Donald L Kohn
Federal Reserve
Track record: No forecast checked yet (39 not due, 12 being checked).
51forecasts & commitments on the record
86%can be checked as stated
48average ambiguity (0-100)
0goalpost moves recorded
0confirmed U-turns
Timeline
came true partly did not not due / being checked / too vague
Calibration score: shown after 10 checked forecasts with a stated likelihood (now 0).
How they speak about the future: educated guess 28, based on data 13, stated on authority 10.
Kinds of claim: scenario (if… then) 26, forecast 19, mixed claim 4, commitment 2. · Download this report card as a picture
In the nine words
πρόνοιαPreparing for the future26 · 51%πρόγνωσιςInference from evidence10 · 20%μαντείαInspired knowledge10 · 20%εἰκασίαConjecture3 · 6%προαναγγελίαPublic pre-announcement2 · 4%
How to read this
Each box is one sentence a public figure or institution said about the future, word for word, with a link to the official text. Can be checked means it names what will happen, by when, and how likely - so it can be compared with official figures later. Too vague to check means it does not. Ambiguity (0-100) is how many different ways the sentence can be read. When the date passes, the forecast is compared with official data and marked came true, partly or did not come true. Labels judge the sentence, never the person. Full guide and glossary.On the record (51)
The current outstanding debt of $39.5 billion will be restructured in several ways.
Capacity under the Revolving Credit Facility will be reduced from $60 billion to $25 billion.
The Federal Reserve will be protected from credit losses by lending amounts less than the market value of the financed security - that is, by applying a "haircut" - and by the $20 billion of capital provided by the TARP.
Most notably, many market participants expected housing prices to continue their upward trend and did not properly consider what might happen if prices leveled off or fell.
For example, if recent increases in world labor supply are restraining domestic unit labor costs to a significant degree or if there are other important influences on inflation that are related to globalization but difficult to quantify in the context of the standard model, we would expect to have seen sizable model errors over the past several years.
In contrast, the forecast errors from a model of core CPI inflation are larger (averaging roughly 1/2 to 1 percentage point per year since mid-2001), perhaps suggestive of some influence from globalization.
If we use out-of-sample dynamic simulations of a model for core PCE price inflation estimated from 1985 through the end of 2001, we find that, although the model overpredicts inflation over the past several years, the errors average only 0.1 to 0.2 percentage point per year, considerably less than one might have expected given the anecdotes in the popular press.
What I would characterize as the standard forecast for this year and next has the economy slowing a bit to trend.
It is also possible that the economy could cool more than expected if housing markets weaken quite substantially, consumption is cut back significantly, and as a consequence businesses pare capital spending plans.
If the economy does not moderate somewhat, pressures on resources will increase, further raising the odds of higher inflation.
At this time, even with housing markets cooling, the fundamentals remain favorable for solid gains over the coming months and quarters in both consumer spending and business investment.
Of course, reactions to higher energy prices are hard to predict, but the measured response of activity over the past couple of years suggests that the most recent price increases will have, at most, only a small effect on economic growth during this year.
These factors include not only last year's devastating hurricanes but also the unusually warm weather in the early part of this year, which very likely provided a fillip to housing construction and consumer spending.
As a consequence, spending for new housing construction, after contributing nearly 1/2 percentage point to overall GDP growth last year, may not increase much this year.
If so, a monetary easing directed at stabilizing output and inflation might, conceivably, drive up real estate values by more than fundamentals alone would merit.
The same considerations apply to homeowners: All else being equal, interest rates are higher now than they would be were real estate valuations less lofty; and if real estate prices begin to erode, homeowners should not expect to see all the gains of recent years preserved by monetary policy actions.
If expectations have been realistic and lending practices only marginally important, a slowdown in house-price appreciation could be gradual and the consequences for consumption growth could be modest; indeed, as signs of a slowdown are still quite tentative, continued strength in house prices are an upside risk to any easing of demand going forward.
If expectations did become less well anchored, core inflation could subsequently rise and the higher level could persist.
At the same time, however, persistently high energy prices also raise the possibility that inflation expectations could ratchet higher, even if core inflation remains fairly low in the short run.
In sum, I see risks on both sides of my expectations that the growth of economic activity will slow modestly on balance over the next year or so, leaving the economy producing at about its sustainable potential.
But uncertainties about final demands from domestic households and from foreign export customers as the dollar strengthened and foreign growth lagged earlier this year also may have weighed on firms' capital spending plans.
Moreover, rebuilding efforts in the Gulf Coast will gain momentum over time--aided by considerable government support--and the pick up in activity will boost spending and employment next year from their currently depressed levels.
Inflation will still rise if central banks allow economies to run "too hot"--beyond sustainable potential-and such a pickup could become self-perpetuating if it became embedded in inflation expectations.
To be sure, a major increase in job turnover as a consequence of expanding trade, with the attendant shifting of resources from one industry to another, could make it harder to match jobs and people, especially if the people losing jobs failed to meet the skill requirements of the sectors gaining jobs.
If some fundamental conditioning factors were to change--for example, if these countries' exchange rates were to rise and their demand to increase--different spending patterns that could reduce the degree of downward pressure on prices might emerge.
With it, we can simulate how core consumer prices would have been expected to evolve over the past ten years if relative import prices had remained constant--that is, had import prices gone up in line with those of domestically produced goods rather than rising approximately 1 percent per year slower on average, as actually occurred.
