Jeremy C Stein
Federal Reserve · USA
Track record: No forecast checked yet (19 not due, 7 being checked).
26forecasts & commitments on the record
50%can be checked as stated
56average ambiguity (0-100)
0goalpost moves recorded
0confirmed U-turns
Timeline
came true partly did not not due / being checked / too vague
Calibration score: shown after 10 checked forecasts with a stated likelihood (now 0).
How they speak about the future: based on data 20, educated guess 3, stated on authority 3.
Kinds of claim: forecast 13, mixed claim 9, scenario (if… then) 4. · Download this report card as a picture
In the nine words
πρόγνωσιςInference from evidence15 · 58%πρόνοιαPreparing for the future4 · 15%μαντείαInspired knowledge3 · 12%πρόβλεψιςSeeing the signs3 · 12%εἰκασίαConjecture1 · 4%
How to read this
Each box is one sentence a public figure or institution said about the future, word for word, with a link to the official text. Can be checked means it names what will happen, by when, and how likely - so it can be compared with official figures later. Too vague to check means it does not. Ambiguity (0-100) is how many different ways the sentence can be read. When the date passes, the forecast is compared with official data and marked came true, partly or did not come true. Labels judge the sentence, never the person. Full guide and glossary.On the record (26)
Market participants now appear to almost uniformly expect that, barring a material change in the outlook for the economy, the Committee is likely to continue tapering our purchases in further measured steps over the remainder of this year.
If the incoming data are broadly consistent with this forecast, the Committee currently anticipates that it would be appropriate to moderate the monthly pace of purchases later this year.
So, for example, when I fill in my "dot" for 2016 in the Survey of Economic Projections, I think of myself as writing down not a commitment for where the federal funds rate will be at that time, but only my best forecast, and one that is highly uncertain at that.
Suppose further that doing so lowers the credit risk premium to 200 basis points temporarily but also increases the odds that this risk premium will, at some point in the next couple of years, revert sharply, moving back in the direction of 400 basis points.
Here's one way to put the broad theme of our work: We have learned from this year's Nobel laureates, Eugene Fama and Robert Shiller, that discount rate variation‑‑that is, transitory movements in asset prices not driven by changes in future expected cash flows‑‑is central to understanding asset pricing.
As you may know, the Federal Reserve has been conducting annual stress tests and capital-planning reviews of the 18 largest banks under the auspices of its Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR) program, and is adding 12 more firms this year, consistent with requirements of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.5
To be clear, I am sketching out a broad concept, and many details would need to be filled in to make it operational--such as, what to do if the unemployment rate falls in one month and then later rises.
For example, according to this view, a nominal 10-year yield of 1.63 percent in early May could be explained to a first approximation based on the expected path of the federal funds rate, plus a negative term premium that was itself primarily a function of the cumulative amount of duration that we were expected to remove from the market via …
If the news is bad, and it is confirmed by further bad news in October and November, this would suggest that the 7 percent unemployment goal is likely to be further away, and the remainder of the program would be extended accordingly.
In particular, I view Chairman Bernanke's remarks at his press conference--in which he suggested that if the economy progresses generally as we anticipate then the asset purchase program might be expected to wrap up when unemployment falls to the 7 percent range--as an effort to put more specificity around the heretofore less well-defined notion of "substantial progress."
Back then, FOMC participants were forecasting unemployment rates around 7-3/4 percent and 7 percent for year-end 2013 and 2014, respectively, in our Summary of Economic Projections; as of the June 2013 round, these forecasts have been revised down roughly 1/2 percentage point each.
If, for example, inflation readings continue to be on the soft side, we will have greater scope for keeping the funds rate at its effective lower bound even beyond the point when unemployment drops below 6.5percent.
Thus, while banks will naturally hold buffer stocks of liquid assets to handle unanticipated outflows, they may not hold enough because, although they bear all the costs of this buffer stocking, they do not capture all of the social benefits, in terms of enhanced financial stability and lower costs to taxpayers in the event of failure.
Then, when hit with large outflows, it could maintain its LCR at 100 percent, but do so by increasing its use of central bank credit lines to 25 percent and selling 20 percent of its other liquid assets.18 This scenario would be the sort of liquid-asset drawdown that one would ideally like to see in a stress situation.
By contrast, in a system with something like a CLF, a bank might in normal times meet 95 percent of its requirement by holding private-market HQLA and the remaining 5 percent with committed credit lines from the central bank, so it would have an LCR of exactly 100 percent.
