Miguel Fernández Ordóñez
Bank of Spain
Track record: 1 forecast checked: 0 came true, 0 partly, 1 did not.
116forecasts & commitments on the record
78%can be checked as stated
40average ambiguity (0-100)
0goalpost moves recorded
0confirmed U-turns
Timeline
came true partly did not not due / being checked / too vague
Calibration score: shown after 10 checked forecasts with a stated likelihood (now 1).
How they speak about the future: based on data 78, educated guess 24, stated on authority 14.
Kinds of claim: forecast 69, mixed claim 24, scenario (if… then) 20, commitment 3. · Download this report card as a picture
In the nine words
πρόγνωσιςInference from evidence74 · 64%πρόνοιαPreparing for the future20 · 17%μαντείαInspired knowledge11 · 9%εἰκασίαConjecture7 · 6%προαναγγελίαPublic pre-announcement3 · 3%πρόβλεψιςSeeing the signs1 · 1%
How to read this
Each box is one sentence a public figure or institution said about the future, word for word, with a link to the official text. Can be checked means it names what will happen, by when, and how likely - so it can be compared with official figures later. Too vague to check means it does not. Ambiguity (0-100) is how many different ways the sentence can be read. When the date passes, the forecast is compared with official data and marked came true, partly or did not come true. Labels judge the sentence, never the person. Full guide and glossary.Checked
On most available forecasts, GDP in the area could grow by around 2.5% this year, marking a significant acceleration on 2005.
Did not come true. Said: economic growth around 2.5% in 2006. Official figure for Spain: 4.0% (World Bank open data). Missed. Off by 1.5 points. official data · checked 14 Nov 2026 · automatic check against official data (rules v3)
On the record (116)
A pick-up in competitiveness will thus be pivotal if external demand is to stand in for the shortcomings of domestic demand and boost growth on the supply side, which in the current circumstances is the only way forward.
Indeed, once these measures have been fully implemented, the provisions set aside by the Spanish banking sector since early 2008 will amount to close to 19% of GDP.
Overall, the clean-up and capital increases arising from the two RDLs approved this year will see a considerable reinforcement of the banking system's buffer against potential losses.
If this were necessary, measures to contain current expenditure or to increase indirect taxes could be adopted, as already contemplated in the Stability Programme ahead of 2013.
The State Budget for 2013, which will begin to be drafted in the coming weeks, must uphold this commitment and give expression in specific
Nor can it be ruled out that the temporary tax increases approved this year may have to remain in place for longer or be replaced in time by other permanent measures.
If the labour reform were to begin to produce its effects soon, wages might grow somewhat slower than in 2011.
If these reforms and measures should restore confidence in the Spanish economy, reduce financing costs and improve the foundations for future growth, 2013 may witness a recovery.
If the Spanish economy eventually recovers, it will have been more than enough, but if the economy deteriorates by more than expected, then capital will have to continue to be increased and improved if banks are to remain solid.
Once this year, thanks to the recent legislation, an additional write-down of €35 billion is completed, a figure of €147 billion will have been reached, namely 14% of GDP.
From almost 10% in 2008, the deficit fell at the end of last year to 3.7% - an adjustment of more than 6 pp of GDP in three years - and at the end of 2012 we might already be in balance.
But also wage growth in some sectors or firms may be lower than it would have been if more flexible labour institutions had allowed productivity gains at the firm level.
The banking system has written off bad debts (equivalent to more than 10% of GDP in the last three-and-a-half years), the average size of banks has increased, capacity has been reduced and a process is under way to transform the savings bank sector, which will help these institutions to meet the new prudential regulation requirements and strengthen their ability to …
If this combination of adjustment and growth were to successfully take root, the Spanish economy could see private-sector deleveraging, the stabilising of public finances and the restructuring of the banking system lead to an increase in confidence, softer financial conditions and, in sum, an improved economic outlook that would boost investment and employment.
Accordingly, the entire process is moving ahead as scheduled in the legislation, which stipulates that the new requirements shall be met by 30 September this year, although institutions opting for private investment may apply for a three-month extension, extendible to six months in the case of market listings.
