The public record of what the powerful say about the futureAll times UTCYour time ATHENA News Room is liveSealed daily · anchored in BitcoinΕλληνικά A Tekmerion product
THE ORACLE HUNTERS • EVERY PROPHECY ON THE RECORD •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The Oracle HuntersEvery prophecy, on the record. · Οἱ Κυνηγοὶ τῶν ΧρησμῶνUnder development

← Tracking the Prophets

Lars E O Svensson

Sveriges Riksbank

Track record: No forecast checked yet (40 not due, 8 being checked).
48forecasts & commitments on the record
88%can be checked as stated
43average ambiguity (0-100)
0goalpost moves recorded
0confirmed U-turns

Timeline

20092009: Not due yet2009: Not due yet2009: Not due yet2009: Not due yet2009: Not due yet2009: Not due yet2009: Not due yet20102010: Due - being checked2010: Not due yet2010: Not due yet2010: Not due yet2010: Due - being checked2010: Not due yet2010: Due - being checked2010: Not due yet (+10 more)20112011: Not due yet2011: Not due yet2011: Not due yet2011: Not due yet2011: Not due yet2011: Not due yet20122012: Not due yet2012: Not due yet2012: Not due yet2012: Due - being checked2012: Due - being checked2012: Not due yet2012: Not due yet2012: Not due yet (+4 more)20132013: Not due yet2013: Not due yet2013: Not due yet2013: Not due yet2013: Due - being checked
came true partly did not not due / being checked / too vague

Calibration score: shown after 10 checked forecasts with a stated likelihood (now 0).
How they speak about the future: based on data 38, educated guess 10.
Kinds of claim: forecast 28, mixed claim 11, scenario (if… then) 9. · Download this report card as a picture

In the nine words

πρόγνωσιςInference from evidence36 · 75%πρόνοιαPreparing for the future9 · 19%πρόβλεψιςSeeing the signs2 · 4%εἰκασίαConjecture1 · 2%
How to read this Each box is one sentence a public figure or institution said about the future, word for word, with a link to the official text. Can be checked means it names what will happen, by when, and how likely - so it can be compared with official figures later. Too vague to check means it does not. Ambiguity (0-100) is how many different ways the sentence can be read. When the date passes, the forecast is compared with official data and marked came true, partly or did not come true. Labels judge the sentence, never the person. Full guide and glossary.

On the record (48)

