General Sir Nick Carter GCB CBE DSO ADC Gen
Foreign & Commonwealth Office · GBR
Track record: No forecast checked yet (10 not due, 7 being checked).
17forecasts & commitments on the record
35%can be checked as stated
39average ambiguity (0-100)
0goalpost moves recorded
0confirmed U-turns
Timeline
came true partly did not not due / being checked / too vague
Calibration score: shown after 10 checked forecasts with a stated likelihood (now 0).
How they speak about the future: based on data 10, stated on authority 5, educated guess 2.
Kinds of claim: forecast 10, mixed claim 5, commitment 1, scenario (if… then) 1. · Download this report card as a picture
In the nine words
πρόγνωσιςInference from evidence10 · 59%μαντείαInspired knowledge4 · 24%πρόνοιαPreparing for the future1 · 6%εἰκασίαConjecture1 · 6%προαναγγελίαPublic pre-announcement1 · 6%
How to read this
Each box is one sentence a public figure or institution said about the future, word for word, with a link to the official text. Can be checked means it names what will happen, by when, and how likely - so it can be compared with official figures later. Too vague to check means it does not. Ambiguity (0-100) is how many different ways the sentence can be read. When the date passes, the forecast is compared with official data and marked came true, partly or did not come true. Labels judge the sentence, never the person. Full guide and glossary.On the record (17)
One of the things that will be announced quite soon, will be the Reserves Forces 2030 work which looks to see how we can have a more productive Reserve which will not just provide an operational Reserve at 180 days readiness to be able to augment and improve the mass of our Armed Forces, but equally will be a home …
And I think by 2030, it’s entirely respectable for us to posit a view that a tactical formation in the Air Force will move from being eight typhoon, to being two typhoon, 10 mosquitoes and 100 Alvino, because that is another way of generating significant mass, and you can see that playing out both in the land and maritime domains …
The rationale for it has been firmly established in the development of the Government’s Integrated Review of Foreign, Defence, Security and International Development Policy which will be published early next year, and we have already seen a new foreign policy posture emerging that indicates the direction of travel, Magnitsky and Hong Kong being obvious examples.
To bring this to life we will run a number of exercises next year to test our resilience and our ability to navigate crisis.
It needs to develop a political strategy for approaching a world in which China will be of growing importance through to 2030.
We are establishing integrated career structures where appropriate that are blended between the services and our civilians – we are calling this ‘unified career management’ and the first of these blended career fields based on cyber will be initiated next year.
In the land domain it is excellent news that after a very long journey the Army will start to see the first versions of the UK Boxer mechanised infantry vehicle begin to enter service in 2021.
For example, the IMF and the Brenthurst Foundation state that 62% of the population of sub-Saharan Africa is under the age of 25, by 2030 the population will be around 1.65 million, and by 2050 it will have doubled from today to around 2.1 billion, with some 900 million living in cities.
This year I suspect I shall regard success as my not making any unwarranted headlines a week before the General Election.
We will pilot this imminently, looking to establish a common human resource management model with some of our key industry suppliers. 2020 was the horizon for Future Reserves 2020 – the so-called FR20 - and it would be appropriate to conduct an FR30 review that would build on the very successful foundation laid by FR20, as well as getting after …
I suggest that our starting point for a review should be a proper assessment of the threat and this should take the form of a net assessment that determines where our current trajectory will take us in 2030 relative to those of our competitors.
Despite the changing character of warfare, the nature of war does not change – it remains a human endeavor, and there will inevitably be some Industrial Age capabilities in our Armed Forces come 2030.
Holding these at a lower ‘war-fighting’ readiness and utilising them on tasks to generate understanding and build relationships, to enable soft power to have effect, building institutions, capacity and resilience in nations that matter to us – as well as countering the agendas of our competitor states … not least in Africa – which will be a source of significant …
And there will be some who might ask if Russia sees itself in decline, and more able now to go to war than in the future, does this encourage them to think of war?
The goal, I think, will be to build on a pilot that we ran last year and to conduct a full-blown mobilization exercise, for all of the Reserve, and the Regular Reserve, just like we used to do in the Cold War, sometime in the middle of next year.
Without economic growth matching population growth it is inevitable that we will see more movement.
Nearly all of this growth will be among the 49 countries of sub-Saharan Africa - some 2 billion people by 2045.
Also said - not checkable as stated (12 newest)
Remarks about the future with no date, figure or likelihood that could be checked. They are kept on the record and shown here, but not scored.
If we are genuinely going to integrate to be able to compete then the way that is pulled together nationally is pretty fundamental to our ability to do it – recognising that the ‘military instrument is just one of the instruments that would need to be applied.
We need to understand how our authoritarian rivals are seeking to establish new rules, and we need to protect the rules that matter to us, and perhaps help others in international terms, create the necessary rules to get after some of these new domains like space and cyber, and of course it’s going to require us in military terms to …
It means that we will definitely invest strongly at the strategic and the operational level and recognise that in this much broader space we are going to need to invest again in componentry - not something as a military we did much over the last 20 years, we were very much focused on land campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq.
I think we should also recognise that as we look forward, that software is going to be as important as hardware in determining what our Armed Forces will be capable of in the future.
And we should expect greater emphasis on climate, the environment, net zero and green renewal in defence as well I would suggest.
It must expand efforts to assess the implications of China’s technological development and monitor and defend against any Chinese activities that could impact collective defence, military readiness or resilience in the Supreme Allied Commander Europe’s (SACEUR) Area of Responsibility.”
Deterring these threats, signalling to the Russian regime that we shall not tamely acquiesce should they escalate requires conventional hard power – warships and aircraft – as well as less conventional capabilities like cyber.
This campaign posture must be dynamically managed and there must be a preparedness to allocate consistent means over longer term horizons, while adjusting the ways to anticipate a rival’s response.
This means that some industrial age capabilities will increasingly have to meet their sunset to create the space for capabilities needed for sunrise.
We will have to take risk, accept some failure and place emphasis on experimentation by allocating resources, force structure, training and exercise activity to stimulate innovation in all lines of development, with a responsive commercial function at the leading edge.
Their goal is to win without going to war: to achieve their objectives by breaking our willpower, using attacks below the threshold that would prompt a war-fighting response.
The US Department of Defence’s latest annual report to Congress on military and security developments involving the People’s Republic of China highlights that the PRC has marshalled the resources, technology, and political will over the past two decades to strengthen and modernize the People’s Liberation Army.