Beverly Hirtle
Federal Reserve Bank of New York
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The very largest and most systemically important firms, including all domestic bank holding companies with assets exceeding $250 billion, will continue to be required to participate in DFAST supervisory stress testing on an annual basis.
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This series follows our inaugural set of posts on heterogeneity in October of last year, in what we hope will be an on-going discussion of work being done at the New York Fed and elsewhere to understand these important topics.
This was a policy choice intended to provide consistency of treatment across banks involved in the stress tests and to counteract any incentives banks might have to understate the impact of the stress scenario.
There was a growing cottage industry in estimating global and U.S. financial sector losses on mortgages, mortgage-backed securities and other positions, with projected global losses ranging as high as $4 Trillion.
Alternatively, in an environment of considerable uncertainty, banks may have been concerned with the negative market signal that a dividend reduction might send, hesitating to be the first to take this step. 1 2 3 4
The tests could have focused on modeling the market value of assets or equity (similar to the Capital Shortfall approach developed by Acharya et al. , or attempted to measure the value or cost of debt, or the impact on credit ratings.
In practical terms, the net income approach involves recognizing that banks will have non-credit-related expenses and earn revenues even during periods of stress.
The current supervisory stress testing regime does address these risks indirectly, to the extent that a banking sector with more robust capitalization is less likely to experience liquidity stresses, runs and the resulting firesales.
Aside from the stress-test-based quantitative requirements, the CCAR also requires large complex banks to do systematic capital planning, including developing criteria for when dividends and share repurchases will be made, increased or curtailed.
The first is what might be called structural objectives , which focus on the impact large, systemically important institutions have on the rest of the system when they fail or become distressed.
The primary goal was to ensure that large banks had sufficient capital to withstand an even-worsethan-expected economic downturn and still be able to lend-a structural perspective.
However, the SCAP's objectives also embodied cyclical concerns, namely, to provide confidence that banks could continue current lending ('leaning into the wind') and thus reduce the likelihood of a worse-than-expected economic outcome.
However, with the recent passage of the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief and Consumer Protection Act, many of these will no longer be subject to DFAST supervisory stress testing or could