Karolina Ekholm
Sveriges Riksbank
Track record: 1 forecast checked: 0 came true, 0 partly, 1 did not.
37forecasts & commitments on the record
95%can be checked as stated
37average ambiguity (0-100)
0goalpost moves recorded
0confirmed U-turns
Timeline
came true partly did not not due / being checked / too vague
Calibration score: shown after 10 checked forecasts with a stated likelihood (now 1).
How they speak about the future: based on data 26, educated guess 9, stated on authority 2.
Kinds of claim: forecast 23, scenario (if… then) 10, mixed claim 3, commitment 1. · Download this report card as a picture
In the nine words
πρόγνωσιςInference from evidence20 · 54%πρόνοιαPreparing for the future10 · 27%εἰκασίαConjecture3 · 8%φρόνησιςPractical wisdom1 · 3%προαναγγελίαPublic pre-announcement1 · 3%πρόβλεψιςSeeing the signs1 · 3%μαντείαInspired knowledge1 · 3%
How to read this
Each box is one sentence a public figure or institution said about the future, word for word, with a link to the official text. Can be checked means it names what will happen, by when, and how likely - so it can be compared with official figures later. Too vague to check means it does not. Ambiguity (0-100) is how many different ways the sentence can be read. When the date passes, the forecast is compared with official data and marked came true, partly or did not come true. Labels judge the sentence, never the person. Full guide and glossary.Checked
Our assessment is that unemployment will not increase again until 2011.
Did not come true. Said: unemployment would rise in 2011. Official figures for Sweden: 8.6% in 2010, 7.8% in 2011 (World Bank open data). official data · checked 14 Nov 2026 · automatic check against official data (rules v3)
On the record (37)
If one is expecting weak demand and thus low price increases in the future, one will not want to increase one's prices very much today.
If one looks at the estimates of the determinants of indebtedness used as a basis for our forecasts, one sees that the effect of the repo rate on households' debt ratios (that is, their debts in relation to disposable income) is very small. 12 A repo rate that is 0.25 percentage points higher during one year is expected to reduce …
It then remained at this level for one year, until December 2013, despite low inflation and an inflation forecast that had been revised down substantially, as well as unemployment that seemed stuck at around 8 per cent.
15 I n a long-run perspective, inflation below the target could lead to unnecessarily high unemployment if inflation expectations are firmly anchored around the target (see Svensson, 2013).
I believe that the high level of debt, combined with an unwillingness to have higher debts than assets, could in such a situation have negative effects on growth in consumption. 10 I would therefore feel more secure if the level of debt was lower, or at least was not increasing.
However, if the supply and demand situation changes, this could very well lead to falls in house prices in some situations.
Actually, an unfavourable scenario could also occur within the normal forecast period, that is, within the next three years.
In the latest issue of its report 'Wage Formation in Sweden', the National Institute of Economic Research assesses this rate to be around 7 per cent at present, but that it will fall to around 6 per cent in the years immediately ahead (see Wage Formation in Sweden 2012, National Institute of Economic Research).
Initially unemployment increased less than we expected given the substantial fall in GDP - it peaked at 9 per cent in early 2010 - but since then it has fallen no lower than 7.6 per cent (see Figure 2).
On the other hand, it may be more difficult to understand the reasons for my stance in 2010, when the Swedish economy had growth rates of over 5 per cent.
However, it is expected to gradually increase to 0.3 per cent of GDP in 2015 as economic activity improves.
The Riksbank's forecast is that public net lending will be negative at -1.1 per cent of GDP this year.
Unemployment has also begun to increase again in recent months and our latest forecast predicts that it will increase further to reach 8.2 per cent in the third quarter of this year.
If the countries that have the weakest public finances refrain from implementing them the interest rates on their sovereign debts will rise and there will thus be a risk of the crisis spreading to other countries.
Before the crisis, the most common view among central bankers was that monetary policy should only react to sharp increases in indebtedness and asset prices if these could be expected to lead to overheating in the economy as a whole and thus to a too high rate of inflation.
The average sovereign debt in the euro area increased from 79.7 per cent of GDP in 2009 to 85.8 per cent in 2010, and is expected to increase to 88.6 per cent in 2011.
Swedish exports grew rapidly in 2010 and during the early part of this year, but already in the July Monetary Policy Report it was stated that growth was expected to enter a calmer phase.
It is expected that growth in Asia and Latin America will remain high, even though it may be dampened by the slowdown in the United States and Europe.
The budget deficit in the United States is expected to reach 10.8 per cent of GDP this year, while the United States' gross debt currently exceeds 100 per cent of GDP.
It is also conceivable that the United States would import more investment goods if its current account deficit decreased, as this would probably entail an expansion of the export-oriented industrial sector at the expense of the more domestically-oriented service sector.
