Lars Nyberg
Sveriges Riksbank
Track record: No forecast checked yet (67 not due, 18 being checked).
85forecasts & commitments on the record
74%can be checked as stated
42average ambiguity (0-100)
0goalpost moves recorded
0confirmed U-turns
Timeline
came true partly did not not due / being checked / too vague
Calibration score: shown after 10 checked forecasts with a stated likelihood (now 0).
How they speak about the future: educated guess 43, based on data 35, stated on authority 7.
Kinds of claim: scenario (if… then) 41, forecast 30, mixed claim 10, commitment 4. · Download this report card as a picture
In the nine words
πρόνοιαPreparing for the future41 · 48%πρόγνωσιςInference from evidence30 · 35%εἰκασίαConjecture7 · 8%προαναγγελίαPublic pre-announcement4 · 5%μαντείαInspired knowledge3 · 4%
How to read this
Each box is one sentence a public figure or institution said about the future, word for word, with a link to the official text. Can be checked means it names what will happen, by when, and how likely - so it can be compared with official figures later. Too vague to check means it does not. Ambiguity (0-100) is how many different ways the sentence can be read. When the date passes, the forecast is compared with official data and marked came true, partly or did not come true. Labels judge the sentence, never the person. Full guide and glossary.On the record (85)
However, it is far from certain that the developments we are seeing now could have been avoided even if the Stability and Growth Pact had been upheld.
If investors are concerned over the British credit worthiness they will sell their government bonds as in the example above.
If they were to carry the cost of maintaining a liquidity buffer in the Riksbank, it is likely that the banks would find it profitable to cut back on the riskier areas of their dollar lending.
What I intend to talk about today is why I believe that cash will continue to play an important role in our payment system for the foreseeable future (even though not 85 million years) and why cards and other technological developments will not be able to fully take the place of cash.
The idea is that the capital requirement will increase if credit growth increases in relation to GDP.
If prices then fall drastically, many people will be stuck with assets that have declined substantially in value, while the value of the loan remains unchanged.
The progress we have made in research and practical policy implementation still holds good, and we will continue to conduct a policy of flexible inflation targeting.
If we knew with certainty that this would happen, then it is likely that most of the models we have now would indicate that we ought to cut the policy rate to alleviate the effects on inflation, production and employment.
Let us assume, for instance, that we were to find ourselves in a situation where there is a major risk that a loan-driven bubble in the property market will collapse further ahead and that it will then contribute to a heavy fall in GDP.
If exaggerated optimism and a high risk propensity over a long period of time have pushed up prices, there is also a considerable risk that the fall from the inflated price level will be very hard once the mood changes.
The 19 Riksbank offices that conducted these operations 10 years ago will have been reduced to one by 2013.
When the new facility comes into operation in 2013, the present cash management facilities in Mölndal and Tumba will be closed down.
If, on the other hand, credit growth were to develop in an unsustainable manner at the same time as housing prices were increasing rapidly, in my opinion, it would be reasonable for monetary policy to take this into consideration, even if short-term inflation may be low.
All of this will hopefully be agreed upon by the finance ministers in December of this year, while Sweden still holds the Presidency of the EU. 2
Basically, what I am saying is that if we cannot find a way to improve and clarify the way we deal with troubled cross-border banks then not very much will be gained by strengthening the harmonisation and co-ordination of regulation and supervision.
If so, an agreement will be reached by the end of this year and the new supervisory structure will be up and running already during the course of next year.
World trade is expected to fall by over 12 per cent. 4 GDP is expected to fall in our region too - by 5 per cent in Sweden, which is slightly more than the figure for our Nordic neighbours.
The Riksbank's assessment in the main scenario of the latest Financial Stability Report is that loan losses are expected to amount to just over 2 per cent of the banks' lending in 2009 and 2010.
At present, the global economy is in recession and GDP is expected to fall by one per cent this year.
The situation is much worse in the Baltic states (see Figures 2 and 3), where GDP is currently expected to fall between 15 and 20 per cent this year. 5 This means that the crisis in the Baltic states is unparalleled compared with previous crises.
The inflation rate will fall if there are no price increases or if the increases are lower than last year.
Our assessment was that inflation will fall quickly over the coming year and then rise slightly, reaching the target of 2 per cent in 2011.
If a severe downward adjustment in house prices were to occur later on, it is probable that monetary policy would receive much of the blame for having been too passive earlier.
Monetary policy should only respond to a rapid increase in house prices and borrowing if the central bank's forecasts indicate that it will lead to problems such as overheating and excessively high inflation.
Nevertheless, there is a significant risk that the credit supply to Swedish companies and households could worsen considerably if the problems on the credit markets take hold and persist.