Inflation expectations would thus probably be stable even if inflation were to overshoot the target for a period of time.
Sveriges Riksbank · said 16 Jan 2013 (date) · Monetary policy and employment - monetary policy is too tight · evidence & why
πρόνοια · Preparing for the futurePartly checkableScenario (if… then)educated guessambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetinflation
Academic literature contains different definitions of short-run and time-varying equilibrium unemployment, such as short-run NAIRU (shortrun Non-Acceleration Inflation Rate of Unemployment - the rate of unemployment that will lead to a constant rate of inflation in the short run) and flexi-price unemployment (the rate of unemployment that would arise if prices and wages were flexible).
Sveriges Riksbank · said 16 Jan 2013 (date) · Monetary policy and employment - monetary policy is too tight · evidence & why
πρόνοια · Preparing for the futurePartly checkableScenario (if… then)educated guessambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partbelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetinflationlabour
A higher policy rate might limit the debt ratio if it led to a lower loan-to-value ratio, if there was a negative relation between the policy rate and the loan-to-value ratio.
Sveriges Riksbank · said 16 Jan 2013 (date) · Monetary policy and employment - monetary policy is too tight · evidence & why
πρόνοια · Preparing for the futurePartly checkableScenario (if… then)educated guessambiguity 56/100implied call / likelihood: No · 35% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetinterest ratesfiscal
While awaiting new estimates that take into account the bias that average inflation lower than average inflation expectations entails, I will use 5.5 per cent as my own assessment of long-run sustainable unemployment.
Sveriges Riksbank · said 16 Jan 2013 (date) · Monetary policy and employment - monetary policy is too tight · evidence & why
The National Institute of Economic Research (2012) estimates a timedependent equilibrium unemployment rate that reaches 6 per cent in 2020, so 6 per cent could be regarded as the Institute's estimate of long-run sustainable unemployment.
Sveriges Riksbank · said 16 Jan 2013 (date) · Monetary policy and employment - monetary policy is too tight · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidencePartly checkableForecastbased on dataambiguity 56/100implied call / likelihood: No · 35% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2020Due - being checkedlabour
With an interest rate after tax of 5 per cent, the interest payment will be 5 per cent of 170 per cent, which is 8.5 per cent of disposable income.
Sveriges Riksbank · said 14 Nov 2012 (date) · Monetary policy, debt and unemployment · evidence & why
With a high mortgage rate of 7 per cent before tax, the mortgage rate after tax will be around 5 per cent.
Sveriges Riksbank · said 14 Nov 2012 (date) · Monetary policy, debt and unemployment · evidence & why
With a 5 per cent interest rate after tax and a disposable income that grows by 4 per cent the current value of this will be roughly 1 800 per cent of disposable income.
Sveriges Riksbank · said 14 Nov 2012 (date) · Monetary policy, debt and unemployment · evidence & why
According to the National Institute of Economic Research's assessment of the Swedish economy in August 2012, both CPI and CPIF inflation will be well below the target in both 2013 and 2014, despite the forecasts assuming a much lower reporate path than the Riksbank's. 23 Sweden has the lowest inflation in the European Union.
Sveriges Riksbank · said 14 Nov 2012 (date) · Monetary policy, debt and unemployment · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedForecastbased on dataambiguity 0/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partmeets the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2013Due - being checkedinflationinterest rates
But CPIF inflation, which gives a better picture of inflationary pressures in periods of large interest rate adjustments, will be around one per cent as an annual average in 2012 and 2013.
Sveriges Riksbank · said 14 Nov 2012 (date) · Monetary policy, debt and unemployment · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidencePartly checkableForecastbased on dataambiguity 56/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partbelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2013Due - being checkedinflationinterest rates
With a disposable income that can be expected to grow by 4 per cent in the long run, therefore, 4 per cent should be deducted from the mortgage rate before tax of 5 per cent.
Sveriges Riksbank · said 14 Nov 2012 (date) · Monetary policy, debt and unemployment · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidencePartly checkableMixed claimbased on dataambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetfiscalhousing
If the average inflation rate would deviate substantially from the target, it is hardly likely that inflation expectations would still remain anchored to the target.
Sveriges Riksbank · said 08 Jun 2012 (date) · Differing views on monetary policy · evidence & why
πρόνοια · Preparing for the futurePartly checkableScenario (if… then)educated guessambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetinflation
If one nevertheless uses the policy rate to influence housing prices (and thereby mortgage growth) this will lead to large costs to the real economy.
Sveriges Riksbank · said 08 Jun 2012 (date) · Differing views on monetary policy · evidence & why
πρόνοια · Preparing for the futurePartly checkableScenario (if… then)educated guessambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partbelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetinflationinterest ratesgrowthhousing
This is thus an example of a situation where raising the policy rate will if anything increase the risks to financial stability. 10
Sveriges Riksbank · said 08 Jun 2012 (date) · Differing views on monetary policy · evidence & why
πρόνοια · Preparing for the futurePartly checkableScenario (if… then)based on dataambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partbelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetinterest ratesfinance
If anything, a lower policy rate might instead mean that the banks have less incentive to seek short-term funding in foreign currency and thus the risks linked to this funding will decline.