Once these effects have worked through, inflation should fall again in the coming months, although for this to happen it will be vital no second-round effects should come about, as these would harm the economy's competitiveness.
Finally, if a sufficiently far-reaching reform of the employment institutional framework is undertaken as to turn employment around, confidence will be restored in the capacity of our country to generate robust growth once again.
The third key element of EU economic governance reform is the creation of a permanent crisis-management instrument, the so-called European Stability Mechanism, which will come into force in mid-2013.
If these three reforms are resolutely seen through, there will be a favourable change on the markets similar to that seen in the first half of this year when the pensions reform and the recapitalisation of credit institutions were approved.
Spain might feature next year as a euro area country that still has a high deficit - 6% at end-2011 - but comparable to that of other major euro area countries and with the lowest debt level among the biggest economies in the area.
Likewise, in the case of the financial system, restructuring will be slower if low growth diminishes the volume of banking business and increases bad debts.
The solution to fiscal problems, no matter how appropriate the policies adopted are, will be much more complicated if public revenue is poor or if we carry on spending 3% of GDP on transfers to the unemployed for any length of time.
Past experience also teaches us that we will only see an increase in the solvent demand for credit that is higher than nominal GDP growth when sufficient time has elapsed since the cyclical trough in the economy.
But we must also be aware that if the obstacles to job creation are not lifted, the markets will ultimately perceive that the only way Spain can recover competitiveness within the Monetary Union will be by maintaining very low GDP growth rates over many years, as has occurred in other countries.
Highly significant progress is being made in international financial regulation, including most notably the regulatory reform of capital and liquidity (known as Basel III), which will come into force in 2013.
If we take into account the margin provided by the loan-to-value ratio and the fall in real estate prices that has already taken place, it would be necessary to make catastrophic assumptions, beyond all reasonable expectations, regarding the expected losses in order for the total losses to be well above the total volume of loan loss coverage.
Solvent demand will remain low and, if credit usually only recovers at the end of an adjustment phase, in the Spanish case, since households and corporations have to reduce their debt, solvent demand for credit can be expected all the more to take longer to grow.
The capital shortfall is for a maximum of €15.152 million, whereby the impact on public debt if the FROB has to be used would be relatively limited.
For instance, it assumed that the Spanish economy was going to undergo a second recession, with a cumulative fall in GDP of close to 3 percentage points.
Another criterion that has proven most useful relates to the substantial amount (up to €99 billion) authorised by Parliament to meet the recapitalisation needs that may arise during the crisis, but to contain in turn the budgetary impact of the restructuring process.
And in the case of the budget deficit, we'll see a decline from over 11% last year to 6% next year.
Its long-term effects will in any event prove more forceful if accompanied by structural reforms that raise the economy's growth potential.
The return of the core inflation rate to its low level before the VAT rise, once the base effects are stripped out in the second half of next year, would be a good indicator that cost- and price-setting processes are moving in the right direction and are capable of surviving comfortably within an area of price stability.
The absence of indexation clauses in wage bargaining for 2011, as stipulated in the agreement in force, will help prevent the rise in VAT from exerting second-round and inflation-inertia effects.
At the end of this year it will be possible to make a full assessment of the consolidation drive made by the regional budgets, but my impression is that, as matters stand today, the measures announced by most regional and local governments far from respond to the reduction in public spending needed.
The cyclical juncture at which the Budget for 2011 has been drawn up is marked by the muted start of a phase of recovery which became discernible in the opening months of 2010 and which will foreseeably continue over the coming year.
To this end, it approved a new raft of measures on 20 May entailing spending cuts of somewhat over €15 billion to be made between 2010 and 2011 (around 1.5% of GDP), on top of the previously approved spending cuts and tax rises.
The FROB has €9 billion in capital and €3 billion of funds from a debt issue and, if needed, it could raise up to €90 billion of funds from third parties.
The package of measures approved in May involves bringing forward to 2010 and 2011 a sizeable portion of the drive to reduce the deficit.
