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THE ORACLE HUNTERS • EVERY PROPHECY ON THE RECORD 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Oracle HuntersEvery prophecy, on the record. · Οἱ Κυνηγοὶ τῶν ΧρησμῶνUnder development

← Tracking the Prophets

Ben Broadbent

Bank of England

Track record: No forecast checked yet (56 not due, 33 being checked).
89forecasts & commitments on the record
84%can be checked as stated
42average ambiguity (0-100)
0goalpost moves recorded
0confirmed U-turns

Timeline

20142014: Not due yet2014: Not due yet20152015: Not due yet2015: Not due yet2015: Not due yet2015: Not due yet2015: Not due yet2015: Not due yet2015: Not due yet2015: Due - being checked (+4 more)20162016: Not due yet2016: Not due yet20172017: Due - being checked2017: Due - being checked2017: Not due yet2017: Due - being checked2017: Due - being checked2017: Due - being checked2017: Not due yet2017: Not due yet (+7 more)20182018: Not due yet2018: Not due yet2018: Not due yet2018: Not due yet20192019: Not due yet2019: Not due yet2019: Not due yet2019: Not due yet2019: Not due yet2019: Due - being checked2019: Due - being checked20202020: Not due yet2020: Not due yet2020: Not due yet2020: Not due yet2020: Not due yet2020: Not due yet20212021: Not due yet2021: Due - being checked2021: Due - being checked2021: Due - being checked2021: Due - being checked2021: Due - being checked2021: Not due yet2021: Due - being checked (+9 more)20222022: Not due yet2022: Not due yet2022: Due - being checked2022: Not due yet2022: Due - being checked2022: Due - being checked2022: Not due yet2022: Not due yet (+4 more)20232023: Not due yet2023: Not due yet2023: Due - being checked2023: Due - being checked2023: Due - being checked2023: Not due yet20242024: Not due yet2024: Not due yet2024: Due - being checked2024: Due - being checked2024: Not due yet2024: Due - being checked
came true partly did not not due / being checked / too vague

Calibration score: shown after 10 checked forecasts with a stated likelihood (now 0).
How they speak about the future: based on data 55, educated guess 23, stated on authority 11.
Kinds of claim: forecast 49, scenario (if… then) 25, mixed claim 12, commitment 3. · Download this report card as a picture

In the nine words

πρόγνωσιςInference from evidence48 · 54%πρόνοιαPreparing for the future25 · 28%μαντείαInspired knowledge9 · 10%εἰκασίαConjecture3 · 3%προαναγγελίαPublic pre-announcement3 · 3%πρόβλεψιςSeeing the signs1 · 1%
How to read this Each box is one sentence a public figure or institution said about the future, word for word, with a link to the official text. Can be checked means it names what will happen, by when, and how likely - so it can be compared with official figures later. Too vague to check means it does not. Ambiguity (0-100) is how many different ways the sentence can be read. When the date passes, the forecast is compared with official data and marked came true, partly or did not come true. Labels judge the sentence, never the person. Full guide and glossary.

On the record (89)