Sveriges Riksbank · said 08 Jun 2012 (date) · Differing views on monetary policy · evidence & why
πρόνοια · Preparing for the futurePartly checkableScenario (if… then)educated guessambiguity 56/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partbelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetinterest ratesfinance
The five-year average of CPIX/CPIF inflation has also been well below the target, apart from the period 2003-2004. 15 As the average for CPI inflation is so far below 2 per cent, especially in comparison with other countries that have had inflation targets as long as Sweden, one could perhaps claim that the Riksbank has neglected the price stability objective.
Sveriges Riksbank · said 08 Jun 2012 (date) · Differing views on monetary policy · evidence & why
To ensure that average inflation is on target over a longer period of time, the central bank could instead have a so-called price level target that means the price level should be stabilised around a price level path that rises by 2 per cent a year.
Sveriges Riksbank · said 08 Jun 2012 (date) · Differing views on monetary policy · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidencePartly checkableMixed claimbased on dataambiguity 71/100implied call / likelihood: No · 35% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetinflationfinance
13 It may appear to be a problem that the lower repo-rate path gives a level of CPIF inflation of around 2.5 per cent at the end of the forecast period.
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidencePartly checkableForecastbased on dataambiguity 71/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetinflationinterest rates
It does, however, appear to fulfil the Qvigstad condition in that the inflation gap in panel c is mainly positive and the unemployment gap in panel d is also positive (for the entire forecast period if the sustainable rate of unemployment is 5.5 per cent and for most of the forecast period if it is 6 per cent).
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidencePartly checkableForecastbased on dataambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetinflationlabour
By stabilising the CPIF around 2 per cent, the CPI will be stabilised around the target in the slightly longer term.
The first is that in my opinion the existing framework for monetary policy could be improved if monetary policy consistently focused on stabilising inflation measured in terms of the CPIF at around 2 per cent and on stabilising unemployment around a sustainable rate.
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidencePartly checkableMixed claimbased on dataambiguity 83/100implied call / likelihood: No · 35% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetinflationlabour
If we instead measure inflation using the CPIF index, which adjusts for the effects of these repo-rate increases, the forecast is on average lower than 2 per cent.
According to the Riksbank's forecasts for the years ahead, CPI inflation will be higher than the target of 2 per cent over the next few years (Figure 3).
The statements and signals from the Federal Reserve are hardly compatible with a forecast that they will begin raising their policy rate in 2011.
πρόβλεψις · Seeing the signsPartly checkableForecastbased on dataambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2011Due - being checked
If unemployment increases by a good 10 percentage points, that is, from almost 9 per cent to almost 19 per cent, and house prices fall by 20 per cent, according to the report only 4.5 per cent of these households will experience both a deficit in their 'left-to-live-on' calculation and a loan-to-value ratio of more than 100 per cent.
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidencePartly checkableMixed claimbased on dataambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partbelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetinflationlabourfiscalhousing
With an interest rate of 7.5 per cent, 92 per cent of households will have a surplus in a 'left-to-live-on' calculation that includes generous standard deductions for the cost of living.
So to reduce house prices by 15 per cent may require raising the repo rate by as much as 10 percentage points.
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidencePartly checkableForecastbased on dataambiguity 56/100implied call / likelihood: No · 40% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetinflationhousing
Here I refer for instance to Ben Bernanke's recent speech (2010) and to the most recent decision by the FOMC on a new round of Quantitative Easing (QE2), which means that the Federal Reserve will buy government bonds regularly up to summer 2011 for the purpose of lowering long-term interest rates in the United States.
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedForecastbased on dataambiguity 0/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partmeets the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2011Due - being checkedinterest rates
The arguments put forward for conducting this policy are that growth is good, interest rates are very low and need to be normalised, that we need to signal to house-buyers that interest rates will increase, that the rise in house prices and household debts needs to be limited, and that financial imbalances could build up if we do not conduct …
πρόβλεψις · Seeing the signsPartly checkableMixed claimeducated guessambiguity 56/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partbelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetinflationinterest ratesgrowthhousing
It is perceived as credible in the sense that the market from and including April expects an unchanged repo-rate path until the end of the fourth quarter of 2010.
Sveriges Riksbank · said 04 May 2010 (date) · Why a low repo rate for an extended period? · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedForecastbased on dataambiguity 0/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablemeets the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2010Due - being checkedinterest rates
Initially, the forecasters tended to overestimate GDP growth in 2009 During the first half of 2008, they estimated on average that growth in 2009 would be approximately 2 per cent.
Sveriges Riksbank · said 18 Mar 2010 (date) · Assessment of monetary policy in Sweden in 2009 · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidencePartly checkableForecastbased on dataambiguity 56/100below the RIM-1 standardNot due yetgrowth
