Jean-Pierre Danthine
Swiss National Bank
Track record: 1 forecast checked: 1 came true, 0 partly, 0 did not.
39forecasts & commitments on the record
56%can be checked as stated
44average ambiguity (0-100)
0goalpost moves recorded
0confirmed U-turns
Timeline
came true partly did not not due / being checked / too vague
Calibration score: shown after 10 checked forecasts with a stated likelihood (now 1).
How they speak about the future: based on data 30, educated guess 8, stated on authority 1.
Kinds of claim: forecast 29, scenario (if… then) 9, mixed claim 1. · Download this report card as a picture
In the nine words
πρόγνωσιςInference from evidence28 · 72%πρόνοιαPreparing for the future9 · 23%μαντείαInspired knowledge1 · 3%εἰκασίαConjecture1 · 3%
How to read this
Each box is one sentence a public figure or institution said about the future, word for word, with a link to the official text. Can be checked means it names what will happen, by when, and how likely - so it can be compared with official figures later. Too vague to check means it does not. Ambiguity (0-100) is how many different ways the sentence can be read. When the date passes, the forecast is compared with official data and marked came true, partly or did not come true. Labels judge the sentence, never the person. Full guide and glossary.Checked
Assuming that monetary policy remains unchanged, the SNB's forecast show that inflation will reach 0.7% this year.
Came true. Said: inflation around 0.7% in 2010. Official figure for Switzerland: 0.7% (World Bank open data). On target. Off by 0.0 points. official data · checked 14 Nov 2026 · automatic check against official data (rules v3)
On the record (39)
They already meet most of the requirements which will apply from 2019.
In consequence, the SNB's foreign exchange holdings surged from about CHF 220 billion in August 2011 to CHF 490 billion by the end of 2014, which corresponds to approximately 75% of Swiss GDP.
An increase in gold holdings could not be reversed, even if necessary from a monetary policy perspective.
Moreover, the international requirement, effective from the beginning of 2015, to disclose the Basel III leverage ratio will enable a direct comparison between large globally active banks.
In terms of loss-absorbing capital - defined as Common Equity Tier 1 capital plus high-trigger contingent capital instruments - their risk-weighted capital ratio either already exceeds or is close to the 13% requirement that will apply from 2019.
Even if the importance of cash does decline over time, it is unlikely that it will be completely replaced.
The first denomination in the new series - the 50-franc note - will not be issued until 2015 at the earliest.
As regards total capital - which, in addition to loss-absorbing capital, also comprises low-trigger contingent capital instruments the big banks have also made great progress; however, they have not yet achieved the ratios that will apply from 2019.
Second, a negative fiscal shock in the US in early 2014, caused, for instance, by renewed political deadlock over public budget negotiations, would probably be a drag on the global economy.
For borrowers, it means bearing in mind that real estate prices are already at elevated levels and ensuring that, even if interest rates were to rise sharply, they could afford to service a loan.
These new rules are being phased in over several years and will come into full effect in 2019. 2
Moreover, these plans will lead to a substantial increase in their leverage ratios by the end of 2014.
According to these plans, and measured in terms of loss-absorbing capital, by the end of 2014, Credit Suisse and UBS are likely to have already met the risk-weighted capital requirement of 13% which will apply from 2019.
In the second case, that is if the situation is rather one of a cyclical upswing, then clearly credit growth will have to undershoot nominal GDP growth for many years in the future.
Owing to the complexity and scope of the necessary work, the first denomination of the series, the CHF 50 note, may be expected in 2015 at the earliest.
The recent work by Rogoff and Reinhart suggests this would mean making sure that the 90% debt to GDP ratio is not reached, even after a plausibly serious stress scenario. 4 Seen in this light, we may doubt that the 60% debt to GDP ratio that has been the reference since the Maastricht Treaty is sufficiently prudent.
The former will be effective from January 2013, the latter already from July 2012 with a transition period until November 2012.
When activated, banks will be required to gradually build up an additional capital buffer of up to 2.5% of total domestic risk-weighted assets during the upswing in the credit cycle.
In the last three years, yearly growth rates of mortgage lending and real estate prices have amounted to about 5% on average. 10 These numbers may not be spectacular compared to the double-digit growth rates often observed during later build-up stages of a bubble.
I will abstain from an in-depth discussion of the catalogue of proposed tools and rather focus on a practical case study, namely the macroprudential instrument introduced in Switzerland earlier this year, the countercyclical capital buffer (CCB).
Calculations based on former banking crises suggest that, on average, about 10% of GDP is lost initially (peak-to-trough) and that the cumulated (longer-term) cost may have added up to 20-100% of pre-crisis GDP (BCBS (2010)).
