Lorenzo Bini Smaghi
European Central Bank
Track record: 1 forecast checked: 0 came true, 0 partly, 1 did not.
159forecasts & commitments on the record
74%can be checked as stated
46average ambiguity (0-100)
0goalpost moves recorded
0confirmed U-turns
Timeline
came true partly did not not due / being checked / too vague
Calibration score: shown after 10 checked forecasts with a stated likelihood (now 1).
How they speak about the future: based on data 90, educated guess 54, stated on authority 15.
Kinds of claim: forecast 90, scenario (if… then) 51, mixed claim 18. · Download this report card as a picture
In the nine words
πρόγνωσιςInference from evidence87 · 55%πρόνοιαPreparing for the future51 · 32%μαντείαInspired knowledge15 · 9%εἰκασίαConjecture6 · 4%
How to read this
Each box is one sentence a public figure or institution said about the future, word for word, with a link to the official text. Can be checked means it names what will happen, by when, and how likely - so it can be compared with official figures later. Too vague to check means it does not. Ambiguity (0-100) is how many different ways the sentence can be read. When the date passes, the forecast is compared with official data and marked came true, partly or did not come true. Labels judge the sentence, never the person. Full guide and glossary.Checked
The projected GDP growth rate starts with a recession of -4% in 2010 and -2.6% in 2011, and returns to positive growth in 2012.
Did not come true. Said: economic growth around -2.6% in 2011. Official figure for Euro area: 1.8% (World Bank open data). Missed. Off by 4.4 points. official data · checked 14 Nov 2026 · automatic check against official data (rules v3)
On the record (159)
On 21 July this year, the heads of state and government recognised that the case of Greece is special and that the modalitities to resolve the crisis will not be repeated.
Further improvements in the fiscal situation of all the euro area members is expected for the current year, with the euro area average coming down to slightly above 4%.
The euro area debt-to-GDP ratio is expected to stabilise in 2013 and come down thereafter.
And the statement which is often made in this country that “there will be no restructuring before 2013” does little to reassure investors, as it implies that there might be one afterwards.
According to the Financial Times, for instance, a default on Greece’s debt would cost the German taxpayers alone “at least €40 billion”. Second, this would be a way to punish patient investors, who are sticking to their investment and have not sold their bonds yet, and are confident that with the adjustment programme the country will get back on its …
China, in particular, has led to a progressive shift in the centre of economic gravity and is expected to overtake the United States in terms of GDP at market exchange rates sometime from 2025 onwards.
To the extent that these prices remain lower than those in advanced economies, any increase will worsen the latter’s terms of trade, especially if domestic production is limited or has been totally offshored.
Assuming that, as a result of increased demand from EMEs and insufficient supplies, commodity prices increase on average by 4% a year, more or less in line with the growth rate of the world economy (or long-term interest rates, according to the Hotelling rule), average prices in the euro area will increase by 1.2% simply because of the effect of …
Since May last year, a series of measures have been implemented, starting with a €110 billion support package for Greece and the creation of the European Financial Stability Facility, and extending to a strengthening of the Stability and Growth Pact and finally a change in the Treaty to allow for a permanent European Stability Mechanism.
If the prices of these products grow at a rate of 2% per year, overall average inflation is 2.6%, exceeding the 2% objective of most central banks in advanced countries, including the ECB, which aims for inflation of below but close to 2% over the medium term.
We can expect that commodity, energy and food, will continue to grow in line with global demand, unless technological innovations are such that they lead to changes which offset the quotations.
If the crisis had the effect of reducing economic potential in terms of level and growth, the accumulated gap is less than when compared with the previous case and will tend to fill up more quickly.
For example, if it is considered that the crisis has had a limited effect on both the level and potential growth rate of the economy, the output gap will be estimated to be very large and the risks of deflation may be considerable.
Alternatively, the central bank may decide to maintain the inflation objective unchanged at 2% (or less).
