Daniel K Tarullo
Federal Reserve
Track record: No forecast checked yet (50 not due, 40 being checked).
90forecasts & commitments on the record
47%can be checked as stated
45average ambiguity (0-100)
0goalpost moves recorded
0confirmed U-turns
Timeline
came true partly did not not due / being checked / too vague
Calibration score: shown after 10 checked forecasts with a stated likelihood (now 0).
How they speak about the future: based on data 46, educated guess 26, stated on authority 18.
Kinds of claim: forecast 48, scenario (if… then) 24, mixed claim 16, commitment 2. · Download this report card as a picture
In the nine words
πρόγνωσιςInference from evidence44 · 49%πρόνοιαPreparing for the future24 · 27%μαντείαInspired knowledge17 · 19%εἰκασίαConjecture3 · 3%προαναγγελίαPublic pre-announcement2 · 2%
How to read this
Each box is one sentence a public figure or institution said about the future, word for word, with a link to the official text. Can be checked means it names what will happen, by when, and how likely - so it can be compared with official figures later. Too vague to check means it does not. Ambiguity (0-100) is how many different ways the sentence can be read. When the date passes, the forecast is compared with official data and marked came true, partly or did not come true. Labels judge the sentence, never the person. Full guide and glossary.On the record (90)
If a bank has the model, it will be able to optimize its balance sheet for the day on which the stress test is to apply by shifting into assets for which relatively lower loss functions apply.
The buffer capital requirement is sized so that, if the economy suffers a severe recession that leads a bank to suffer a substantial loss, the bank will still be above its minimum capital level and thus able to continue operating and lending to support economic growth.
If they cannot do so because, for example, their capital positions have been too weakened, the result could be a deepening of what may already be a serious recession.
For example, one 2013 study suggests that total U.S. losses from the financial crisis could range from 40 to 90 percent of a year's worth of economic output, or $6 to $14 trillion.
In the very short term, we will also finalize our rule requiring the most systemically important firms to hold a sizeable amount of long-term debt, which would be available to the FDIC or a bankruptcy judge for conversion into equity should the firm fail.
An example would be the minimum margining requirements on securities financing transactions that have been agreed to at the Financial Stability Board (FSB), which the Federal Reserve will be proposing through a rulemaking next year.
And firms that have less than $250 billion in assets and do not have extensive international or nontraditional banking activities will also transition to a more tailored set of capital planning expectations outside the CCAR process.
And we would, in any case, be reluctant to substitute a higher payout ratio for the original 30 percent ratio because it may end up being an implicit target for banks to try to reach.
If so, then migration out of the traditional banking sector could damage the efficiency of banks and increase their vulnerability.
In addition, the banking agencies will be proposing a net stable funding ratio rule, aimed at assuring adequate medium-term liquidity, in the next few months.
For home countries, the relatively longstanding principle that regulators should exercise effective consolidated supervision remains critical, though I would emphasize that the regulation imposed by home jurisdictions is of equal--if not greater--importance.
Second is the fact that, for purposes of establishing regulatory objectives, a bank with $12 billion in assets might not be readily distinguishable from one with $8 billion in assets.
And we will be working with the other banking regulators to build out the Basel III countercyclical capital buffer regime, which takes effect in the United States next year.
Similarly, if central bank lending facilitates exit by the uninsured depositors of a troubled bank, the costs borne by remaining creditors or the deposit insurance fund will increase.
Even if the central bank were appropriately reluctant to increase moral hazard by stepping in for private funding when an institution is in fact insolvent, the prospect of a rapid, disorderly default could still motivate LOLR lending.
If solvent banks are confident that they will be able to borrow from the central bank against good collateral to meet any unforeseen funding needs, then they need not completely stop lending even amid increased uncertainty about future funding needs.
I anticipate we will hear similar, and perhaps additional concerns, from a variety of perspectives when the federal banking agencies issue a proposed rule next year to implement the NSFR in the United States.
Bank holding companies with less than $500 million in assets may still be required to file regulatory reports with the same detail and frequency as larger bank holding companies if they meet certain criteria that are set forth in the instructions for the Federal Reserve FR Y-9SP and FR Y-9C regulatory reports or to otherwise meet supervisory needs.
