMixed claimbased on dataambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partbelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2026Not due yetinflationinterest ratesgrowthfiscalfinance
Underlying CPI inflation is expected to increase gradually; in the second half of the projection period presented in the July Outlook Report -- which covers the period through fiscal 2026 -- it is likely to be at a level that is generally consistent with the price stability target.
Bank of Japan · said 12 Sep 2024 (date) · Economic activity, prices and monetary policy in Japan · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedForecastbased on dataambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2026Not due yetinflationfiscal
In terms of the median of the Policy Board members' forecasts, the CPI (all items less fresh food) is projected to continue to see a year-on-year rate of increase of around 2 percent -specifically, 2.5 percent for fiscal 2024, 2.1 percent for fiscal 2025, and 1.9 percent for fiscal 2026 (Chart 6).
Bank of Japan · said 12 Sep 2024 (date) · Economic activity, prices and monetary policy in Japan · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedForecastbased on dataambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2025Due - being checkedinflationfiscal
In terms of the median of the Policy Board members' forecasts -- as presented in the July 2024 Outlook for Economic Activity and Prices (Outlook Report) -Japan's real GDP growth rate is expected to be at 0.6 percent for fiscal 2024, 1.0 percent for fiscal 2025, and 1.0 percent for fiscal 2026 (Chart 1).
Bank of Japan · said 12 Sep 2024 (date) · Economic activity, prices and monetary policy in Japan · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedForecastbased on dataambiguity 0/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablemeets the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2025Due - being checkedinflationgrowthfiscal
Thus, bearing in mind that the short-term interest rate should be at the 1 percent level by the second half of the projection period that runs through fiscal 2026, I think the Bank needs to gradually raise this rate in response to the increase in the likelihood of achieving the price stability target.
Bank of Japan · said 12 Sep 2024 (date) · Economic activity, prices and monetary policy in Japan · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidencePartly checkableMixed claimbased on dataambiguity 56/100below the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2026Not due yetinterest ratesfiscalfinance
This means that the interest rate level will increase by around 0.1 percentage point, given that the rate was in the range of minus 0.1 to 0 percent before the policy change.
Bank of Japan · said 27 Mar 2024 (date) · Economic activity, prices and monetary policy in Japan · evidence & why
Specifically, the Bank has set the uncollateralized overnight call rate as the policy interest rate and will encourage that rate to remain at around 0 to 0.1 percent by applying an interest rate of 0.1 percent to current account balances held by financial institutions at the Bank.
Bank of Japan · said 27 Mar 2024 (date) · Economic activity, prices and monetary policy in Japan · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidencePartly checkableForecastbased on dataambiguity 56/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partbelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetinterest ratesfinance
The Bank will continue its JGB purchases with broadly the same amount as before, and in the case of a rapid rise in long-term interest rates, it will nimbly respond by, for example, increasing the amount of JGB purchases.
Bank of Japan · said 27 Mar 2024 (date) · Economic activity, prices and monetary policy in Japan · evidence & why
προαναγγελία · Public pre-announcementPartly checkableCommitmentstated on authorityambiguity 56/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partbelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetinterest ratesfinance
I think that this year's wage growth is highly likely to surpass the previous year's substantial growth.
Bank of Japan · said 27 Mar 2024 (date) · Economic activity, prices and monetary policy in Japan · evidence & why
εἰκασία · ConjectureCan be checkedForecasteducated guessambiguity 0/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 90% · for the most partmeets the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2024Due - being checkedgrowthlabour
In terms of the median of the Policy Board members' forecasts, the CPI (all items less fresh food) is projected to see a year-on-year rate of increase of 2.8 percent for fiscal 2023, 2.4 percent for fiscal 2024, and 1.8 percent for fiscal 2025 (Chart 5).
Bank of Japan · said 27 Mar 2024 (date) · Economic activity, prices and monetary policy in Japan · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedForecastbased on dataambiguity 0/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablemeets the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2025Due - being checkedinflationfiscal
In terms of the median of the Bank of Japan Policy Board members' forecasts -- as presented in the January 2024 Outlook for Economic Activity and Prices (Outlook Report) -- Japan's real GDP growth rate is expected to be at 1.8 percent for fiscal 2023, 1.2 percent for fiscal 2024, and 1.0 percent for fiscal 2025; the economy is projected …
Bank of Japan · said 27 Mar 2024 (date) · Economic activity, prices and monetary policy in Japan · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedForecastbased on dataambiguity 0/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablemeets the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2025Due - being checkedinflationgrowthfiscalfinance
The second is an inflation-overshooting commitment, in which the Bank has committed to continuing to expand the monetary base until the year-on-year rate of increase in the observed CPI exceeds the price stability target of 2 percent and stays above the target in a stable manner, thereby strengthening people's confidence that the target will be achieved.
Bank of Japan · said 22 Feb 2023 (date) · Economic activity, prices and monetary policy in Japan · evidence & why
In terms of the medians of the Policy Board members' forecasts, the CPI for all items less fresh food is projected to see a year-on-year rate of increase of 3 percent for fiscal 2022.
Bank of Japan · said 22 Feb 2023 (date) · Economic activity, prices and monetary policy in Japan · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidencePartly checkableForecastbased on dataambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetinflationfiscal
As Japan's recent potential growth rate is estimated to be in the range of 0.0-0.5 percent, the economy is projected to continue growing at a pace above its potential.
Bank of Japan · said 22 Feb 2023 (date) · Economic activity, prices and monetary policy in Japan · evidence & why
The Bank will continue expanding the monetary base until the year-on-year rate of increase in the observed CPI (all items less fresh food) exceeds the price stability target of 2 percent and stays above the target in a stable manner.
Bank of Japan · said 22 Feb 2023 (date) · Economic activity, prices and monetary policy in Japan · evidence & why
The rate of increase is then likely to decelerate to around 1.5-2.0 percent for fiscal 2023 and fiscal 2024 but remain somewhat high compared to the past.
Bank of Japan · said 22 Feb 2023 (date) · Economic activity, prices and monetary policy in Japan · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedForecastbased on dataambiguity 56/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2024Due - being checkedfiscal
In terms of the medians of the Bank of Japan Policy Board members' forecasts -- as presented in the January 2023 Outlook for Economic Activity and Prices (Outlook Report) -- Japan's real GDP growth rate is expected to be at 1.9 percent for fiscal 2022, 1.7 percent for fiscal 2023, and 1.1 percent for fiscal 2024 (Chart 7).
Bank of Japan · said 22 Feb 2023 (date) · Economic activity, prices and monetary policy in Japan · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedForecastbased on dataambiguity 0/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablemeets the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2024Due - being checkedinflationgrowthfiscalfinance