David Rule
Bank of England
Track record: No forecast checked yet (6 not due, 7 being checked).
13forecasts & commitments on the record
54%can be checked as stated
50average ambiguity (0-100)
0goalpost moves recorded
0confirmed U-turns
Timeline
came true partly did not not due / being checked / too vague
Calibration score: shown after 10 checked forecasts with a stated likelihood (now 0).
How they speak about the future: based on data 8, stated on authority 3, educated guess 2.
Kinds of claim: forecast 8, scenario (if… then) 3, mixed claim 2. · Download this report card as a picture
In the nine words
πρόγνωσιςInference from evidence7 · 54%πρόνοιαPreparing for the future3 · 23%μαντείαInspired knowledge3 · 23%
How to read this
Each box is one sentence a public figure or institution said about the future, word for word, with a link to the official text. Can be checked means it names what will happen, by when, and how likely - so it can be compared with official figures later. Too vague to check means it does not. Ambiguity (0-100) is how many different ways the sentence can be read. When the date passes, the forecast is compared with official data and marked came true, partly or did not come true. Labels judge the sentence, never the person. Full guide and glossary.On the record (13)
As many of you will be aware, the FCA's agreement with panel banks to provide LIBOR quotes will end in December 2021, now just over 30 months away.
On the demand side, more employers might be in a position to afford a buy out if improvement in life expectancy stalls, interest rates rise and asset values increase (Chart 2).
We expect to finalise these proposals by the end of September so that firms can start applying the Test on their base balance sheets from the end of this year.
The Standard will then be finalised ahead of a five-year monitoring period starting in 2020.
through some suitable alternative approach, to provide no more than a 1 in X probability that Solvency Capital Requirement (SCR) coverage might fall below 100%. 5 We published Supervisory Statement 4/18 on Financial Management and Planning by Insurers earlier this year.
Because I am not going to talk about 'A' for assets as I gave a speech earlier this year on the use of illiquid assets and particularly equity release mortgages to back annuities.
For example, it could be explained by medical underwriting of the mortgage that justifies a higher loan-to-value ratio for a younger customer if their life expectancy is impaired.
Insurers' business plans suggest this proportion might increase to around 40% by 2020.
However these will tend to increase over time as interest is rolled up, particularly if the interest rates exceed house price appreciation.
Our analysis of insurers' equity release exposures suggests that a stress roughly aligned to the FPC's banking system stress test (a 30% fall in house prices and 0-0.5% growth per annum thereafter) could lead to industry-wide losses of £2-3 billion (see table and chart below).
If the future trend is in fact in line with past inflation, booked reserves would need to be 25% higher than currently assumed.
The results of our first concurrent stress tests of major UK banks and building societies will be announced next month.
But as banks move closer to the critical point at which the leverage ratio rather than the risk-weighted ratio becomes binding - an average risk weight of 35% based on a Tier 1 leverage ratio requirement of 3% and risk-weighted requirements and buffers of 8.5 %3 - they will need to be increasingly mindful of both constraints.
Also said - not checkable as stated (12 newest)
Remarks about the future with no date, figure or likelihood that could be checked. They are kept on the record and shown here, but not scored.
We will need a longer period to draw strong conclusions about trends.
Management might be tempted to put too much trust in the reputation of the supplier and assume that if many other insurers are using the model, 'it must be fine'.
We will shortly publish the main points arising from responses to that Dear CEO letter.
'an internal credit assessment should consider all possible sources of credit risk, both qualitative (eg due to strength of the terms and conditions in the loan agreement or a lack of default data) and quantitative (eg due to economic stresses), and how these may interact.
An internal credit assessment will then need to be mapped onto a credit quality step (CQS).
The PRA's view is that the CQS to which an internal credit assessment maps should lie within the plausible range of CQSs that could have resulted from an issue rating given by an External Credit Assessment Institution (ECAI).
We have proposed that this should take place by the end of 2021 at the latest.
Groups will be permitted to use simplifications, simplifying assumptions and proxies, although we would expect that need to reduce as the monitoring period progresses.
Where we have concerns over a firm's response to our Dear CEO letter, we will follow these up, including with the Board where appropriate.
We will also be alert to insurers seeking to reduce capital requirements through aggressive changes to internal models or over-optimistic business plans.
First, they do not have to hold capital against the full risk that credit spreads will move against them in the market;
In the case of bonds, this is the liquidity premium for the risk that they might have to sell into secondary bond markets at a time when credit spreads are wide.