Huw Pill
Bank of England · GBR
Track record: No forecast checked yet (28 not due, 18 being checked).
46forecasts & commitments on the record
76%can be checked as stated
43average ambiguity (0-100)
0goalpost moves recorded
0confirmed U-turns
Timeline
came true partly did not not due / being checked / too vague
Calibration score: shown after 10 checked forecasts with a stated likelihood (now 0).
How they speak about the future: based on data 30, stated on authority 11, educated guess 5.
Kinds of claim: forecast 34, mixed claim 7, scenario (if… then) 5. · Download this report card as a picture
In the nine words
πρόγνωσιςInference from evidence30 · 65%μαντείαInspired knowledge11 · 24%πρόνοιαPreparing for the future5 · 11%
How to read this
Each box is one sentence a public figure or institution said about the future, word for word, with a link to the official text. Can be checked means it names what will happen, by when, and how likely - so it can be compared with official figures later. Too vague to check means it does not. Ambiguity (0-100) is how many different ways the sentence can be read. When the date passes, the forecast is compared with official data and marked came true, partly or did not come true. Labels judge the sentence, never the person. Full guide and glossary.On the record (46)
Here I am using the word ‘premia’ in a loose sense, namely as a label for the gap between survey-based measures of the modal Bank Rate outlook (from the Banks’ MaPS survey, which at present point to levels unchanged at 3.75%) and the pricing of forward Bank Rate in the OIS curve.
As, for example, reflected in recent MaPS surveys, which report that market participants have foreseen unchanged Bank Rate at 3.75% as the most likely outcome even while the money market curve is upward sloping. ↑
Chart 3 shows the BVAR median projection for underlying ‘sticky-central’ inflation under the assumption Bank Rate remains unchanged at 3.75%, comparing this with an equivalent forecast for headline CPI inflation.
The majority of the Committee have judged that level of Bank Rate (together with the tightening in broader financial conditions, including the emergence of an upward sloping money market yield curve over the next year) as sufficient to contain inflationary risks coming from higher energy prices.
While the latter falls back towards target in 2027, the underlying measure remains stuck meaningfully above 2%, with the risks around this projection being clearly to the upside. Such analysis gives reason for caution in sounding the all clear as regards lasting achievement of the inflation target, in line with my recent policy votes.
A robust monetary policy will deliver inflation close to the 2% target on a lasting basis across a broad and diverse set of possible environments.
However, (1) it would have to have been clear much earlier - at least a year earlier - if monetary policy were to be able to contain the initial inflationary impulse from higher energy prices; and (2) as the military threat grew, market pricing of natural gas futures rose.
As always, my decision will focus on achieving the MPC's price stability mandate through achieving the 2% inflation target on a sustained and lasting basis.
Ultimately, monetary policy can do little to offset the real impact of real shocks: all it can do is support the necessary and inevitable adjustment of the economy to that real shock in a manner that guarantees inflation will remain at its 2% target on a sustainable basis over the medium term.
Given the MPC's mandate, CPI inflation will revert to 2% over time.
Headline inflation is set to fall sharply in the coming months, both because the big contributions from energy price rises last year will drop out of the annual calculation and because wholesale gas prices have reverted of late.
Over the past 18 months since I joined the MPC: we have raised Bank Rate by almost 400 basis points; we have halted asset purchases and started to run down the portfolio of assets held as a result of quantitative easing (QE); and we have changed the character of our communication about the economic outlook and its implications for policy.
Even after the MPC has brought CPI inflation back to 2% - as I am sure it will - you can be sure that there will still be plenty of interesting and important work for you to do at the Bank if we succeed in attracting you to Threadneedle Street.
As ever, I will come to my own conclusions about Bank Rate on those occasions on the basis of my assessment of the data flow, with my decision focused on meeting the MPC's price stability mandate through achieving the 2% inflation target on a sustained and lasting basis.
Annual private sector regular pay growth was 7.3% in the latest report, 0.1pp higher than expected in the MPR, even if the momentum of wage growth may now be slowing.
In particular - and reflecting the central conjunctural issues - I have focused on whether, and, if so, how, the initial inflationary impulse stemming from higher European wholesale natural gas prices will propagate through the UK price process.
That threat will be more acute to the extent that domestic firms and workers seek to protect the real value of their profits and earnings in the face of higher - even if no longer rising - imported energy prices.
This will have a mechanical moderating effect on headline inflation from the middle of next year, as the MPC has anticipated in its latest forecasts.
On the basis of current futures prices, wholesale natural gas prices may stabilise or even fall somewhat in the coming months - indeed, that is precisely what we have seen in recent weeks.
As it turned out, that easing did not materialise: through the middle of this year, the labour market has continued to tighten and has proved tighter than we had expected, largely owing to the adverse developments in participation that we did not fully foresee.
The open question is how we will act in order to achieve the 2% inflation target sustainably, given the substantial challenges of the moment.
Nonetheless, the point made here holds: if asset purchases are intended to complement the setting of Bank Rate by supporting the transmission of monetary policy decisions reflected in the changing Bank Rate, then these asset purchases will take place in parallel with Bank Rate changes, rather than once the scope for Bank Rate changes has been exhausted,
- 9 Broadbent (2021) and Tenreyro (2022) offer some model simulations that illustrate the challenges monetary policy faced in addressing these inflationary shocks, demonstrating the substantial output costs entailed in stabilising inflation at 2% if those gas prices rises had been anticipated early enough for monetary policy action to offset them.
Although it has eased somewhat in recent months, the January European wholesale gas price future - most relevant for next year's household energy bills that enter the CPI basket - rose more than ten times to its August peak.