Assuming an average increase of these products by 4% a year, more or less in line with the rate of growth of the world economy (or long-term interest rates, according to the Hotelling rule), average prices in the euro area will increase by 1.2% only because of the effect of these products.
Reacting to the monetary side of this symbiosis may prevent larger problems from occurring subsequently. In addition, monitoring credit growth can also be useful to identify other sources of unsustainable credit developments, even if some of them cannot necessarily be eliminated by monetary policy tools, and would instead require action of a macro-prudential nature.
Moreover, there were few, even in the inner circle of decision-makers, who understood the gravity of the situation in which the markets found themselves in early May this year.
Note: on 10 May, change in bond prices rose to +35% for Greece and +14% for Portugal.
Accordingly, asking who will provide the demand of last resort if the deficit countries save more might not be the right question to ask, because it is based on the presumption that the unsustainable pre-crisis growth rate represents the post-crisis objective.
In the long run, however, current account deficits could well increase again globally if the fiscal expansion which has taken place in recent years is not reined in.
Government debt levels among advanced economies are expected to increase further and approach 100% of GDP.
Although deficits are expected to start narrowing gradually next year, the fiscal burden remains huge.
The problem is that surplus countries are in surplus in the first place either because they are fiscally more conservative, at least compared with the more profligate countries – and rightly so I should add – or are facing a situation in which private savings are very high and might even increase if public dis-savings were to rise.
The International Monetary Fund estimates that by 2015 the general government gross debt will reach 110% of GDP in the United States and 95% of GDP in the euro area.
The taskforce is expected to report to ministers by October 2010.
Concrete proposals to strengthen the governance of the euro area are being discussed and will be approved by the end of this year.
A task force chaired by the EU President Van Rompuy will make concrete proposals to the Heads of State and Government by the end of this year.
Had Greece taken these measures earlier and avoided the financial crisis, growth would have probably been lower than the one projected at that time (in the autumn of 2009 the European Commission was projecting GDP growth in Greece to be-0.3% for 2010), but certainly higher than the one expected now (-4%) .
Finally, a European Financial Stability Fund has been created, based on existing funds amounting to €60 billion and on additional government guarantees of €440 billion and an expected contribution from the IMF of up to €250 billion.
The public debt is expected to stabilise, in proportion to GDP, in 2013 at a level of 149% of GDP and start falling thereafter.
The projected GDP growth rate starts with a recession of -4% in 2010 and -2.6% in 2011, and returns to positive growth in 2012.
Did not come true. Said: economic growth around -2.6% in 2011. Official figure for Euro area: 1.8% (World Bank open data). Missed. Off by 4.4 points. official data · checked 14 Nov 2026 · automatic check against official data (rules v3)
The BCBS will issue by the end of this year a fully calibrated, comprehensive set of measures based on the outcome of this work The bottom-up impact assessment will provide policy-makers with guidance on the proper calibration of the proposed measures as well as form a basis for establishing a credible minimum after cumulating the effects of the changes, taking …
The first results of these exercises are expected to be available next month.
Agreement has been reached at G20 level that the new standards will be phased in as financial conditions improve and the economic recovery firms up, with implementation envisaged by end-2012.
The same policy intention underlies our Securities Markets Programme, which we started on 10 May this year.
If, however, agents are concerned that future growth will not be enough to generate sufficient tax revenue to ensure the sustainability of public debt, they will tend to increase savings, weakening the effectiveness of the stimulus and exacerbating in this way the debt dynamics.
One might ask, for example, if a decision to increase interest rates would be judged right or wrong by a financial market participant based on the outlook for inflation – or based on the speculative position that the market participant itself has taken.
As you will surely recall, by 1990 the world’s ten largest banking corporations were headquartered in Japan, and Japanese branches and subsidiaries accounted for almost 20% of all commercial and industrial loans to borrowers located in the US. This expansion is rivalled in magnitude only by the rapid decline of Japanese banking overseas during the 1990s.
If central banks had taken the signals coming from strong monetary and credit growth in mid-decade more seriously, monetary policy decisions might have been better calibrated to contain the financial imbalances that ultimately led to the financial crisis.