In addition, we have not seen a clear upward trend in volatility of financial asset prices over the past twenty-five years, as one might expect if herding had increased in importance.
If the Federal Reserve was authorized to pay interest on excess reserves, and did so, the rate paid would act as a minimum for overnight interest rates, because banks would not generally lend to other banks at a lower rate than they could earn by keeping their excess funds at a Reserve Bank.
Moreover, over the period shown, there was, on average, some bias in the staff's inflation forecasts; inflation has tended to come in lower than the staff anticipated, by about 0.2 percentage point per year.
If inflation is anticipated over the period ahead, wages and prices will be set commensurately higher as workers and firms strive to protect themselves against the erosion of their purchasing power.
We have not yet finished this task: The federal funds rate appears to be below the level that we would expect to be consistent with the maintenance of stable inflation and full employment over the medium run, and, if growth is sustained and inflation remains contained, we are likely to raise rates further at a measured pace.
And if the government tried to honor its current long-run commitments to future retirees without raising tax rates, it seems unlikely that it could borrow the massive amounts needed without paying creditors higher returns - returns potentially so high over coming decades as to be economically debilitating.
Unless policy is tightened as slack diminishes, inflation will pick up, undermining growth and destabilizing the economy when the inevitable correction occurs.
Since last fall, expectations of inflation over the next year or so have risen notably.
But with the federal funds rate already at 1 percent, our scope for that was limited; and if the economy suffered any downward shocks, policy could reach the constraint of a zero federal funds rate, with uncertain consequences.
If increased flexibility in setting reserve requirements were authorized, the Federal Reserve nonetheless could consider substantial reductions in reserve requirements, or even their eventual removal, as long as balances held at Reserve Banks other than required reserve balances could serve the purpose of ensuring the effective implementation of monetary policy.
Such a development might be possible if interest rates were to rise to high levels, which would reduce the demand for required and contractual balances and provide extra incentives for reserve avoidance.
Judging from the results of statistical models incorporating the factors we have been examining, increases in commodity, energy and import prices together might have boosted core consumer inflation on the order of roughly 1/4 to 1/2 percentage point over the past four quarters.
1 In simulations of the FRB/US model, which uses such a framework, the 70 percent confidence interval around the four-quarter forecast of core PCE inflation is 1-1/4 percentage points wide.
Much of the acceleration in the early months of this year likely reflects a rebound from unexplainably low inflation last year and the feed-through of increases in commodity, energy, and import prices.
We will not know for some time with any degree of confidence whether this increase marked a further pickup in structural productivity growth - that is, over and above the already rapid rate of increase of the late 1990s.
Such increases are probably contributing to the broad pickup in inflation that we have seen this year, but most likely they are not going to be a source of continuing upward pressure on prices.
Indeed, the step-up in inflation this year from last year's pace may partly reflect such a return.
If investors sense that asset-price adjustments are undermining the expansion, interest rates will fall back because investors will anticipate a lower trajectory for the federal funds rate.
As a consequence, debt servicing obligations will rise very gradually even if market interest rates increase rapidly.
Such a jump could raise core inflation temporarily if it is passed through to other prices or if it contributes to increasing inflation expectations.
If our imports fall and exports rise, just the opposite will occur in the rest of the world.
If the fiscal path does not change, unless private savings rise considerably to compensate, interest rates will be higher than they otherwise would be to ration the scarcer savings, and we will have slower growth in the capital stock and in the number of houses and autos.
Such consequences could occur even in the absence of a 'bubble' in housing prices if households were overextended and lenders had not taken adequate precautions against even a measured drop in collateral values.
But such as they are, they do not suggest that as interest rates rise we will find that we are left with a vast oversupply of houses and durables.
Showing the newest 50 - the ledger has all 51.
Also said - not checkable as stated (12 newest)
Remarks about the future with no date, figure or likelihood that could be checked. They are kept on the record and shown here, but not scored.
Using these rights, the Federal Reserve works with management of AIG to develop and oversee the implementation of the company's business strategy, its strategy for restructuring, and its new compensation policies, monitors the financial condition of AIG, and must approve certain major decisions that might reduce its ability to repay its loan.
Moreover, at the time the Board extended the Revolving Credit Facility, there was no federal entity that could provide capital to AIG to help stabilize it.
The investment manager to the New York Reserve Bank for these entities projects that, even under very stressed scenarios, the loans to Maiden Lane II and Maiden Lane III will be repaid over time with no loss to the taxpayer.
Regarding the future, the remaining TARP funds will play an essential role in further strengthening the financial system and restoring normal credit flows.
An important use of these funds will be to step up efforts to avoid preventable foreclosures.
The tradeoff is that the more deliberate approach would likely result in relatively fewer mortgages being modified.
Finally, I would expect the bulk of the remaining TARP funding to be devoted to strengthening financial institutions, thereby supporting the normalization of credit markets and the flow of new credit.
Some of this support might take the form of additional capital injections, both to offset additional credit losses and to further expand lending capacity.
in many ways, and we will need to continue to consider whether additional steps are needed to re-open credit flows and support the economy.
When, in the future, the financial system stabilizes and our economies start to recover, central banks will need to decide how best to phase out these extraordinary liquidity actions and credit-market interventions.
In broad terms, policymakers must look for ways to identify those waves of innovation and expansion in financial services - or in any other sector, for that matter - that may be accompanied by a buildup of destabilizing forces, such as rapidly rising asset prices or excessive leverage.
Economists at central banks and in academia will need to devote much effort to overcoming these deficiencies in coming years.