Clare Lombardelli
HM Treasury
Track record: No forecast checked yet (23 not due, 5 being checked).
28forecasts & commitments on the record
82%can be checked as stated
49average ambiguity (0-100)
0goalpost moves recorded
0confirmed U-turns
Timeline
came true partly did not not due / being checked / too vague
Calibration score: shown after 10 checked forecasts with a stated likelihood (now 0).
How they speak about the future: based on data 25, stated on authority 2, educated guess 1.
Kinds of claim: forecast 21, mixed claim 5, commitment 1, scenario (if… then) 1. · Download this report card as a picture
In the nine words
πρόγνωσιςInference from evidence21 · 75%πρόβλεψιςSeeing the signs4 · 14%πρόνοιαPreparing for the future1 · 4%προαναγγελίαPublic pre-announcement1 · 4%μαντείαInspired knowledge1 · 4%
How to read this
Each box is one sentence a public figure or institution said about the future, word for word, with a link to the official text. Can be checked means it names what will happen, by when, and how likely - so it can be compared with official figures later. Too vague to check means it does not. Ambiguity (0-100) is how many different ways the sentence can be read. When the date passes, the forecast is compared with official data and marked came true, partly or did not come true. Labels judge the sentence, never the person. Full guide and glossary.On the record (28)
If unemployment were to rise further, I will pay close attention to whether that is easing wage pressures or instead revealing the limits of the labour market’s ability to move people quickly into new jobs.
Unemployment fell in the most recent data and in our November central projection remains broadly stable in the region of 5%, as shown in Chart 1.
But underlying wage growth remains at the upper end of the range consistent with the inflation target, while forward-looking indicators point to continued strength into next year.
A further 3.6 million people left employment at some point during the year while about 4.3 million people entered.footnote This underlying amount of change is higher than might be assumed from the stability of aggregate statistics, such as the headline unemployment rate.
But the latest Bank assessment is that underlying wage growth remains at the upper end of the range consistent with the inflation target, while forward-looking indicators point to continued strength into next year.
That evidence will shape my judgement of how much further monetary policy needs to go to return inflation sustainably to the 2% target.
If energy prices were to fall back and their contribution to inflation were eventually to turn negative, monetary policy should equally look through that temporary weakness and focus on returning inflation sustainably to the 2% target in the medium term.
But the larger the energy shock becomes and the longer it persists, the more likely it is that we will eventually see significant pass-through of higher energy costs to other prices.
Some industry associations such as the Food and Drink Federation already forecast food price inflation to peak at over 6% in the summer of 2027.
Bank staff expect external pressures including high energy prices to push food price inflation up over coming quarters, to a little under 3% by the end of the year and towards 4% in 2027 Q1.
Without these measures, the inflation projection for the first quarter of next year would likely be closer to 4.5%.
The Bank’s latest near-term inflation forecast now points to CPI inflation rising from its current level of 3.1% to around 3.7% in 2026 Q4 and to around 4.2% in 2027 Q1, materially higher than our projection in July.
Illustrative estimates of wage growth consistent with 2% CPI inflation, based on reasonable assumptions for medium-term import price inflation and labour productivity growth.
More broadly, the evidence suggests that at 4.25% monetary policy is still restrictive, so if we were to find ourselves in a world with greater inflation persistence than expected, policy would still be providing pressure to squeeze inflation out of the system.
Taken together, the combination of further gradual progress on disinflation and the trade developments led me to conclude that a 25bps cut was the appropriate decision for May.
And forwardlooking indicators point to further progress on disinflation; the Agents' pay survey has pay settlements at 3.7% by end-2025 and expectations for wage growth from the DMP survey are around 4% by year-end.
I expect you will see us experimenting with some things over the next year.
And disinflation has progressed faster than expected - one year ago the MPC expected CPI inflation to be 3.3% in the third quarter of 2024, more than 1 percentage point higher than the outturn.
Even though headline inflation fell steeply from its peak and has been around target for half a year, services inflation is still above its pre-pandemic average (Chart 2) - it was 5% in October and we expect it to stay around that rate for another few months.
If this dynamic persists into next year and perhaps beyond, there is a risk that, absent a policy response, workers and firms might start to adjust to a new normal of wage increases of perhaps 3.5% or 4% and price inflation closer to 3% than to the target.
As a result, as the tailwind from lower energy prices dissipates, we expect headline inflation to rise back to 2.8% in the third quarter of 2025.
And we will also host a conference in summer 2025 to explore some of the interconnected issues around scenarios, modelling and communication for effective monetary policy making.
The OBR’s April 2020 scenario estimated UK unemployment could be in the region of 10 percent [see C1.3 within charts and tables, https://obr.uk/coronavirus-analysis/]
Once HMT had a few early and experimental real-time indicators of how consumers and businesses were reacting to lockdown, and official data from the final days of March from which we could extrapolate, we used an approach that modelled output industry by industry using official and real time indicators suggested a hit around 20-25 percent.
Combining Okun’s Law – which observes that changes in the unemployment rate is typically half the percentage point change in GDP – with the change in activity implies that the unemployment rate could have risen to between 9 percent and 12 percent.
But based on historical trends and how much GDP fell in 2020, we would have expected unemployment to have reached somewhere between 9 and 12 percent. As it was, UK unemployment peaked well below that at 5.2 percent.
The furlough cost the UK taxpayer £70 billion in total, and supported nearly 12 million jobs. Peak usage was just shy of 9 million jobs in May 2020.
And finally, unemployment: A 10 percent hit to activity could reasonably have led to unemployment reaching 9-12 percent.
Also said - not checkable as stated (11 newest)
Remarks about the future with no date, figure or likelihood that could be checked. They are kept on the record and shown here, but not scored.
The economy has been more resilient to the recent energy cost shock than expected.
If those looking for work are poorly matched to the jobs available, higher unemployment may do less to ease wage pressures than it has in the past.
The gains from AI will depend partly on how readily people can move towards the new opportunities it creates.
But the credibility of, and trust in, central banks will be enhanced if we acknowledge the genuine uncertainty that policymakers need to confront.
Instead, it is a broad framework to guide policy and what people should expect from policy, thereby anchoring inflation expectations as Carl Walsh emphasised yesterday.
Scenarios can help communicate that uncertainty and the factors that policymakers may need to react to if uncertainties crystalise.
So we are going to move away from that to a forecast based on an initial staff proposal, that a majority of the Committee agree is a reasonable basis for discussions.
Speech by Ms Clare Lombardelli, Deputy Governor for Monetary Policy of the Bank of England, at the Second Thomas Laubach Research Conference, organised by the Federal Reserve Board, Washington DC, 16 May 2025.
The Bank of England approaches Ben's conclusion that it is useful to use a baseline forecast and scenarios from a different place to the Federal Reserve.
So the picture is not entirely reassuring, although we should expect this disinflation to be bumpy.
These include that the model is linear, that monetary policy is set to minimise a quadratic 'loss function', and that both the private sector and monetary policymaker have full information about each other's behaviour and the shocks hitting the economy. Expanding the breadth of our toolkit for policy simulations is one of the key areas we will be pursuing in …