In particular, policy makers might also have formed an overly benign assessment of the situation prevailing in 2002-2004 if they relied excessively on output gap measures, as these measures were based on overly optimistic assumptions about potential growth.
A study by Thomas Laubach based on US data, for example, estimates that every percentage point increase in the projected deficit-to-GDP ratio results in an increase in long-term interest rates of 20 to 29 basis points, whereas a percentage point increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio is associated with an increase of about 3 to 4 basis points.
For example, we can say that, based on data from the last (say) thirty years, there is an X% probability that next year the euro area economy will grow by Y%.
Current account positions are expected to evidence a significant expansion of the imbalances by as early as 2014-15.
Nonetheless, if nominal interest rates remain unchanged the expected pick-up in Chinese inflation by mid-2010 may result in negative real deposit rates close to the 2008Q1 level.
Reserve accumulation is back The stock of foreign exchange reserves in all emerging and developing economies is projected by the IMF to reach USD 7 trillion by early 2011.
If the adjustment is too swift, it could result in an over-adjustment of credit flows, i.e. be too restrictive, giving rise to recessionary effects on the real economy.
The Basel reform will be phased in gradually as financial conditions improve and the economic recovery strengthens, with the aim of implementation by the end of 2012.
Based on the outcome thereof, the aim is to arrive, by the end of 2010, at an appropriate calibration for the new requirements in terms of the level and quality of capital, in order to find a balance between financial innovation, financial stability and sustainable economic growth.
If the decision to exit is made too early, the economic recovery may be put at risk, as higher interest rates will produce a tightening effect on consumption and investment decisions at the very time when the pick-up in the economy is still fragile.
The latest Eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections place euro area real GDP growth between 0.1% and 1.5% – well below the annual growth rate of above 3% witnessed in 2006.
Showing the newest 50 - the ledger has all 159.
Also said - not checkable as stated (12 newest)
Remarks about the future with no date, figure or likelihood that could be checked. They are kept on the record and shown here, but not scored.
The policy implications are that there are three key areas where preventive action could and should be taken, and which require structural change by major economies: first, financial developments in emerging market economies (EMEs); second, further financial and economic integration in Europe; and third, reforms to ensure that financial markets serve the real economy and support stability. 2.
I would suggest that economic growth which relies on an unsustainable policy framework might even turn out ex post to be an “accounting illusion”.
In such a context, it is difficult to enforce policies resulting from international commitments that may, over the short term and particularly in the run-up to an election, be seen to contradict national objectives.
Domestic savings could then be more easily channelled into domestic investment, promoting domestic income growth and consumption, and rebalancing economic growth away from exports and reducing the incentive to maintain a low currency value.
I won’t go into detail here but will simply say that it is important to realise that the size of the backstop has to be proportional to the systemic risk we may face.
In other words, the less taxpayers’ money you spend at the start of the contagion, the more taxpayers’ money you may ultimately have to spend to avoid serious financial disruption.
The political authorities, and the taxpayers to whom they report, have to understand that if this risk materialises, and the euro area fails to provide a convincing answer, all parts of the Union will be severely affected, even those who currently seem safe.
All policy-makers involved, including governments and parliaments, should learn from the experience so far, in particular the fact that apparently easy solutions for taxpayers may turn out to be much more costly.
But on the other hand, if the adjustment is too quick, it may lead to a credit crunch with negative feedback loops on the real economy.
Although no systemically important euro area bank has been allowed to fail, and solutions have been found in all cases, the decentralised approach and lack of explicit resolution mechanisms have caused concern in the markets that “tail events” could take place.
Given such uncertainty, the Triffin International Foundation may well have to organise another conference in the 22nd century!
However, when policies become too short term-oriented and inward-looking, they tend to produce negative spillovers on the rest of the world (e.g. inflationary pressures or an environment with relatively low yields) and over the longer run may, if there are no rebalancing measures, prove unsustainable and impair the smooth functioning of the IMS.