It's all very well to draw a simple, static heuristic like Chart 8b but, once you're in a dynamic setting, and if people understand the resultant decline in income growth is likely to last for some time, then demand too would fall.
Bank of England · said 20 May 2024 (date) · From NICE-to not so nice · evidence & why
πρόνοια · Preparing for the futurePartly checkableScenario (if… then)based on dataambiguity 56/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetgrowth
If spending grows too rapidly, tighter monetary policy will help meet both objectives (and vice-versa when it's too weak).
Bank of England · said 20 May 2024 (date) · From NICE-to not so nice · evidence & why
πρόνοια · Preparing for the futurePartly checkableScenario (if… then)educated guessambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partbelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetinterest rates
And if the origin of these second-round effects is the squeeze in real incomes in 2022, their recovery this year may matter.
Bank of England · said 20 May 2024 (date) · From NICE-to not so nice · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidencePartly checkableForecastbased on dataambiguity 56/100implied call / likelihood: No · 40% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2024Due - being checked
If the process were entirely symmetric then you might expect these effects to unwind relatively quickly, within the next year or so.
Bank of England · said 20 May 2024 (date) · From NICE-to not so nice · evidence & why
εἰκασία · ConjecturePartly checkableMixed claimeducated guessambiguity 56/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2025Due - being checked
Whatever the priors of its individual members the MPC will continue to learn from the incoming data and, if things continue to evolve with its forecasts - forecasts that suggest policy will have to become less restrictive at some point - then it's possible Bank Rate could be cut some time over the summer.
Bank of England · said 20 May 2024 (date) · From NICE-to not so nice · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidencePartly checkableMixed claimbased on dataambiguity 83/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partbelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetinterest ratesfinance
Judging by what the Bank's Agents are telling us about wage growth in 2024 - their forecast would entail almost no convergence to our wage equations through the rest of this year (or therefore any diminution in the aqua line in Chart 7) - that seems right.
Bank of England · said 20 May 2024 (date) · From NICE-to not so nice · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedForecastbased on dataambiguity 0/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablemeets the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2024Due - being checkedgrowthlabourfinance
In symbols, if (the log of) employment is measured with some serially uncorrelated error error ϵ, such that ̂ = + , where l is the true number, then its growth rate will a moving-average error term: ∆ ̂ = ∆ + ∆ .
Bank of England · said 18 Dec 2023 (date) · Signal versus noise · evidence & why
πρόνοια · Preparing for the futurePartly checkableScenario (if… then)educated guessambiguity 56/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partbelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetgrowthlabour
And it's evident from all of them that pay growth - and with it other indicators of domestic inflation like the services component of the CPI - has been significantly faster than the sorts of rates that, over time, one might think of as consistent with the 2% inflation target.
Bank of England · said 18 Dec 2023 (date) · Signal versus noise · evidence & why
πρόβλεψις · Seeing the signsPartly checkableForecastbased on dataambiguity 71/100implied call / likelihood: No · 35% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetinflationgrowth
And long-dated revisions of the sort we saw in this year's Blue Book, relating to economic growth well over a year ago, won't in any case have much bearing on monetary policy as any effects the additional output might have had on employment and subsequently inflation would already have come through.
Bank of England · said 18 Dec 2023 (date) · Signal versus noise · evidence & why
μαντεία · Inspired knowledgeCan be checkedForecaststated on authorityambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: No · 35% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2023Due - being checkedinflationinterest ratesgrowthlabour
But | think it's reasonable to expect a decline in both components of CPI inflation — not just energy but "core" goods as well — over the next few months.
μαντεία · Inspired knowledgePartly checkableForecaststated on authorityambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standarddue 22 Feb 2024 (vague)Due - being checkedinflationenergy
Dotted line is a projection to the end of 2023 consistent with the August 2023 Monetary Policy Report forecast.
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidencePartly checkableForecastbased on dataambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2023Due - being checkedinterest rates
If borrowers are (on average) more credit constrained than savers, and therefore more sensitive to changes in cash flow, equal declines in debt interest costs on the one hand, and deposit receipts on the other, will on balance be expansionary.
Bank of England · said 25 Apr 2023 (date) · Monetary policy - prices versus quantities · evidence & why
