Laurence H Meyer
US Federal Reserve System
Track record: No forecast checked yet (83 not due, 26 being checked).
109forecasts & commitments on the record
72%can be checked as stated
44average ambiguity (0-100)
0goalpost moves recorded
0confirmed U-turns
Timeline
came true partly did not not due / being checked / too vague
Calibration score: shown after 10 checked forecasts with a stated likelihood (now 0).
How they speak about the future: educated guess 52, based on data 41, stated on authority 16.
Kinds of claim: scenario (if… then) 50, forecast 43, mixed claim 13, commitment 3. · Download this report card as a picture
In the nine words
πρόνοιαPreparing for the future50 · 46%πρόγνωσιςInference from evidence37 · 34%μαντείαInspired knowledge14 · 13%εἰκασίαConjecture5 · 5%προαναγγελίαPublic pre-announcement3 · 3%
How to read this
Each box is one sentence a public figure or institution said about the future, word for word, with a link to the official text. Can be checked means it names what will happen, by when, and how likely - so it can be compared with official figures later. Too vague to check means it does not. Ambiguity (0-100) is how many different ways the sentence can be read. When the date passes, the forecast is compared with official data and marked came true, partly or did not come true. Labels judge the sentence, never the person. Full guide and glossary.On the record (109)
Specifically, if the Fed were allowed to offer interest on reserve balances, the demand for voluntary reserve balances to facilitate settlements across banks could rise.
Even if there were no required reserves, banks would still hold settlement balances to meet liquidity needs and might continue to hold these reserves at the central bank.
If the issuers were not banks, however, then the introduction of new types of private money could increase financial instability and pose difficulties if-and this is a big if--the scale of operations were large relative to the financial system.
The floor would be set through a re-deposit facility at which banks could deposit any unwanted reserves with the Fed at a rate perhaps 50 basis points below the target funds rate.
The ceiling could be set through a so-called Lombard facility at which banks would be able to borrow at a penalty rate, perhaps 50 basis points above the
In the absence of such new statutory authority, the Fed has indicated it might need to alter the way it implements monetary policy, in the event that required reserve balances fell further and the volatility of the funds rate increased.
Together these factors suggest the potential of a return to more solid rates of growth next year.
All the natural forces we expected to contribute to recovery before the events of September 11, while perhaps delayed, are likely to become part of the recovery in 2002.
The Congress may still pass additional fiscal stimulus before year-end.
Still, on balance, a package of well-crafted, temporary, quick-acting demand-side fiscal measures would, in my view, make a constructive contribution to supporting and strengthening the rebound expected next year.
The second is the remainder of a typical monetary policy forecast period, in this case through 2003.
Though I viewed economic growth as perhaps bottoming out after slowing to a near-zero rate in the second and third quarters, I expected growth to build only slowly and therefore expected the pace of recovery through the first half of 2002 to be disappointing.
You will, I think, see the result in the next consultative document which I hope will be published early in 2002.
I trust that when the 2002 consultative document is published early next year, the banking industry will provide us with thoughtful feedback, and especially information, to help us gauge the overall quantitative effect of the proposals on your respective institutions.
In addition, even if we overcame the reluctance of banks to borrow, we would likely need an alternative to the current active administration of the window if we wanted to have a significantly higher amount of discount window borrowing.
We support the Commission's recent actions to extend the public comment period on the rules until September 4, 2001, and to extend the effective date of the interim final rules and the statutory provisions that they implement until at least May 12, 2002.
For example, banks will not be able to confirm that they meet the "chiefly compensated" standard in the trust and fiduciary exception until they review all of their compensation earned at the end of the year.
Under current arrangements, the premiums could differ significantly if one of the funds fell below the designated reserve ratio of 1.25 percent of insured deposits and the other fund did not.
If there is resistance to declines in nominal wages, a small amount of wage inflation may enhance the flexibility of real wages and facilitate the movement to equilibrium in the labor market. 15 Whether this requires positive price inflation will depend on the variance of the wage changes, the degree of nominal wage rigidity, and the rate of growth of …
That is, if the economy is operating at a level of output below full employment, the price level will tend to fall, and at least for a given value of the nominal money supply, this will tend to stimulate aggregate demand.
They conclude: "[I]n very low inflation environments…the zero bound could prove to be a significant constraint on policy…With the effectiveness of open market operations diminished at times, the economy would likely experience a noticeable increase in the variability of output and employment, particularly if policymakers were to pursue an inflation target of 1 percent or below."
Therefore, in terms of the CPI, if this were the only consideration, the target could be set at 1 percent to allow for measurement error (and also a round number).
We could say that the new economy has suffered an old economy disease - if not a full-fledged recession, at least a close relative, a growth recession - as a result of the developments I just described.
But even if the new, higher rate of structural productivity growth were to persist, could aggregate demand grow faster than the upward-revised rate of increase in supply, and could the unemployment rate fall indefinitely, without the economy overheating and inflation rising?
To be sure, if the higher rate of productivity growth continued, growth could remain elevated compared to its average rate over the previous two decades.
The Blue Chip consensus forecast in December, for example, still projected 3 percent growth over 2001.
In the consensus forecast, the economy converges in 2002 to something very close to trend growth at full employment.
