David Miles
Bank of England
Track record: No forecast checked yet (8 not due, 4 being checked).
12forecasts & commitments on the record
67%can be checked as stated
48average ambiguity (0-100)
0goalpost moves recorded
0confirmed U-turns
Timeline
came true partly did not not due / being checked / too vague
Calibration score: shown after 10 checked forecasts with a stated likelihood (now 0).
How they speak about the future: based on data 10, stated on authority 2.
Kinds of claim: forecast 10, mixed claim 2. · Download this report card as a picture
In the nine words
How to read this
Each box is one sentence a public figure or institution said about the future, word for word, with a link to the official text. Can be checked means it names what will happen, by when, and how likely - so it can be compared with official figures later. Too vague to check means it does not. Ambiguity (0-100) is how many different ways the sentence can be read. When the date passes, the forecast is compared with official data and marked came true, partly or did not come true. Labels judge the sentence, never the person. Full guide and glossary.On the record (12)
For example, in a counter-factual experiment using vector auto-regressions, they estimate that for the US if policy rates had started rising in 2003 and peaked at around 7.5% in late 2006, then the peak of the real house prices would have been around 7.5% lower; real credit growth would have been just 3% lower by the end of 2006.
Many then will talk about the big mistake the MPC made in late 2010 and the first part of 2011.
In Ireland the fall in economic activity has been greater: the level of output is about 13% lower than at the end of 2007; if one had expected growth of 3% a year - significantly lower than the average in the preceding 10 years - output is now more than 20% below where it seemed likely to be.
From the onset of the financial crisis that started towards the end of 2007 real output in the UK has fallen about 10% relative to the upward path it might have been expected to follow.
It is a near certainty that four or five years from now the monetary policy that is set over the next year will, with the benefit of hindsight, look very likely to have been too loose or too tight.
Whole-economy annual wage settlements have now fallen to around 1.5% - well below both the current rate of inflation and below the inflation rate thought likely over the next year (see Chart 16).
The best fit of the data I could find - and it did fit the data extremely well (Chart 8 see below) - implied that 95% of the time the shock to annual GDP was well behaved and came from a normal distribution with a fairly small volatility (a standard deviation of about 3%).
For example, a 5 percentage point increase in banks capital from 15% to 20% would likely have considerably less impact on the probability of banks' failing than raising capital from 10% to 15%.
I will make the same assumptions as in the FSR, namely that if a bank crisis occurs the initial impact is to reduce output by 10% of GDP.
The paper indicates that a 1% rise in capital requirements could reduce output by 0.08% of GDP in the long run.
And illustrative estimates in the most recent Bank of England Financial Stability Report (FSR) indicate, under certain conservative assumptions, that the long run costs could amount to 4% of current annual
Of course wage pressures may build significantly over the next year or so, though I do not believe this is the most likely outcome.