If China, for example, maintains a fixed exchange rate against the dollar, this will make it possible to adjust the real exchange rate if China has a higher rate of inflation than the United States.
If the change is deemed to be temporary, it is reasonable to assume that many firms will avoid changing their prices and that the pass-through will thus be moderate.
than in the forecast, particularly towards the end of the forecast period. 14 My preferred repo rate path, which goes up to 3.25 per cent at the end of the forecast period, gives a lower unemployment forecast than does the main scenario's repo rate path.
In the most recent monetary policy decision, the gap between the main scenario's forecast of foreign policy rates and the forecast I preferred was certainly significantly narrower than it was during the autumn of 2010 - but, even so, it still concerned a difference of more than 50 basis points towards the end of the forecast horizon (see Figure 6).
50 per cent over the short term. 7 The pass-through on consumer prices will be lesser, as the price in Sweden for imported goods is also determined by domestic components such as wages, taxes and transportation costs.
Empirical studies suggest that, for example, a weakening of the exchange rate by 4 per cent will increase import prices by about 2 per cent, which is to say that the pass-through is about
In our most recent forecast, which assumed the stabilisation of these prices, underlying inflation, even in the main scenario, was estimated at less than 2 per cent for most of the forecast period (see Figure 2).
It could also be due to a fear of losing market shares if the price is raised. 3 If the prices are not changed at all, the effect of the weaker SEK/EUR exchange rate will be that the profit margins for the Swedish cheese importer fall. 4 In this case, sales can be maintained, but profits will fall.
This means that they will rise by 7.5 per cent. 9 If one assumes that these prices constitute 30 per cent of the consumer price index (CPI), this means that consumer prices will rise by just over 2 per cent as a consequence of the change in the exchange rate.
This means that the cheese will now cost the importer 15 per cent more in kronor.
It might perhaps have been possible to avoid the house price bubble if tighter monetary policy had been conducted at the beginning of the 2000s, but the price in terms of deflation and low growth could have been unreasonably high.
Inflation measured in terms of the CPIF, in which mortgage rates are kept constant, is more stable but it is expected to be below 2 per cent for most of the forecast period (see Figure 8).
If we wait too long, there is a risk that we will need to increase the repo rate very quickly in order to meet the inflation target.
Irrespective of which indicators you look at, resource utilisation is still very low in Sweden and abroad and the development of employment is expected to be weak throughout next year.
Our assessment is that unemployment will not increase again until 2011.
Did not come true. Said: unemployment would rise in 2011. Official figures for Sweden: 8.6% in 2010, 7.8% in 2011 (World Bank open data). official data · checked 14 Nov 2026 · automatic check against official data (rules v3)
Unemployment is therefore expected to increase both this year and next year.
Sweden's GDP is now expected to fall by 4.9 per cent this year compared with last year.
Also said - not checkable as stated (12 newest)
Remarks about the future with no date, figure or likelihood that could be checked. They are kept on the record and shown here, but not scored.
If we see clear signs that inflationary pressures are weaker than expected, we must continue to show through our actions that we take the inflation target seriously, by making monetary policy even more expansionary.
This must be traded off against the benefit one can expect, that is, potentially less negative consequences of a crisis caused by households' high indebtedness.
18 The Canadian central bank governor recently described monetary policy as an exercise in risk management, where the risk of inflation falling and moving even further from the target has to be weighed against the risk of financial imbalances.
My assessment is that it does not have any major impact on household debt to hold the repo rate slightly higher for a limited period of time (see Figure 2). 14 To have an effect that is more than marginal, one would probably need to hold the repo rate so high that the costs in terms of poorer macroeconomic growth …
Thus, there are two questions one needs to take a stance on: How does indebtedness affect the risk that shocks will lead to a really severe depression?
In an upturn, substantial credit expansion will activate the buffers, which means that the banks will gradually have to hold more capital.
The banks will therefore not need to reduce their lending to the same extent, which would otherwise reinforce the downturn.
The Basel III Accord will also place requirements on the banks' leverage ratio, which is the minimum amount of capital that the banks must retain regardless of the risk class of the assets. 10 The fact that a requirement for the leverage ratio sets a ceiling for indebtedness in the banking system is very attractive.
At the same time, the banks will no longer have to rely upon the risk weights correctly reflecting the actual risk in lending.
Consequently, this is an instrument that we know we will be able to use in Sweden in a number of years.
Quite simply, we will have to test our way forward, while constantly doing our best to assess the efficiency of the instruments being employed. 13 The financial system is complex and dynamic, and the risk outlook is changing all the time.
A tool such as the countercyclical capital buffers may seem to be so wide-ranging that it should be able to work in approximately the same way as the interest rate.