Responding to this objective is the ambitious package of measures approved by the government on 22 May, complementing the initial consolidation efforts included in the State budget for 2010 and in the updated Stability Programme presented in January this year.
This budget deficit target of 6% of GDP in 2011 should, moreover, be immovable and not conditional upon other factors, even though these are beyond the control of the authorities, such as lower-than-expected economic growth.
The euro area is over the worst phase of the recession, but if ambitious supply-side policies are not pursued, recovery will prove particularly slow.
Progress since along the path to recovery has been much more evident in the emerging economies, for which the latest projections indicate growth rates above 6% for 2010.
The package of measures approved on 20 May brings forward a signiÞcant portion of the effort to be made to reduce the deÞcit in 2011, when it should stand at 6% of GDP, and acts directly on its structural component, which is projected to fall by somewhat more than half with respect to the estimated 2009 levels.
If we do not undertake ambitious labour reform, the Spanish economy will enter a tough and complicated period, in which not only will growth be lower than it would be with extensive reform, but, moreover, its impact on public finances will be extremely negative, making it difficult to achieve the targets set in the Stability Plan.
If there is no labour reform and the bloated unemployment figures persist, public finances will suffer in two ways: not only regarding expenditure, which has already reached enormous proportions, but also on the revenue side, because the millions of people who remain jobless barely contribute to public revenue.
But the relationship between the economy and the financial system also works in the opposite direction and, evidently, if the necessary measures for reactivating employment growth within a reasonable time frame are not adopted, bad debts will continue to mount and there will be more financial institutions facing difficulty in providing the financing needed for economic recovery.
However, I must say that, if reforms are not adopted promptly, high unemployment might be prolonged, which would contribute to increasing financial institutions' difficulties and would prevent the soundness of the financial system from acting, as it has to date, as an essential pillar of economic growth in Spain.
The growth path in 2010 might also be affected by the VAT rise announced for next July, since this measure might bring forward
While public investment will continue to account for a high proportion of GDP in 2010, this figure will be lower than in 2009.
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Also said - not checkable as stated (12 newest)
Remarks about the future with no date, figure or likelihood that could be checked. They are kept on the record and shown here, but not scored.
However, as this episode is progressively overcome, the approved labour market reforms will foreseeably have a favourable impact on employment generation, contribute to adjusting working conditions to firms' specific circumstances and provide for a more efficient reallocation of productive resources, which should ultimately prompt an increase in productivity levels.
The need to reduce debt levels will, coupled with fiscal consolidation demands, continue to limit the possibilities of expanding domestic spending, meaning that the recovery should turn on net external demand.
Without a recovery in employment and in growth, it will be costlier in the long run to pursue fiscal consolidation, so boosting structural reforms must be a priority.
The measures that have to be adopted must reduce debt in an environment in which the interest burden will be growing and where the double-dip in economic activity will affect tax revenue and some cyclical expenditure.
Given these risks, the Budget must be rigorously implemented and mechanisms activated to enable any emerging deviations to be detected sufficiently in advance, so that additional countervailing measures may be taken.
The authorities at all levels of government have taken a significant first step in ratifying these targets and agreeing on their contribution to the consolidation drive that must be undertaken in the coming months.
But it has also revealed the faults existing in the monitoring, early warning and budgetary control procedures then in force, especially for the regional governments, which the budgetary stability law currently before Parliament and which I shall refer to later must correct.
The targets set by this Programme must anchor the budget measures of the coming years, ensuring that the general government deficit can be reduced to below 3% of GDP in 2013 and, subsequently, that a balanced budget can be achieved.
In addition, they must seek to stabilise the public debt ratio and subsequently reduce it to below 60% in 2020.
The fiscal consolidation so defined must be considered unavoidable and necessary to restore economic growth in the medium term, although the size and timing of the adjustment required may have negative effects on activity in the short term.
I am not going to talk today about what banks must do, which is a lot.
Also, new instruments to increase credit to SMEs will have to continue to be tested.