Irma Rosenberg
Sveriges Riksbank
Track record: No forecast checked yet (39 not due, 21 being checked).
60forecasts & commitments on the record
88%can be checked as stated
39average ambiguity (0-100)
0goalpost moves recorded
0confirmed U-turns
Timeline
came true partly did not not due / being checked / too vague
Calibration score: shown after 10 checked forecasts with a stated likelihood (now 0).
How they speak about the future: based on data 23, educated guess 22, stated on authority 15.
Kinds of claim: forecast 31, scenario (if… then) 20, mixed claim 6, commitment 3. · Download this report card as a picture
In the nine words
πρόγνωσιςInference from evidence22 · 37%πρόνοιαPreparing for the future20 · 33%μαντείαInspired knowledge11 · 18%προαναγγελίαPublic pre-announcement3 · 5%εἰκασίαConjecture2 · 3%πρόβλεψιςSeeing the signs2 · 3%
How to read this
Each box is one sentence a public figure or institution said about the future, word for word, with a link to the official text. Can be checked means it names what will happen, by when, and how likely - so it can be compared with official figures later. Too vague to check means it does not. Ambiguity (0-100) is how many different ways the sentence can be read. When the date passes, the forecast is compared with official data and marked came true, partly or did not come true. Labels judge the sentence, never the person. Full guide and glossary.On the record (60)
But if the central bank acts too late and, for example, raises the interest rate just before a bubble would nevertheless have burst of its own accord, monetary policy may instead contribute to worsening the fall in demand.
And as I leave the Riksbank at the end of the year one could say that I have come full circle.
In May of this year I held a speech on the upward pressure on international commodity prices that had been exerted for some time.
But at the September meeting the Executive Board's assessment was that there would not be any more raises and that the interest rate might need to be cut during 2009.
The National Accounts for the first quarter of this year show that GDP growth was 2.2 per cent, which was 0.6 percentage points less than we had forecast in April.
If, for example, new groups are being employed at low entry wages to a greater extent than before, then the average rate of wage increase will be lower.
If the expectations of the relative return on this type of investment were to decline, it could instead have a subduing effect on prices.
Commodities are priced in dollars, and this may mean that commodities exporters will try to gain compensation through higher prices if the dollar falls.
If food commodities and oil prices soar, this means that companies' costs will rise and inflation will be pushed up.
Nevertheless, it was assumed that the weaker prospects for economic activity internationally would lead to a slowing down of growth in Sweden as well later this year and early next year.
If the international price impulses were to become stronger and longer lasting than expected, inflation would of course be higher.
What will it entail for future monetary policy if these price rises continue?
If the expectations of inflation are pushed up and remain above the inflation target, there is a risk that they will become a self-fulfilling prophecy.
But if commodity prices soar, this means that companies' costs will rise and inflation will be pushed up.
If world market prices do not continue to rise at the same rapid pace in future, inflation will fall back again.
But, as we have written in previous reports, there is also a risk that inflation will be higher than in the main scenario if wage developments are stronger and productivity weaker than expected.
The question is how resistant household consumption, which corresponds to approximately 70 per cent of GDP, will be given the shocks facing the US economy.
I therefore assessed that weaker productivity growth indicates that companies will be more restrictive in recruiting labour rather than that we will see rapid price increases in the future.
Growth in Sweden is expected to be approximately the same this year as last year, but in reality this is a weakening if one takes into account the larger number of working days this year.
In the main scenario the recovery in the United States and the euro area is expected to begin during the second half of this year and next year growth will largely be back at the trend level.
If, for instance, house prices were to fall more than expected, this could once again increase the unrest in the markets and lead to rising interest rates and falling stock prices, not only in the United States.
On the two occasions so far when we have presented a new assessment the monetary policy decision to raise the interest rate to 0.25 percentage points has indeed been anticipated and hardly been questioned.
I will also give some reflections on the experiences of the two occasions on which we have published our own interest rate path in connection with the Monetary Policy Reports published in February and June this year.
A further reason why we foresaw higher inflationary pressures was that the Government's Spring Budget Bill appeared likely to stimulate demand slightly more, at least next year, than we had previously estimated.
From now on, we will hold press conferences after each monetary policy meeting, regardless of what decision has been taken.
If, for instance, the annual interest rate for government bonds is higher for long durations than for short ones, this could be interpreted as the market expecting the repo rate to be raised.
During 2007 rising unit labour costs will provide an increasing contribution to inflation and a couple of years ahead underlying inflation is expected to be in line with the target, given a gradual increase in the repo rate.
Our assessment is that the effects of the energy prices will subside at the beginning of 2007.