As I noted at the outset, one important concern about a pure quantity-based system of regulation is that if a bank is held to an LCR standard of 100 percent in normal times, it may be reluctant to allow its ratio to fall below 100 percent when facing large outflows for fear that doing so might be seen by market …
A number of observers have expressed the concern that if a bank is held to an LCR standard of 100 percent in normal times, it may be reluctant to allow its ratio to drop below 100 percent when facing large outflows, even if regulators were to permit this temporary deviation, for fear that a decline in the ratio could be …
On the domestic front, the Federal Reserve expects that the U.S. banking agencies will issue a proposal later this year to implement the LCR for large U.S. banking firms.
Even if it were almost costless to impose higher capital requirements on bigger banks--so that doing so provided essentially no disincentive to bank size--it might still be a good idea to do so, for purely prudential reasons.
The exact amount of the surcharge will range from 1 percent to 2.5 percent, and will depend on factors that include a bank's size, complexity, and interconnectedness, as measured by a variety of indicator variables.8 These progressive surcharges are effectively a type of price-based regulation, and therefore should have the advantages I just noted.
In a span of four months, the exposure of money funds to euro-area banks fell by half, from about $400 billion in May to about $200 billion in September.5 Coincident with this contraction in dollar funding, the CIP basis widened in the direction predicted by our model, increasing the cost of obtaining synthetic dollars via the FX swap market.
Based on this evidence, a reasonable estimate is that, if the Fed were to undertake an additional $500 billion Treasury LSAP, both long-term Treasury and corporate bond rates might be expected to decline by something on the order of 15 to 20 basis points.
Indeed, the Fed's past actions are likely one important reason why Treasury term premiums are now near historic lows, on the order of minus 80 basis points, according to a model used by the Board staff.2 Moreover, while this is not entirely uncontroversial, my own reading of the evidence is that there has also been substantial pass-through to corporate bond …
Said differently, the case for an LSAP might seem more appealing if the term premium on Treasury bonds were at plus 200 basis points instead of its current level of roughly minus 80 basis points.
As a concrete case, if you did this exercise with the Fed's workhorse FRB/US model, it would tell you that the $500 billion LSAP should bring down the unemployment rate by approximately two-tenths of a percentage point at a two-year horizon.8 This effect is economically meaningful.
To be clear on where I stand, I support the Committee's decision of last month--namely, to initiate purchases of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) at a rate of $40 billion per month, in tandem with the ongoing maturity extension program (MEP) in Treasury securities, and to plan to continue with asset purchases if the Committee does not observe a substantial improvement in …
Also said - not checkable as stated (12 newest)
Remarks about the future with no date, figure or likelihood that could be checked. They are kept on the record and shown here, but not scored.
Monetary policy will be geared to evolving conditions in the economy, and the public does need to understand that as those views evolve, the Committee's views on policy will likely evolve with them.
It is common to hear observers talk about the Committee's reaction function, which describes how we will behave in various contingencies.
All along, the market is making conjectures about how we will behave, and these conjectures in turn can have a powerful influence on the debate itself.
Second, the Securities and Exchange Commission recently released its proposed rule under the Jumpstart Our Business Startups--or JOBS--Act, which is likely to influence the environment for crowdfunding in general and for community development finance specifically.
Many of you may be wondering, "Why is the Fed interested in this topic?" First, at a fundamental level, it's important for us to keep our finger on the pulse of financial innovation and the changing dynamics of the financial services industry--even in those parts of the industry where we do not have a direct regulatory role.
I am going to try to make the case that, all else being equal, monetary policy should be less accommodative--by which I mean that it should be willing to tolerate a larger forecast shortfall of the path of the unemployment rate from its full-employment level--when estimates of risk premiums in the bond market are abnormally low.
We will have to do the work and see what emerges.
To be specific, are there cases in which one might tolerate a larger forecast shortfall of the path of the unemployment rate from its full-employment level than one would otherwise, because of a concern that a more accommodative policy might entail a heightened risk of some sort of adverse financial market outcome?
While I hope to convince you that this path is worth exploring, I cannot say that I know yet exactly where it will lead--and, in particular, whether it will ultimately deliver monetary policy prescriptions that differ in a quantitatively meaningful way from those offered by our current models.
These risk premiums include the term premium on Treasury securities, as well as the expected returns to investors from bearing the credit risk on, for example, corporate bonds and asset-backed securities.
Let me start by summarizing what I take to be the paper's main messages.1 First, the authors argue that policymakers should pay careful attention not just to measures of leverage in the banking and shadow banking sectors, but also to the financial stability risks that might arise from the behavior of unlevered asset managers, such as those running various types …
Specifically, as short-term rates begin to rise and fund manager i contemplates whether she should bail out of long-term bonds and move into short-term bills, she is more apt to do so if she thinks that some other manager, j, is also going to bail--because she is worried that otherwise, she may wind up underperforming manager j and finishing last …