Similarly, because most bank holding companies under $1 billion have limited activities outside of their banks, and we will still receive detailed quarterly bank data, the reduced regulatory reporting requirements for qualifying holding companies should not be problematic for supervisors.
My expectation is that if banks do not take more effective steps to control the behavior of those who work for them, there will be both increased pressure and propensity on the part of regulators and law enforcers to impose more requirements, constraints, and punishments.
For other, smaller banking organizations--those with $10 billion or less in total consolidated assets--there is no supervisory expectation or regulatory requirement that these firms will conduct capital stress testing.
Finally, I might mention a change made this year that actually reverted to a feature of the SCAP.
More generally, to the degree uninsured depositors or other bank creditors expect that they will be protected by the government in the event the bank encounters serious difficulties, those same features of market discipline will again be weakened.
Of course, this is not the only way to draw the lines, and there could be reasons for applying additional requirements to specific banks, even if they fall below the presumptive asset threshold.
If the line were redrawn at a higher figure, we might explore simpler methods for promoting macroprudential aims with respect to banks above $10 billion in assets but below the new threshold.
It would be worthwhile to have a policy discussion of statutes that might be amended explicitly to exclude community banks (which, again, are generally defined as those with less than $10 billion in assets) from their coverage.
But the principles informing regulation were basically the same whether the institution was a community bank or a holding company with a $1 trillion balance sheet whose failure might shake the entire financial system.
Remember that, just a few years ago, many forecasters--in and out of the Federal Reserve--were projecting growth rates at an annualized rate of 4 percent or greater for at least a year.
But now, in part because we did not have such a spike in the early stages of recovery and instead have had modest growth in place for several years, it seems less likely that we will experience a growth spurt in the next couple of years that would engender concerns about rapid wage pressures and changes in inflation expectations.
In the next decade--that is, up to the onset of the financial crisis in 2007--the combined assets of the world's 10 largest banks as a share of global GDP nearly tripled, to about 43 percent.
As a technical matter, the relevant FBOs are subject to the traditional 4 percent U.S. leverage ratio, but it is very likely that this requirement will be less binding than the 3 percent international leverage ratio because of the inclusion in the denominator of the latter of off-balance-sheet activities and exposures.
Here, then, is the potential quandary: The very accommodative monetary policy that contributed to the restoration of financial stability could, if maintained long enough in the face of slow recovery in the real economy, eventually sow the seeds of renewed financial instability.
The level of the buffer will be set at 1 percent of risk-weighted assets, starting July 1, 2015.13
Although the three federal banking agencies included a countercyclical capital provision in the capital regulation to implement Basel III adopted last summer, the provision will not take effect in the United States until 2016.
One oft-stated worry is that when it is time to normalize policy, we will be unable to withdraw reserves as quickly as needed to prevent an unwanted rise in inflation.
At that time, the Committee indicated that no increase in the federal funds rate target should be anticipated so long as unemployment remained above 6-1/2 percent and inflation was projected to be no more than 2-1/2 percent one-to-two years ahead.
This finding is consistent with the lack of widespread stress during the period of May through June 2013 when interest rates increased considerably.7 The next set of stress-test results, which we will release next month, will provide further insight on this point, both to regulators and to markets.
If we think back to the rapid growth of the shadow banking system in the pre-crisis period, we are reminded of some glaring vulnerabilities: Large firms that could themselves be considered shadow banks and that relied on the shadow banking system for a significant proportion of their funding--a group that included the "free-standing" investment banks--were outside the perimeter of prudential …
Work to date has reduced the amount of intraday credit provided by the clearing banks from 100 percent of the tri-party repo market to approximately 30 percent, and commitments by market participants suggest that this amount will fall to 10 percent by the end of next year.
They also complicate the orderly resolution of major financial firms in the event of failure.12 Indeed, precisely because an effective orderly resolution mechanism provides for continued funding of certain short-term creditors to staunch potentially calamitous runs, that type of funding will not be subject to the increased market discipline resulting from the creation of a credible resolution process.
