John Murray
Bank of Canada
Track record: No forecast checked yet (16 not due, 12 being checked).
28forecasts & commitments on the record
82%can be checked as stated
39average ambiguity (0-100)
0goalpost moves recorded
0confirmed U-turns
Timeline
came true partly did not not due / being checked / too vague
Calibration score: shown after 10 checked forecasts with a stated likelihood (now 0).
How they speak about the future: based on data 24, educated guess 4.
Kinds of claim: forecast 15, scenario (if… then) 8, mixed claim 5. · Download this report card as a picture
In the nine words
πρόγνωσιςInference from evidence20 · 71%πρόνοιαPreparing for the future7 · 25%φρόνησιςPractical wisdom1 · 4%
How to read this
Each box is one sentence a public figure or institution said about the future, word for word, with a link to the official text. Can be checked means it names what will happen, by when, and how likely - so it can be compared with official figures later. Too vague to check means it does not. Ambiguity (0-100) is how many different ways the sentence can be read. When the date passes, the forecast is compared with official data and marked came true, partly or did not come true. Labels judge the sentence, never the person. Full guide and glossary.On the record (28)
Although one might assume that the demand for Canadian exports from U.S. governments (federal, state and local) would be minimal, preliminary evidence suggests that approximately 12 per cent of our non-commodity exports over the 1997 to 2012 period went to the U.S. government sector.
The Bank expects inflation to return to the 2 per cent target in about two years, as the effects of retail competition dissipate and excess capacity is absorbed.' ( Monetary Policy Report Summary , January 2014.)
This is materially different from actually reducing the amount of stimulus which, in the case of the United States, is still expected by most observers to begin in the second half of 2015.
In the case of Japan, the central bank's balance sheet is projected to hit nearly 60 per cent of GDP within the next two years.
Chart 2 shows the state of the U.S. economy over the past five years (the solid red line), and where the Bank of Canada projects it will be going over the next two years (the dashed red line).
Europe's GDP has yet to return to its pre-recession peak, and is not expected to do so until 2015 at the earliest.
If strong aggregate demand pressures appeared likely to push output above the economy's capacity limits and lift inflation above the 2 per cent target, the Bank would respond by raising the overnight rate.
The process would be reversed, of course, if demand were too weak and inflation seemed likely to fall below 2 per cent.
Depending on the assumptions, it could range from $6 to $9 trillion Sources: Bank of Canada and World Bank
In 2017, world GDP is lower by over US$7 trillion, and it could well be much worse ( Chart 8 ).
Third, if speculators were pushing prices above their fundamental levels, one would expect to see inventory levels rising, reflecting unwanted output.
If you look closely, you will notice that both of the real-price series are relatively stable, unlike the nominal-price series, which have risen sharply over the past 40 years, reflecting the effects of generalized price inflation.
looking and the policy was sufficiently credible and well understood, the central bank might enjoy what Lars Svensson (1999) termed a 'free lunch.' The third concerned the possibility that it might facilitate the pursuit of a lower inflation rate (or price-level path), if this were judged desirable.
A wide range of models suggest that, all other things being equal, economic welfare is maximized at inflation rates lower than 2 per cent, but considerable uncertainty still exists regarding how large these gains might be.
The central issue that remains is whether monetary authorities should be expected to go further than the prescripts of flexible, forward-looking inflation targeting would suggest. 22 If so, what form would it take?
If the learning curve is too long and expectations are too slow to adjust, the present value of any shift to price-level targeting could easily turn negative. 18 The Bank is currently conducting some experimental work designed to shed light on both issues, and hopes to report its preliminary findings later this year.
This research will inform the renewal of the Bank's inflation-targeting agreement with the government in 2011.
If these two economies continue to grow at annual rates of 8 to 10 per cent, as we have seen recently, they will soon overtake even the largest advanced economies, and their prospective demand for commodities could be enormous.
If prices stay high (or low) for a sufficiently long time, these reallocations of capital and labour could well be warranted and yield valuable returns, even if prices eventually revert to trend.
Oil and natural gas prices, as judged by the profiles of the futures curves for these commodities, are projected to rise quite modestly over the next three years, while non-energy prices are projected to increase by a cumulative 30 per cent.
Third, if action is necessary, the central bank will either lower or raise its target interest rate, depending on the circumstances.
At the Bank of Canada's last fixed announcement date we lowered the target overnight rate to 25 basis points - consistent with our estimate of the effective lower bound - and committed to keep the rate there until the end of the second quarter of 2010, conditional on the inflation outlook.
Yet, would that be wise if a slowing economy and other developments were expected to reverse these inflation pressures in the future?
If households and businesses are convinced that inflation will soon return to 2 per cent, they are less likely to form extrapolative expectations based on movements in current headline inflation.
This phenomenon might reflect the success that the Bank has enjoyed over the past 17 years in keeping total CPI inflation close to its 2 per cent target.
However, the recent decline in both spot and futures prices for energy commodities means that the spike in total CPI inflation expected between now and the first quarter of 2009 will be lower than projected in July.
Although this measure is likely to rise modestly towards the end of this year, it is still well below the headline or total CPI inflation rate, which has been running at about 3.4 per cent.
Further, as we said in our 3 September interest rate announcement, we anticipate that certain temporary factors now affecting both the total and CPIX measures of inflation should dissipate over the coming quarters and that both measures will converge on 2 per cent in the second half of 2009.
Also said - not checkable as stated (12 newest)
Remarks about the future with no date, figure or likelihood that could be checked. They are kept on the record and shown here, but not scored.
The more likely lesson that one might draw from this shared international experience is that the effect of output gaps on inflation is subject to a much longer lag than previously thought and that, to have an effect, the gaps must be not just large, but persistent.
This is not to preclude the possibility of other forces at work in Canada, such as an output gap that might be underestimated, just that the alternative explanation - a delayed response - must be given serious consideration.
At the same time, we must be careful not to assume that what has happened elsewhere will necessarily happen here.
Since monetary policy operates with long and variable lags, policy formulation must be forward-looking and anticipate the forces that might be acting on the economy one and two years out. 3
I expect that in New Brunswick you are well aware that there are large and persistent gaps between the prices charged in the United States and in Canada for similar goods.
In a fully competitive world, free of impediments to trade, one would expect to see what we economists call the law of one price (LOP) enforced.
Indeed, while we might expect the exchange rate to act as a buffer, it seems to be driving prices in the two countries away from each other.
- Shouldn't the exchange rate be preserving competitiveness and correcting any trade imbalances that might arise if large deviations were allowed to persist?
First, many of the goods and services included in the price indexes are not traded (e.g., haircuts), so one would not expect their prices to be the same between countries.
Shouldn't we expect changes in the exchange rate to offset changes in prices, thereby limiting any further widening in the price gap and preserving a form of relative PPP?
Advanced economies were going to have to boost domestic savings to get out of hock, and EMEs were going to have to rely on their own consumers for future growth.
Any positive confidence effects that might be associated with promises of fiscal rectitude and substantive structural reform were likely to be small and insufficient, on their own, to correct the widening output gap.