Miguel Fernandez Ordonez
Bank of Spain
Track record: No forecast checked yet (2 not due, 1 being checked).
3forecasts & commitments on the record
100%can be checked as stated
24average ambiguity (0-100)
0goalpost moves recorded
0confirmed U-turns
Timeline
came true partly did not not due / being checked / too vague
Calibration score: shown after 10 checked forecasts with a stated likelihood (now 0).
How they speak about the future: based on data 2, stated on authority 1.
Kinds of claim: forecast 2, commitment 1.
In the nine words
How to read this
Each box is one sentence a public figure or institution said about the future, word for word, with a link to the official text. Can be checked means it names what will happen, by when, and how likely - so it can be compared with official figures later. Too vague to check means it does not. Ambiguity (0-100) is how many different ways the sentence can be read. When the date passes, the forecast is compared with official data and marked came true, partly or did not come true. Labels judge the sentence, never the person. Full guide and glossary.On the record (3)
In the absence of prompt and decisive reforms in these areas we will see unemployment increase sharply, with the harmful effects that this has on activity and on the stability of our financial institutions.
It is difficult to predict whether this tightening will continue, although money market rates (the main benchmark in Spanish mortgage loans) now contain a substantial risk premium over the ECB's official rates, currently at 4.25%.
Moreover, macroeconomic stability is assured: the inflation rate will probably be closer to the European average in 2009 and 2010 and the markets expect interest rates to continue at relatively moderate levels, far from the double-digit levels of the 1980s and 1990s.
Also said - not checkable as stated (12 newest)
Remarks about the future with no date, figure or likelihood that could be checked. They are kept on the record and shown here, but not scored.
With less leverage, and greater resilience on the part of banks, we will not avert cycles, but we will experience cycles that are less painful for our citizens.
The important thing is that we should be ready to discuss countercyclical mechanisms, in provisions, in capital and wherever we believe they might be appropriate and feasible.
Numerous factors have played an important role in triggering the current crisis: the subprime mortgages, the highly complex securitisation structures, the originate-to-distribute model, the over-reliance on rating agencies, risk valuation models that few could understand, etc. Many of these mistakes have been identified over the past 15 months by the authorities and by financial institutions themselves.
During expansions, households and firms tend to overestimate the future growth of their income and raise their degree of leverage in an attempt to bring their current spending patterns into line with this expected flow of future income.
Finally, in an environment marked by low interest rates and the search by banks for yield, the general conditions of risk acceptance and selection are substantially relaxed, which translates into the riskier granting of credit that will materialise once the cycle turns down.
As I just mentioned, banks commit lending policy errors in upturns, when there is excessive optimism and it is believed that the business cycle has disappeared and that recessions are a relic of the past that will not return, and when bankers, caught up in this wave of exuberance, relax their credit granting standards.
Greater competition among banks to attract deposits, and the fact that they are replacing lower-remunerated sight deposits with time deposits, will also put pressure on the financial costs Spanish banks have to bear.
In short, the banking sector will have to live with a structure of higher financial costs, which will squeeze the net interest margin and, therefore, the capacity to generate revenues.
Despite the counterweight provided by the existence of the general provision in Spain and the very low starting levels of the doubtful assets ratio, this has led to the need for greater credit write-downs, which have to be taken to the income statement, and that is the third reason why profits will be under pressure in the banking sector.
This will require an adjustment of their balance sheets, so that credit flows to the real economy while attention is paid to the greater risk of default which will have to be correctly managed.
Although we cannot expect that these measures will immediately correct the difficult economic situation at hand, but rather that the process of adjustment will be slow and laborious, they should however help financial institutions to resume normal operations and restore confidence to the financial markets.
It is vital that governments and parliaments reject these temptations, not only because of the possible budgetary repercussions, but also because it is essential that economic agents adapt to the new realities, however painful these may be.