For instance, estimates have been provided suggesting that the cumulated output loss incurred by the recent crisis could amount to 90% of 2009 world GDP. 6 Naturally enough, the afore-mentioned approach of 'benign neglect' is no longer seen as an acceptable way to deal with potential excesses building up through the financial cycle.
As I have just pointed out, the big banks have only moderate direct exposure to the most vulnerable peripheral euro area countries, yet if the crisis in these countries were to deepen, a general deterioration in economic and financial conditions could be expected.
If the SNB's recommendations are implemented, the banks will be legally obliged to meet specific equity capital requirements as soon as certain indicators on the real estate and mortgage markets show signs of unsustainable growth.
That said, if developments in the international economy prove to be worse than foreseen, or if the Swiss franc does not weaken further, as it is expected to, downside risks for price stability could re-emerge.
For 2012, the SNB is now forecasting moderate growth, at close to 1%.
As my first slide highlights, the most recent forecasts for 2012 show an inflation rate of -0.6%, as compared to a rate of 0.3% in 2013 and 0.6% in 2014.
Taylor even suggests that, if central banks had set higher interest rates in this period, the subsequent housing bubble and the global financial crisis might have been avoided. 7 According to this view, the crisis stemmed from a misapplication of the 'inflationtargeting' precept.
This new regulatory regime will come into force on 1 st January 2013, pending approval of the associated directives by Parliament.
The simulated policy would probably also have prompted a significant drop in cumulative real GDP growth, estimated at about 3.3 percent.
The slide illustrates that the simulated policy would probably have kept real house prices some 7.5 percent lower than they were at their peak.
Both of these views suggest that central banks could have potentially helped prevent the crisis by setting higher interest rates and that they should have done so if the 'inflationtargeting' precepts had been fully understood and optimally followed.
This is in line with the share of Swiss exports to the euro area, and only five percentage points more than our allocation three years ago, though the size of our FX reserves, excluding swaps, increased from CHF 50 billion in 2008 to over CHF 225 billion by the end of September 2011.
For all these reasons, we may hypothesise that the total cost of bank financing will not materially increase as a result of higher capital requirements, in particular if the latter can take the form of Cocos.
These investigations are currently underway, and a decision by the SNB on whether to settle Swiss franc transactions in T2S is expected by midMay 2011.
These acquisitions led to a significant increase in currency reserves, which rose from CHF 95 billion in December 2009 to over CHF 230 billion at the end of May 2010.
advanced G20 countries, public-sector capital injections to the banking sector so far have been estimated at 3.4% of GDP! 3 This is a lower bound for the risks assumed by the public sector; the latter may have been closer to 25% of GDP for the major western economies, according to a recent estimate by J.C.
The SNB's forecasts also show that inflation will begin to increase again from the beginning of 2011, to reach 2% in the first half of 2012.
Assuming that monetary policy remains unchanged, the SNB's forecast show that inflation will reach 0.7% this year.
Came true. Said: inflation around 0.7% in 2010. Official figure for Switzerland: 0.7% (World Bank open data). On target. Off by 0.0 points. official data · checked 14 Nov 2026 · automatic check against official data (rules v3)
Also said - not checkable as stated (12 newest)
Remarks about the future with no date, figure or likelihood that could be checked. They are kept on the record and shown here, but not scored.
Third, it can be expected that regulatory developments at both international and national level will result in increased capital requirements. 1 The Swiss big banks should prepare for these developments.
In particular, should momentum on the mortgage and residential real estate markets pick up again, additional measures might become necessary.
A number of studies have shown that, in some instances, model-based RWA do not properly reflect a bank's economic risks .2 As a consequence, capital ratios calculated using model-based RWA may overstate the true level of resilience.
In the residential investment property segment in particular, additional demand from investors searching for yield might push prices up further.
For its part, the SNB will continue to monitor developments on the mortgage and real estate markets closely, and will reassess the need for an adjustment to the countercyclical capital buffer on a regular basis.
It is important to note that the costs and benefits of a given policy measure may change over time, and must therefore be reassessed repeatedly.
This does not mean that the SNB will refrain from expanding its balance sheet further, should it prove necessary.
Should there be renewed signs of a further build-up, I am confident that we could contain the problem.
Speech by Mr Jean-Pierre Danthine, Vice Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the Swiss Finance Institute Evening Seminar, Geneva, 19 May 2015.
Based on practical experience of making monetary policy in the last few years, I will try today to dispel four Swiss monetary policy 'fictions' by contrasting them with established facts about Swiss monetary policy.
As before, the SNB will regularly assess whether the countercyclical capital buffer needs to be adjusted due to mortgage and real estate market developments.
In the SNB's view, a possible recalibration of capital requirements must reflect the size and concentration of our banking sector.