The inflationary impulse this entails is to some extent counteracted by the low unit labour costs, but inflation this year will probably be slightly higher than we had assumed in our June forecast.
Although the high GDP growth in itself indicates that inflation may rise more rapidly in future, the strong productivity growth is at the same time expected to contribute to cost pressures being lower this year than was assumed in June.
The signals regarding the US economy are mixed, however, and some indicate that growth will be weaker than expected next year.
GDP growth this year was therefore expected to be high, which was supported by both the national accounts figures for the first quarter and the economic indicators for developments during the second quarter.
When our forecasts were based on an unchanged repo rate, monetary policy could be explained by the simple rule of thumb that I described - the repo rate would normally be changed if the forecast showed inflation deviating from target.
The outcome was 0.3 percentage points higher than forecast in the Inflation Report (for both CPI and UND1X).
Guided by this assumption, monetary policy could, somewhat simplified, be described by the following rule of thumb: if the forecast inflation, given an unchanged repo rate, deviated from the target, the repo rate should normally be raised or lowered.
One potential cause of concern, which we cannot disregard, is that if this trend continues at the same rapid rate, a situation could develop where, at a later date, there is a risk of a considerable slowdown in growth and employment as a result of households finding themselves compelled to increase savings owing to a heavy debt burden.
The assessment in December for the Swedish economy was that growth would increase this year but subsequently slow down slightly in the next few years.
In the December Inflation Report, we made the assessment that international growth would be good this year and in the next few years but would slow down somewhat.
If interest rates rise, interest expenditure as a share of disposable incomes will increase, which tends to dampen consumption demand.
This forecast has been very accurate up to the beginning of this year even though there have been some large short-term deviations on the way (see Figure 2).
Since May 2003 it has averaged 0.8 per cent according to the CPI.
To make the Riksbank's monetary policy strategy clear it has been described in terms of a simple policy rule: if the forecast points to an inflation rate above 2 per cent 1-2 years ahead the repo rate should normally be raised, whereas it should normally be lowered if inflation is forecast to be below 2 per cent.
We have not considered it possible to be more precise than this, given the difficulties in measuring growth, etc. If we look ahead, it is reasonable to believe that growth will in future be somewhere within this interval, although where depends on how far ahead one looks.
Over the coming years, growth will probably be closer to 2.5 per cent than to 2 per cent.
The assessment in the October Inflation Report is that employment, labour force participation and mean working time will rise during the economic upturn forecast for the coming years and will contribute to an increase in the number of hours worked of approximately 1 per cent a year during the period.
The demographic situation, with a declining percentage of the population of working age, will deteriorate significantly in the long term, particularly after 2010.
Population growth and change in age group 20-64 years in the population 1981-2020 (forecast 2004-2020), per cent
The rate of price increase in terms of the consumer price index, CPI, shall be limited to 2 per cent a year with a tolerated deviation interval of +/- 1 percentage point.
However, the rapid increase in house prices and indebtedness occurring now is something we shall monitor closely.
Suppose that as a result of some shock the inflation rate after 1.5 years is forecast to rise from 2 to 3 per cent.
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Also said - not checkable as stated (12 newest)
Remarks about the future with no date, figure or likelihood that could be checked. They are kept on the record and shown here, but not scored.
Although the upward pressure on commodity prices has taken a time-out with the slowdown in world growth, in a year or two it may very well be a problem that central banks will once again need to manage.
The view that the central bank should only react if the forecasts indicate problems may appear reasonable, but there are some uncertainties in this, particularly with regard to how this should be translated into practical policy.
The conclusion the Riksbank has reached with regard to monetary policy is therefore that this type of risk may need to be taken into consideration in a different way than the normal procedure, via the forecasts for inflation and the real economy.
If it should suddenly become difficult or very expensive for the bank to borrow money, it may experience difficulty in meeting its payments.
Further, my assessment was that the repo rate might need to be cut more than indicated by the proposed interest rate path and I therefore entered a reservation against the new interest rate path.
We have to be prepared to take action although we hope that we will never need to do so.
The Riksbank has regularly emphasised many of the risks in the financial system and what could happen if the financial turbulence should grow worse.
We will of course continue to follow developments very closely.
We are six Board members and it is during the coming weeks that each person will finally form his or her opinion of how the economy will develop in the future and what monetary policy is required to attain the inflation target at the same time as avoiding excessive fluctuations in the real economy.
If we make any major changes that have significance for our forecasts we will of course let you know.
If an independent central bank is to be perceived as credible it must be possible for outsiders to understand its decisions and to assess its activities.
But how do we go about producing a forecast that leads to a decision on the interest rate?