πρόνοια · Preparing for the futurePartly checkableScenario (if… then)educated guessambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partbelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetfiscalfinance
If a country was prepared to tolerate a slightly higher rate of inflation it could (on this view) generate a permanent rise in its real income.
Bank of England · said 20 Oct 2022 (date) · The inflationary consequences of real shocks · evidence & why
πρόνοια · Preparing for the futurePartly checkableScenario (if… then)educated guessambiguity 56/100implied call / likelihood: No · 35% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetinflation
The path of wholesale energy prices is highly uncertain but here too rates of inflation - annual rates have averaged over 300% in the past six months 7 - are in time likely to fall significantly.
Bank of England · said 20 Oct 2022 (date) · The inflationary consequences of real shocks · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidencePartly checkableForecastbased on dataambiguity 56/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetinflationenergy
However, by relieving some of the immediate pressure on household finances, the policy would also add significantly to domestic spending over the next year (relative to our last forecast).
Bank of England · said 20 Oct 2022 (date) · The inflationary consequences of real shocks · evidence & why
μαντεία · Inspired knowledgePartly checkableForecaststated on authorityambiguity 56/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2023Due - being checked
Given the path of wholesale gas prices implied by financial markets at the time, OFGEM's price cap was set to rise (in the central forecast) by over 3% of household income by next spring.
Bank of England · said 20 Oct 2022 (date) · The inflationary consequences of real shocks · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidencePartly checkableForecastbased on dataambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetinflationenergy
It fell sharply during the first half of this year (relative to income) and is likely to have fallen further since then (the dot at the end of Chart 9 is an estimate of the position at the end of Q3, based on recent moves in asset prices).
Bank of England · said 20 Oct 2022 (date) · The inflationary consequences of real shocks · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidencePartly checkableForecastbased on dataambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2022Due - being checkedinflation
In the third quarter of this year, UK GDP will probably be only slightly below where it was in the last quarter of 2019, immediately before the pandemic.
Bank of England · said 20 Oct 2022 (date) · The inflationary consequences of real shocks · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedForecastbased on dataambiguity 0/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablemeets the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2022Due - being checkedgrowthhealth
Broadly speaking, policy will be contractionary (expansionary) if the official interest rate is higher (lower) than i*.
Bank of England · said 30 Mar 2022 (date) · Reliable partners · evidence & why
πρόνοια · Preparing for the futurePartly checkableScenario (if… then)educated guessambiguity 56/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partbelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetinterest rates
If there's a risk of deflation but the policy rate is stuck at the lower bound, and QE is for some reason thought to be ineffective, a declaration that policy will remain accommodative, even in the event of more inflationary pressure in the future, can in principle stimulate demand today.
Bank of England · said 30 Mar 2022 (date) · Reliable partners · evidence & why
πρόνοια · Preparing for the futurePartly checkableScenario (if… then)educated guessambiguity 56/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partbelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetinflationinterest rates
From today's perspective, in the face of a risk of deflation, it would be better if you could persuade people that you will keep policy loose for an extended period, even in the event that inflation rises above target.
Bank of England · said 30 Mar 2022 (date) · Reliable partners · evidence & why
πρόνοια · Preparing for the futurePartly checkableScenario (if… then)educated guessambiguity 56/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partbelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetinflation
In this respect, a credible declaration that you will keep the actual policy rate low, even in the event of a future increase in inflation, does two things.
Bank of England · said 30 Mar 2022 (date) · Reliable partners · evidence & why
πρόνοια · Preparing for the futurePartly checkableScenario (if… then)educated guessambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partbelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetinflationinterest rates
This 'promise to be irresponsible' won't necessarily be believed because, when the time comes, and if there were subsequently some significant rise in inflationary pressure, the policymaker will be tempted to go back on the earlier promise and respond by raising interest rates.
Bank of England · said 30 Mar 2022 (date) · Reliable partners · evidence & why
πρόνοια · Preparing for the futurePartly checkableScenario (if… then)educated guessambiguity 56/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partbelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetinflationinterest rates