The work being done by the FDIC in building out its approach to Title II will continue, and the FDIC has indicated that it will explain this thinking in further detail in a public release later this year.
The Federal Reserve, in consultation with the FDIC, will be issuing in the next few months a proposal that would require the largest, most complex banking firms to hold minimum amounts of long-term, unsecured debt at the holding company level.
Even if financial stability objectives are effectively incorporated into monetary policy, monetary tightening will surely not be the correct response to most instances of increasing leverage or asset prices that raise macroprudential concerns.
If the measures are designed to be targeted, questions of efficacy may be raised by those who believe that suppression of excess credit or asset price increases in one sector will likely result only in the redirection of credit and speculation to other sectors until underlying macroeconomic and financial conditions have ceased enabling such activities.
For example, the scenario might include a sharp drop in house prices if analysis suggested--but did not confirm--that there was overheating in the housing market, and if supervisors judged that large banks had correlated exposures to the housing sector.
For example, if the loss to the financial system from the failure of a systemically important firm would be five times that resulting from failure of the non-systemic firm, then the firm would have to hold additional capital sufficient to make the expected probability of failure one-fifth that of the non-systemic institution.
However, because it will not take effect in the United States until 2016 and because other regulatory and supervisory tasks created by Dodd-Frank and other initiatives need to be completed more quickly, we have not yet built out this tool through policy statements or other institutional steps.
Later this year, we will issue under the authority granted by Dodd-Frank a proposed set of capital surcharges congruent with that framework.
The Board could approve an acquisition even if it determined that there was some adverse effect on financial stability if it also determined that the transaction would produce benefits outweighing the financial stability concerns by, for example, increasing competition or efficiencies or public convenience.
However, the buckets to which they will be assigned will not be finalized under more up-to-date data is available and analyzed next year.
Showing the newest 50 - the ledger has all 90.
Also said - not checkable as stated (12 newest)
Remarks about the future with no date, figure or likelihood that could be checked. They are kept on the record and shown here, but not scored.
In doing so, it should alleviate the apprehension of banks that they may be subject to objections to their capital plans that are both very public and hard to fully anticipate.
Additionally, giving the firms the model will likely encourage increased correlations in asset holdings among the larger banks--a trend that increases systemic risk, since everyone will be exposed should those asset classes suffer reversals.20
To truly assure the safety and soundness of the financial system, a leverage ratio serving as the sole or dominant form of prudential regulation would probably have to be set considerably higher, at a level where the impact on financial intermediation could be quite substantial.
This is as it should be, insofar as stress testing is meant to help set capital requirements for when they will most be needed--that is, in a serious economic downturn.
Because the difference in the external costs of the distress or failure of a G-SIB as compared to a non-G-SIB is likely to be at least as high during times of macroeconomic and financial market stress as during ordinary times, there is no reason why the G-SIB surcharge should not be a part of the post-stress capital regime.
But the regime must also be able to contemplate failure by a very large bank--that is, to plan for the possibility that a larger bank may become insolvent notwithstanding much greater ex ante resiliency.
The regime must promote market discipline and offset the moral hazard that comes if a bank and its creditors believe the government will have no real choice but to bail the bank out.
And a transaction-based measure may be thought of as one needed to protect financial stability regardless of whether all entities that might engage in such a transaction need to be regulated because of the risks associated with their business models.
I was always struck by how much of a conceptual anchor for a banking law course was provided by the famous Corrigan/Aspinwall debate on whether banks were "special."9 One could note, for example, that Aspinwall's observation that banks were becoming less special might have suggested that other forms of intermediaries should be more regulated, rather than the implication that banks …
I should note at the outset that, in the interest of time, I will confine myself to the prudential aspects of financial regulation.
So we will probably continue to build on a form-based regulatory regime, though the potential range of complementary function-based measures could be quite extensive.
Insofar as I have succeeded in identifying questions that will be central to the further development and refinement of a regulatory system that takes account of the financial system as a whole, all of what I have already said should be fertile ground for legal and economic scholarship.