Government representatives of the UK
Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office · GBR
Track record: No forecast checked yet (1 not due, 0 being checked).
1forecasts & commitments on the record
0%can be checked as stated
36average ambiguity (0-100)
0goalpost moves recorded
0confirmed U-turns
Timeline
came true partly did not not due / being checked / too vague
Calibration score: shown after 10 checked forecasts with a stated likelihood (now 0).
How they speak about the future: based on data 1.
Kinds of claim: mixed claim 1.
In the nine words
How to read this
Each box is one sentence a public figure or institution said about the future, word for word, with a link to the official text. Can be checked means it names what will happen, by when, and how likely - so it can be compared with official figures later. Too vague to check means it does not. Ambiguity (0-100) is how many different ways the sentence can be read. When the date passes, the forecast is compared with official data and marked came true, partly or did not come true. Labels judge the sentence, never the person. Full guide and glossary.On the record (1)
We have already indicated that if Iran fails to implement the essential and urgent actions contained in the November 2022 Resolution, the Board will have to be prepared to take further action in support of the Secretariat to hold Iran accountable in the near future, including the possibility of additional resolutions.
Also said - not checkable as stated (5 newest)
Remarks about the future with no date, figure or likelihood that could be checked. They are kept on the record and shown here, but not scored.
We reiterate that, should Iran enable the IAEA Director General to conclude that these issues have been clarified and resolved and are no longer outstanding, we will not deem further reports and Board discussion necessary.
This issue touches upon the very core of the Agency’s safeguards mandate: it is about Iranian undeclared activities at undeclared locations involving uranium metal, some of which is of unknown origin and might still be outside of safeguards.
Unless and until Iran provides technically credible explanations in response to the Agency’s outstanding questions, the Agency will not be able to confirm the correctness and completeness of Iran’s declarations under its NPT Safeguards Agreement or provide assurance that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful.
The further Iran goes down its conscious path of non-cooperation, the closer this Board will get to reaching the conclusion that the Agency is not able to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material.
We urge Iran to promptly cooperate with the Agency on installing surveillance and monitoring equipment where requested, providing urgent access to camera data which it is currently withholding and addressing the gaps in the recordings.