If you think trend supply growth is pretty stable - and that was generally the view at the time then stronger activity will always mean more pressure on resources, weaker activity less of it.
Bank of England · said 30 Mar 2022 (date) · Reliable partners · evidence & why
πρόνοια · Preparing for the futurePartly checkableScenario (if… then)educated guessambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partbelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetgrowth
And even if you took a different view, and thought it was more likely that they'll still be rising at that point, you would also need to judge the extent to which that would depress domestic demand and spending (especially at a time when, on current plans, tighter fiscal policy will be doing the same).
Bank of England · said 06 Dec 2021 (date) · Lags, trade-offs and the challenges facing monetary policy · evidence & why
εἰκασία · ConjecturePartly checkableMixed claimeducated guessambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetfiscal
In the third quarter of this year private-sector output grew by a little less than we'd anticipated in August and was still 2% lower than at the end of 2019Q4.
Bank of England · said 06 Dec 2021 (date) · Lags, trade-offs and the challenges facing monetary policy · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidencePartly checkableForecastbased on dataambiguity 36/100below the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2021Due - being checkedgrowth
Again supposing all this had been predictable in advance, in the spring of 2020, the policy maker in this simulations might have chosen not to tighten policy quite so aggressively, and to tolerate a degree of above-target inflation at the end of this year, in order to avoid such a steep rise in unemployment.
Bank of England · said 06 Dec 2021 (date) · Lags, trade-offs and the challenges facing monetary policy · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedForecastbased on dataambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: No · 35% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2021Due - being checkedinflationlabour
In the spring of next year, when the next rise in the Ofgem cap on gas and electricity bills comes through, it will probably climb comfortably through 5%, a long way north of the MPC's 2% target.
Bank of England · said 06 Dec 2021 (date) · Lags, trade-offs and the challenges facing monetary policy · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedForecastbased on dataambiguity 0/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablemeets the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2022Due - being checkedenergy
However, based on the spending plans in the November Budget, the OBR expects overall employment in the public sector to carry on growing, by a further 3% over the next three years.
Bank of England · said 06 Dec 2021 (date) · Lags, trade-offs and the challenges facing monetary policy · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedForecastbased on dataambiguity 0/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablemeets the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2024Due - being checkedlabourfiscal
The aggregate rate of inflation is likely to rise further over the next few months and the chances are that it will comfortably exceed 5% when the Ofgem cap on retail energy prices is next adjusted, in April.
Bank of England · said 06 Dec 2021 (date) · Lags, trade-offs and the challenges facing monetary policy · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidencePartly checkableForecastbased on dataambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standarddue 04 Jun 2022 (vague)Due - being checkedinflationenergy
The MPC expects inflation to rise significantly further, to well over 3%, over the next six months.
Bank of England · said 22 Jul 2021 (date) · Mismatch · evidence & why
Quite a bit of the current rise in inflation is actually coming directly from the higher price of oil, something that is likely to fall away through the early part of 2022.
Bank of England · said 22 Jul 2021 (date) · Mismatch · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedForecastbased on dataambiguity 0/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablemeets the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2022Due - being checkedinflationenergy
The DMP data are based on realised employment/sales growth over the last two years plus expected growth over the next year.
Bank of England · said 22 Jul 2021 (date) · Mismatch · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedForecastbased on dataambiguity 0/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablemeets the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2022Due - being checkedgrowthlabour
During the second quarter of this year it's likely that an average of over 2½ million people were furloughed - more than 7% of the workforce.
Bank of England · said 22 Jul 2021 (date) · Mismatch · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidencePartly checkableForecastbased on dataambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2021Due - being checked
On a reasonable estimate GDP in the second quarter of this year was probably around 5% higher than in the first and more than 22% higher than a year earlier.
Bank of England · said 22 Jul 2021 (date) · Mismatch · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidenceCan be checkedForecastbased on dataambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2021Due - being checkedgrowth
So, while we know it's going to go further over the next few months, I'm not convinced that the current inflation in retail goods prices should in and of itself mean higher inflation 18-24 months ahead, the horizon more relevant for monetary policy.