If inflation expectations are stable close to the inflation target then the target is credible and it will therefore be easier for the Riksbank to stabilise both inflation and resource utilisation.
Sveriges Riksbank · said 18 Mar 2010 (date) · Assessment of monetary policy in Sweden in 2009 · evidence & why
πρόνοια · Preparing for the futurePartly checkableScenario (if… then)educated guessambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partbelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetinflation
However, the Riksbank's new forecast entailed a considerably lower repo rate in 2010 and 2011 than the market had expected.
Sveriges Riksbank · said 18 Mar 2010 (date) · Assessment of monetary policy in Sweden in 2009 · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidencePartly checkableForecastbased on dataambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2011Due - being checked
During the first half of 2008, most forecasters expected that inflation would be between 2 and just below 3 per cent in 2009, while the actual outcome was -0.3 per cent.
Sveriges Riksbank · said 18 Mar 2010 (date) · Assessment of monetary policy in Sweden in 2009 · evidence & why
The repo rate was expected to remain at a low level until the beginning of 2011 (see Figure 1).
Sveriges Riksbank · said 18 Mar 2010 (date) · Assessment of monetary policy in Sweden in 2009 · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidencePartly checkableForecastbased on dataambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2011Due - being checked
The lower repo-rate path, as proposed in the main scenario, gave an inflation forecast, measured in terms of the CPIF, approaching 2 per cent two years ahead.
Sveriges Riksbank · said 18 Mar 2010 (date) · Assessment of monetary policy in Sweden in 2009 · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidencePartly checkableForecastbased on dataambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetinflationinterest rates
In July, the majority of the Executive Board stated in a press release and in the Monetary Policy Report that 'the Riksbank's assessment is that, after cutting the repo rate to 0.25 per cent, it will have reached its lowest level in practice'.
Sveriges Riksbank · said 24 Feb 2010 (date) · Why a lower repo rate path? · evidence & why
over four quarters will thus give, all else being equal, an increase in inflation of just over 0.4 percentage points and, if employment varies one-to-one with hours worked, an increase in employment of approximately 0.35 per cent, which is equivalent to an estimated figure of over 16 000 jobs.
Sveriges Riksbank · said 24 Feb 2010 (date) · Why a lower repo rate path? · evidence & why
The effects of expected and unexpected deviations from the repo rate path of 0.25 percentage points over four quarters.
Sveriges Riksbank · said 24 Feb 2010 (date) · Why a lower repo rate path? · evidence & why
If employment varies one-to-one with hours worked, which is realistic in a year or a couple of years' time, employment will then increase by approximately 0.35 per cent.
Sveriges Riksbank · said 24 Feb 2010 (date) · Why a lower repo rate path? · evidence & why
One might think that if one nevertheless does not choose the lower repo rate path one must have strong reasons for this.
Sveriges Riksbank · said 24 Feb 2010 (date) · Why a lower repo rate path? · evidence & why
εἰκασία · ConjecturePartly checkableMixed claimeducated guessambiguity 56/100implied call / likelihood: No · 35% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetinterest rates
In Figure 4 we can see that the main scenario for February 2008 leads to resource utilisation being stabilised rather well, but that the CPI forecast is a little high in relation to the target of 2 per cent.
Sveriges Riksbank · said 13 Mar 2009 (date) · Evaluating monetary policy · evidence & why
If the price level target is credible, the long-term inflation expectations will be stable, even if low inflation or deflation is expected in the short term.
Sveriges Riksbank · said 17 Feb 2009 (date) · Monetary policy with a zero interest rate · evidence & why
πρόνοια · Preparing for the futurePartly checkableScenario (if… then)educated guessambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetinflation
With a well-motivated average inflation target it may be easier to justify this monetary policy and to create confidence in allowing inflation to exceed 2 per cent during a period of time in order to provide a sufficiently low real interest rate.
Sveriges Riksbank · said 17 Feb 2009 (date) · Monetary policy with a zero interest rate · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidencePartly checkableForecastbased on dataambiguity 56/100implied call / likelihood: No · 40% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetinflationinterest rates
way: "[T]he appropriate target for monetary policy is to achieve an inflation rate of 2-3 per cent on average over the cycle". 9 If the central bank by means of convincing analyses and forecasts can gain credibility for such a temporary price level target - a temporary average inflation target - the price level target's inherent stabilisation of the real …
Sveriges Riksbank · said 17 Feb 2009 (date) · Monetary policy with a zero interest rate · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidencePartly checkableMixed claimbased on dataambiguity 56/100implied call / likelihood: No · 35% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetinflationinterest ratesfinance
In a case where there is a risk that inflation will be too low, or even negative, for a couple of years it may be appropriate, in order to avoid the disadvantage with a standard inflation target that I mentioned above, to tighten the inflation target and temporarily interpret it as a target of 2 per cent for average inflation …
Sveriges Riksbank · said 17 Feb 2009 (date) · Monetary policy with a zero interest rate · evidence & why
If inflation then falls below 2 per cent during a period of time, it must be kept above 2 per cent during a period of time to ensure the average will be 2 per cent.
Sveriges Riksbank · said 17 Feb 2009 (date) · Monetary policy with a zero interest rate · evidence & why
This type of temporary price target could be introduced in the form of an average inflation target, so that inflation over the coming five years should on average be 2 per cent.
Sveriges Riksbank · said 17 Feb 2009 (date) · Monetary policy with a zero interest rate · evidence & why