However, if there is an overly sharp correction or 'hard landing' if you like, it could lead to weak growth in the economy for a long period of time.
If the increased opportunities to borrow were to have a full impact on house prices, the reform could push up prices by around five per cent.
If households choose to use the sum they save on the abolished tax to take out larger loans, it is possible that this will lead to a slightly faster increase in prices than would otherwise have been the case.
If property prices were to fall heavily during an economic downturn, this could also lead to large loan losses for the banks and further aggravate the slowdown.
At the same time, tax on capital gains on housing will probably be raised from 20 to 30 per cent.
In addition, it now appears that the property tax will be abolished completely with effect from January 2008.
I believe that we will have to assume that property prices and indebtedness will continue to increase relatively substantially over the coming period.
If we look ahead, there is reason to believe that credit derivatives will gain increased significance.
If the premiums on credit derivatives increase substantially, this will mean that at the same time the return on the underlying bonds increases.
But I assume that we will see increased activity among the Swedish banks, partly because the banks' customers are calling for it and partly to manage the risks in their own balance sheets.
However, this year did not develop as expected.
If interest rates rise, these costs will increase just as quickly, and households with very substantial loans and a large share of these at a variable interest rate, will face significant cost increases
When we gradually raised the repo rate this year by a total of one and a quarter percentage points, it was because our inflation forecasts indicated that inflation would otherwise have been above the two per cent target at the end of the forecast period.
If, for instance, the forecast inflation rate were to be close to target two years ahead, but showed a rapid acceleration at the same time as growth in the real economy was high, it is possible that the implied forward rate path could not be expected to reflect a desirable development in the repo rate.
This assumption had the advantage of providing a very simple and clear policy rule for monetary policy: If the forecast for inflation at the end of the forecast period was below two per cent, the repo rate would normally be cut, and if it was above two per cent the interest rate would be raised.
If high productivity growth and low import prices were instead to lead to inflation being well below two per cent, it might be possible to correct the problem quickly by cutting the interest rate.
In accordance with this view, we have raised the repo rate four times so far this year and my assessment is that the repo rate will need to be raised further in future.
A large number of borrowers will then experience unsatisfactory profitability, particularly if the interest rate then increases slightly, and will be unable to pay their loans.
If one tries to affect growth and employment by systematically keeping interest rates low and increasing liquidity in the economy, or by allowing public sector projects to be financed directly by the central bank, the profits will be only short term.
Nor does it rule out a more general drop in prices in the period ahead, even though any such decline is likely to be less drastic than if prices had shot up in a way that could not be explained by developments in underlying factors.
If such driving forces are significant then there is a risk that households could have difficulty meeting their interest payments when interest rates rise; further, the downward adjustment in prices could be very dramatic when the lack of realism in estimates finally becomes evident.
If we were to see a notably poorer development than we envisage now, such as much lower growth than forecast, the arguments in favour of cutting interest rates would in my opinion take on greater substance.
Since 1997 we have applied a simple policy rule in order to make our monetary policy even easier to understand: If the forecast shows that inflation will be above target level two years ahead, we usually raise the repo rate, and we lower it if the forecast is below target level.
Our forecast for Sweden was a growth rate of around 3 per cent a year, which is higher than we consider to be sustainable in the long term.
If, for instance, the interest rate rises from 3 to 4 per cent, it means that the monthly cost will increase by one third.
Showing the newest 50 - the ledger has all 85.
Also said - not checkable as stated (12 newest)
Remarks about the future with no date, figure or likelihood that could be checked. They are kept on the record and shown here, but not scored.
But it is probably quite rare that one will actually need to use macroprudential tools, or the policy rate, to subdue a credit boom and thus reduce the risk of a crisis.
Logically, one could thus argue that monetary policy and financial stability policy are two different types of policy that should be conducted quite separately.
## The policy rate will probably need to support financial stability policy
Hopefully, it will be possible to find a set of macroprudential tools that are efficient enough so we do not need to use the policy rate for this purpose.
Financial crises were not considered to be likely and financial stability came far down on the political agenda.
No doubt the macro-scenario could have been more conservative and possible contagion between banks and countries could have been handled better.
The ESRB will have an important role to play in the construction of future stress tests.
In June, the ESRB also pointed out that bank funding vulnerabilities could pose a threat to financial stability.
An important task for the ESRB will therefore be to make this concept more precise.
In connection with the financial crisis, however, policy makers have been forced to realise that increased financial stability has to come at the cost of either financial integration or national sovereignty.
The banks will need to hold both more and better capital and their buffers for managing liquidity shortfalls will need to increase.
How large a foreign currency reserve do we need to have to ensure that the Swedish banks will not face a shortage of liquidity in a crisis situation?