Bank of England · said 22 Jul 2021 (date) · Mismatch · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidencePartly checkableMixed claimbased on dataambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 80% · for the most partbelow the RIM-1 standarddue 18 Jan 2022 (vague)Due - being checkedinflationinterest rates
If orders take time to respond, a cut in prices will initially reduce a firm's profits.
Bank of England · said 12 Jan 2021 (date) · Covid and the composition of spending · evidence & why
πρόνοια · Preparing for the futurePartly checkableScenario (if… then)educated guessambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partbelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetinflation
If rates of unemployment were to remain relatively high even two or three years from now, it's likely the saving rate will also be above average.
Bank of England · said 12 Jan 2021 (date) · Covid and the composition of spending · evidence & why
πρόνοια · Preparing for the futurePartly checkableScenario (if… then)educated guessambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetlabour
Come what may, the MPC will continue to set policy in order to achieve the 2% inflation target, in line with its remit, over the medium term.
Bank of England · said 12 Jan 2021 (date) · Covid and the composition of spending · evidence & why
down (the MPC's central forecast in November was for a peak rate of almost 8%, despite a sharp projected recovery in output as health risks fade) that the appropriate response has been to ease policy significantly.
Bank of England · said 12 Jan 2021 (date) · Covid and the composition of spending · evidence & why
And despite a very sharp recovery in the summer, as the first lockdown was lifted, it's likely that GDP in the fourth quarter of last year was around 10% lower than at the end of 2019.
Bank of England · said 12 Jan 2021 (date) · Covid and the composition of spending · evidence & why
It might also tell you something if the central bank eased policy and, at the same time, the authorities introduced restrictions to limit or prevent people from selling the government's debt.
Bank of England · said 02 Sep 2020 (date) · Government debt and inflation · evidence & why
πρόνοια · Preparing for the futurePartly checkableScenario (if… then)educated guessambiguity 56/100implied call / likelihood: No · 35% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetfiscalfinance
For example, if the central bank is easing policy in the face of clear inflationary pressure that might suggest it's putting weight on some other objective: the joint behaviour of instrument and target can be informative.
Bank of England · said 02 Sep 2020 (date) · Government debt and inflation · evidence & why
πρόνοια · Preparing for the futurePartly checkableScenario (if… then)educated guessambiguity 71/100implied call / likelihood: No · 35% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetinflationfinance
If higher inflation and nominal growth pushed up the demand for physical cash the government might make a little more from that source.
Bank of England · said 02 Sep 2020 (date) · Government debt and inflation · evidence & why
πρόνοια · Preparing for the futurePartly checkableScenario (if… then)educated guessambiguity 56/100implied call / likelihood: No · 35% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetinflationgrowth
Yet, in some ways, one might be surprised that prices didn't rise further (inflation averaged 2% between 1792 and 1815).
Bank of England · said 02 Sep 2020 (date) · Government debt and inflation · evidence & why
inflation as over the previous five years (it averaged 4% in the second half of the 1960s) they might still have expected a cumulative real return of over 50%.
Bank of England · said 02 Sep 2020 (date) · Government debt and inflation · evidence & why
If everyone knew in advance that inflation was about to rise permanently by (say) 1% point you'd expect nominal yields to be 1% point higher, across the curve, than they otherwise would've been.
Bank of England · said 02 Sep 2020 (date) · Government debt and inflation · evidence & why
And if you take seriously the crude estimates we've just been through, you might expect that to have had a significant effect on productivity growth.
Bank of England · said 20 May 2019 (date) · Investment and uncertainty - the value of waiting for news · evidence & why
πρόνοια · Preparing for the futurePartly checkableScenario (if… then)based on dataambiguity 56/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetgrowth
Even if low bond yields don't presage rapid growth of house prices, one thing they do suggest is that interest payments on mortgage debt will also remain relatively low.
Bank of England · said 23 Jan 2019 (date) · Debt dynamics · evidence & why
πρόνοια · Preparing for the futurePartly checkableScenario (if… then)educated guessambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 85% · for the most partbelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetinflationgrowthfiscalhousing
It also suggests that, after a long period of relatively subdued growth in the purchase price of housing - since 2004 the average rate of increase has been 3% a year - we can expect the same for mortgage debt over the next few years.
Bank of England · said 23 Jan 2019 (date) · Debt dynamics · evidence & why
πρόγνωσις · Inference from evidencePartly checkableForecastbased on dataambiguity 36/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardNot due yetgrowthfiscalhousing