The ECB has an explicit medium-term numerical inflation objective - inflation less than 2 percent (but not less than zero) - while the Fed has a price stability objective but no explicit numerical objective.
But if inflation falls below 2 percent, the ECB is not under the same pressure to ease - at least until inflation (or the forecast) threatens to fall below zero.
If inflation (or more precisely, the inflation forecast) rises above 2 percent, their strategy clearly dictates that monetary policy tighten.
However, if fiscal policy wanted to play a more important role in active stabilization policy, the potential for tension between the administration and the Congress and the Federal Reserve could increase, especially at times when the fiscal and monetary authorities have different views about the cyclical situation or if they have different objectives.
In January of this year, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision released its second consultative paper for the New Basel Capital Accord and asked for public comment by the end of May.
If upward pressure on rates arises, for example, from higher nominal income growth or higher inflation expectations, the manager will automatically add reserves with open market operations to prevent a rise in the funds rate above its target.
If deflation follows, a price-level target implies that the central bank will target rising prices - or inflation - for a while in order to return the price level to its target level.
If policymakers can convince the public that policymakers will drive the one-period rate to zero in period two, the interest rate on the two-period bond will fall in the first period, stimulating aggregate demand.
In this case, even additional conventional operations - open market operations in Treasury bills - might stimulate aggregate demand, even if they could not further lower the short-term nominal interest rate.
In fact, if the money demand equation (underlying the LM curve) is stable, there will be a stable relationship between money and inflation in the long run.
If this were being developed for the FOMC, the calibration of the reference value for M2 growth would need to incorporate either the staff estimate of trend growth or, still more likely, an estimate derived from a survey of FOMC members.
The IRB banks' riskmeasurement and management processes will be strengthened, and capital markets will have more information with which to judge risks and arguably assert more discipline, if risks appear to rise.
More to the point, virtually all of these techniques and procedures seem currently unnecessary for most U.S. banks, and they will remain so unless the economics and the nature of community banking substantially change.
If measured credit risk declines because of the new risk weights - especially for the more advanced approaches - the addition of operational risk will partially offset that decline.
In addition, if inflation moved upward, inflation expectations would be less likely to follow immediately, making it easier for the central bank to contain inflation.
If aggregate demand were to slow, a stimulative monetary policy move would be less likely to undermine confidence in the central bank's pursuit of price stability when the central bank is independent (and has a price stability mandate).
If nominal wages do not immediately respond, the growth in labor costs will fall by precisely the same amount as the increase in the growth of labor productivity.
Estimates among private forecasters of trend productivity growth cluster in a range of 2-1/2 percent to 2-3/4 percent with the upper end in the neighborhood of 3 percent to 3-1/2 percent.
Because wages have likely already partially adjusted to the cumulative increase in productivity growth during the last several years, the portion of the acceleration still putting downward pressure on inflation may be somewhat less than 2 percentage points.
A projected drop in oil prices likely underpins the consensus forecast of a decline in overall inflation next year.
The consensus private-sector forecast is for the growth in real GDP to slip below trend in the third quarter, then post a modest rebound in the fourth quarter, and continue in 2001 at a pace that will keep the unemployment rate nearly steady.
In Chapter 4, I discuss a transition to a period of slower growth and possibly higher inflation, a transition that in all likelihood we will make at some point.
Had they conducted stress tests, some lenders might have seen how exposed they were to changes in exchange rates or to an interruption of steady economic growth.
Showing the newest 50 - the ledger has all 109.
Also said - not checkable as stated (12 newest)
Remarks about the future with no date, figure or likelihood that could be checked. They are kept on the record and shown here, but not scored.
hazard by encouraging overborrowing and overlending through leading investors to believe that the official community will bail them out should debt repayment problems arise.
Pressures could also spread through world financial markets to industrial economies, as happened with the Russian financial crisis.
In particular, countries with histories of high inflation and poor macroeconomic management may have felt the need for fixed exchange rates, at least for a transitional period, until they developed a better track record for policy performance.
Some initial fiscal cost may be associated with lengthening debt maturities because long-term interest rates generally are higher than short-term rates.
The IMF is also conducting research examining various indicators that may serve as guideposts for debt and may help in managing reserves in emerging-market economies.
In the Basel II process, for example, standards appropriate for large, internationally active banks in the developed industrial economies may be inappropriate for emerging-market economies.
Those banks in this country that argue that disclosure will create an uneven playing field vis-à-vis domestic nonbanks should consider whether they might not be better served by disclosure rules for their foreign bank competitors.
This must be an iterative process involving supervisors and the banking industry, and there must be mutual trust if it is going to work effectively.
But I believe we will develop a set of rules and policies that will be a substantial improvement over the current framework and--most important--that the new groundwork will spur important further progress in risk management and in banking supervision.
To ensure the credibility of this process, we will expect those same risk classifications and quantifications of default probabilities and loss severities to be used for pricing, reserving, internal capital allocation, and other management purposes.
While everyone understood that considerable uncertainties--related to economic assumptions and future policy decisions--surrounded these projections, they required that the Federal Reserve take seriously the possibility that monetary policy might have to be conducted without Treasury securities.
It may be deemed necessary, in particular, to accept that some credit risk will have to be taken and to focus on managing that risk, on maintaining neutrality by operating in a wide range of markets, and on avoiding political pressure through a clear and explicit prohibition against favoring particular sectors.