Also said - not checkable as stated (12 newest)

Remarks about the future with no date, figure or likelihood that could be checked. They are kept on the record and shown here, but not scored.

All else being equal, the Riksbank's estimate should then be reduced by 0.75 percentage points, whereby the Riksbank's final interval after the adjustment will be 4.25-6.75 per cent, with a midpoint of 5.5 per cent.
Sveriges Riksbank · said 16 Jan 2013 (date) · Monetary policy and employment - monetary policy is too tight · evidence & why
The increased growth and activity and the expectation that the central bank may eventually have to accept an appreciation may then still lead to a capital inflow, even though the interest-rate differential is unchanged.
Sveriges Riksbank · said 29 Nov 2011 (date) · Monetary policy after the crisis · evidence & why
πρόνοια · Preparing for the futurePartly checkableCall for actionstated on authorityambiguity 83/100implied call / likelihood: No · 40% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardgrowthfinance
Given this, flexible inflation targeting - applied in the right way and using all the information that is relevant for the forecast of inflation and resource utilisation, including the conduct of financial-stability policy when appropriate - remains in my view the best-practice monetary policy before, during, and after the financial crisis.
Sveriges Riksbank · said 29 Nov 2011 (date) · Monetary policy after the crisis · evidence & why
εἰκασία · ConjecturePartly checkableSpeculationeducated guessambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardinflationinterest rates
I have long been in favour of the publication of a policy-rate forecast on a regular basis, based on both the existing practical experience of publishing such forecasts and the fact that what matters for the economy and private-sector decisions is not what the policy rate is during the one or few months until the next policy meeting but what …
Sveriges Riksbank · said 29 Nov 2011 (date) · Monetary policy after the crisis · evidence & why
εἰκασία · ConjectureToo vague to checkSpeculationeducated guessambiguity 56/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardinterest rates
Countries that choose to peg to the dollar will tend to import U.S. expansionary monetary policy into to their own country.
Sveriges Riksbank · said 29 Nov 2011 (date) · Monetary policy after the crisis · evidence & why
εἰκασία · ConjectureToo vague to checkSpeculationeducated guessambiguity 56/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partbelow the RIM-1 standardinterest ratestrade
This monetary policy may in many cases be too expansionary for the countries concerned, creating an overheated economy with risks for bubbles and other negative consequences.
Sveriges Riksbank · said 29 Nov 2011 (date) · Monetary policy after the crisis · evidence & why
εἰκασία · ConjectureToo vague to checkSpeculationeducated guessambiguity 71/100implied call / likelihood: No · 40% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardinterest rates
This will increase real activity and both exports and imports, which in a situation with underutilised world resources is to the benefit of all.
Sveriges Riksbank · said 29 Nov 2011 (date) · Monetary policy after the crisis · evidence & why
In such a second-best situation, if there is a threat to financial stability, one may argue that, to the extent that policy rates do have an impact on financial stability, this impact should be taken into consideration when choosing the policy-rate path to best stabilise inflation and resource utilisation.
Sveriges Riksbank · said 18 Nov 2010 (date) · Where do central banks go from here? · evidence & why
πρόνοια · Preparing for the futureToo vague to checkCall for actionstated on authorityambiguity 71/100implied call / likelihood: No · 40% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardinflationinterest ratesfinance
Ultimately, my main conclusion for monetary policy is that flexible inflation targeting - applied in the right way and in particular using all the information about financial conditions that is relevant for the forecast of inflation and resource utilisation at any horizon - remains the best-practice monetary policy before, during, and after the financial crisis.
Sveriges Riksbank · said 18 Nov 2010 (date) · Where do central banks go from here? · evidence & why
εἰκασία · ConjecturePartly checkableSpeculationeducated guessambiguity 56/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardinflationinterest rates
If the central bank uses all relevant information in constructing these forecasts , including the impact of changes in financial conditions on inflation and resource utilisation at any horizon, monetary policy will automatically respond in the best possible way to changing financial conditions (Woodford 2007, 2010a).
Sveriges Riksbank · said 18 Nov 2010 (date) · Where do central banks go from here? · evidence & why
πρόνοια · Preparing for the futureToo vague to checkScenario (if… then)based on dataambiguity 83/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partbelow the RIM-1 standardinflationinterest ratesfinance
Furthermore, the policy rate is an ineffective instrument for influencing financial stability, and policy rates high enough to have a noticeable effect on credit growth and house prices will have a strong negative effect on inflation and resource utilisation, even in sectors that are not experiencing any speculative activity.
Sveriges Riksbank · said 18 Nov 2010 (date) · Where do central banks go from here? · evidence & why
εἰκασία · ConjecturePartly checkableSpeculationeducated guessambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partbelow the RIM-1 standardinflationinterest ratesgrowthfinance
In times of crisis, authorities may use instruments such as lending of last resort, variable-rate lending at longer maturities (credit policy, credit easing), special resolution regimes for financial firms in trouble, government lending guarantees, government capital injections, and so forth.
Sveriges Riksbank · said 18 Nov 2010 (date) · Where do central banks go from here? · evidence & why