Showing the newest 50 - the ledger has all 89.

Also said - not checkable as stated (12 newest)

Remarks about the future with no date, figure or likelihood that could be checked. They are kept on the record and shown here, but not scored.

This should be ready for publication in the spring of next year.
Bank of England · said 18 Dec 2023 (date) · Signal versus noise · evidence & why
μαντεία · Inspired knowledgeToo vague to checkMixed claimstated on authorityambiguity 56/100below the RIM-1 standarddue 31 Dec 2024
As this happens, one might expect these second-round effects on wage growth and broader domestic inflation to weaken as well, quite independently of the stance of monetary policy.
Bank of England · said 18 Dec 2023 (date) · Signal versus noise · evidence & why
εἰκασία · ConjecturePartly checkableSpeculationeducated guessambiguity 56/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardinflationinterest ratesgrowthlabour
Second, even what we do get to observe - GDP, employment, wages and the like - may not be perfectly measured.
Bank of England · said 18 Dec 2023 (date) · Signal versus noise · evidence & why
εἰκασία · ConjectureToo vague to checkSpeculationeducated guessambiguity 71/100implied call / likelihood: No · 40% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardgrowthlabour
He explains that although import costs have been declining in recent months, it is likely that monetary policy will have to remain in restrictive territory for some time.
πρόνοια · Preparing for the futurePartly checkableCall for actionstated on authorityambiguity 56/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardinterest ratestrade
We can expect this to feed through to retail goods inflation over the next few months.
μαντεία · Inspired knowledgeToo vague to checkForecaststated on authorityambiguity 56/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standarddue 22 Feb 2024 (vague)inflation
As such, monetary policy may well have to remain in restrictive territory for some time yet.
πρόνοια · Preparing for the futurePartly checkableCall for actionstated on authorityambiguity 71/100implied call / likelihood: No · 40% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardinterest rates
And whatever the particular shocks to which they might be exposed in the future it's not obvious that private-sector firms involved in these GVCs should somehow be unaware of, or fail to internalise, the risks involved (or, therefore, that there's a prima facie case for government intervention).
By design, the Committee did not embark on QT until the official interest rate reached a certain threshold - a level from which (were the need to arise) it could then be cut.
Bank of England · said 25 Apr 2023 (date) · Monetary policy - prices versus quantities · evidence & why
πρόνοια · Preparing for the futurePartly checkableCall for actionstated on authorityambiguity 56/100implied call / likelihood: No · 35% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardinterest rates
If the central bank needs to be recapitalised, for example, the government will at some point have to tax the private sector to pay for this (for more on the wealth effects of changes in central bank liabilities see Weil (1989) , Harrison and Thomas (2019) and Buiter (2020) ).
Bank of England · said 25 Apr 2023 (date) · Monetary policy - prices versus quantities · evidence & why
Less ink is spilled on the second question, concerning QT: should the MPC not include in its forecasts some identifiable and separate effects of asset sales on activity and inflation?
Bank of England · said 25 Apr 2023 (date) · Monetary policy - prices versus quantities · evidence & why
πρόνοια · Preparing for the futureToo vague to checkCall for actionstated on authorityambiguity 83/100below the RIM-1 standardinflation
So it's not a huge surprise that, having ruled out at the start the conditions that might require it, this model should 'have no place' for money.
Bank of England · said 25 Apr 2023 (date) · Monetary policy - prices versus quantities · evidence & why
That's because, as long as people are free to borrow and lend, demand in these models is fully pinned down by current and (expected) future real interest rates.
Bank of England · said 25 Apr 2023 (date) · Monetary policy - prices versus quantities · evidence & why
εἰκασία · ConjectureToo vague to checkSpeculationeducated guessambiguity 56/100implied call / likelihood: Yes · 70% · probablebelow the RIM-1 standardinterest rates