But, given the need to contain the risk of greater inflation persistence implied by potential second round effects, further action is likely to be required to ensure inflation will return sustainably to its 2% target over the medium term.
At every juncture, the MPC has remained committed to a medium-term view that stabilises inflation around the 2% target.
Relative to where we might otherwise have expected to be early next year on the basis of wholesale gas futures prices, the introduction of the £2500 cap on an average energy bill directly reduces CPI inflation.
The EPG has capped the expected average energy bill at £2500, for the next two years, a substantially lower level than the earlier Ofgem price cap mechanism would have implied given the evolution of wholesale gas prices.
In my remarks today, I aim to make three points: (1) to emphasise the MPC's focus on returning inflation to its 2% target; (2) to re-call the drivers of recent inflation developments and how they have shaped the MPC's policy actions; and (3) to re-state and unpack the MPC's most recent communication about the outlook for monetary policy decisions.
The MPC will take the actions necessary to return inflation to the 2% target sustainably in the medium term, in line with its remit.
Not only did this give a false - and thus misleading - impression that Bank Rate was set to move mechanically and unconditionally upward over the coming months, but it also discouraged markets from pricing the macroeconomic risks to the interest rate outlook.
In May, inflation reached 9.1%. The MPC forecasts a further rise to around 11% later in the year, once rises in international commodity prices stemming from Russia's invasion of Ukraine pass through to UK utility and food prices.
It thus reflects the uncertainties we face, and the likelihood that we will have to take finely-balanced decisions over rates not just in August but also beyond that, in the face of two-sided risks to the economic outlook into next year.
As a result, in taking monetary policy decisions today, the MPC needs to take account not just of the immediate inflationary impact of higher energy prices in the coming months, but also the potential disinflationary impact of higher energy prices through weaker incomes and demand at longer horizons.
If a QT sale is pre-announced ahead of implementation, the initial fall in bond prices will result in a pre-implementation increase in the share of money in the overall portfolio: money is capital certain, whereas the value of bonds will be lower on announcement because of the expectation that bond prices will fall on implementation.
So the MPC forecasts that, as we move towards the end of this year, this real income squeeze coming from higher international energy and goods prices will slow domestic demand and eventually result in higher unemployment and a looser labour market.
And, prima facie, the constant rate scenario contained in the MPC's May report appears to justify the guidance that 'some degree of further tightening in monetary policy may still be appropriate in the coming months': maintaining Bank Rate at 1% would fail to achieve the 2% inflation target within the forecast period.
towards the end of 2023); and a variant projection where Bank Rate is held constant at the 1% level established at the May MPC meeting.
Inflation is projected to reach double digits towards the end of this year, a significant overshoot of the 2% inflation target.
As I am sure you all know, at its meeting at the start of this month, the MPC decided to raise Bank Rate by a further 25bp to 1%. The Committee also judged that some degree of further tightening in monetary policy may still be appropriate in the coming months.
On Wednesday, we learnt that UK consumer price inflation currently stands at 9.0%. The MPC forecasts that it will rise to double digits in the fourth quarter of this year.
If such swings in market sentiment and expectations were to weaken central banks' ability to steer the market rates of most relevance to spending and investment decisions, then the transmission of monetary policy will be at risk.
These have repeatedly surprised to the upside in both magnitude and persistence over the past year, putting painful pressure on the cost of living and placing the MPC in the current, very uncomfortable position of forecasting headline CPI inflation to peak at over 7% in April.
Under our baseline paths for wages and energy prices, our published scenarios suggest that leaving Bank Rate unchanged at 0.5% indefinitely would - unsurprisingly - leave inflation above our 2% target at the policy-relevant horizon, whereas following the market-implied path to 1.2% by the end of this year would have left inflation somewhat below target.
But we expect the forecast stronger momentum in domestic wage and cost growth to ease beyond this year, as headline inflation falls and unemployment rises owing to the impact of higher energy prices on real incomes and domestic demand.
Should they fall slowly in line with futures prices, inflation is forecast to fall below the 2% target by a meaningful margin at the policy-relevant horizon.
Also said - not checkable as stated (12 newest)
Remarks about the future with no date, figure or likelihood that could be checked. They are kept on the record and shown here, but not scored.
Rather my intention is to emphasise that at each of its meetings the MPC will need to make an active choice about the stance of monetary policy.
He stresses that the MPC must continue to monitor how these external shocks to inflation might become embedded in the economy, and therefore risk persistently high domestically driven inflation.
Recognising the uncertainties it faces, the MPC must manage the balance of risks to the inflation outlook, taking account of the likely costs and duration of deviations from the inflation target.
Nevertheless, given where we stand, I still choose to emphasise the MPC's need to be watchful for signs of greater-than-expected persistence in inflationary pressure.
Any plan has to be conditional on economic conditions, and responsive to economic shocks and disturbances. 7 The MPC has flagged that it will use Bank Rate as its active instrument to address new shocks as they emerge, leaving the QT programme to run 'in the background' as long as market conditions permit.
Monetary developments need to be incorporated into a wider assessment of the economic outlook, such as the MPC forecast that we publish regularly in the Monetary Policy Report.
Of itself, the resulting lower and flatter profile for headline inflation should diminish the risks coming from potential second round effects, and a make shift towards more inflationary psychology less likely.
We will need to assess all these elements and the interactions among them within our November forecast.
That assessment will need to embody recent evidence of weakness in economic activity, as well as the impact of the Government's Energy Price Guarantee on headline inflation and wage and price setting behaviour.
It will have to factor in the evolution of international commodity prices, not least developments in wholesale natural gas markets.
And it will need to assess the impact of the Government's Growth Plan and other fiscal announcements in detail.
We will come to our more complete assessment in November.