Axel A Weber
Deutsche Bundesbank
Track record: 1 forecast checked: 0 came true, 0 partly, 1 did not.
91forecasts & commitments on the record
73%can be checked as stated
34average ambiguity (0-100)
0goalpost moves recorded
0confirmed U-turns
Timeline
came true partly did not not due / being checked / too vague
Calibration score: shown after 10 checked forecasts with a stated likelihood (now 0).
How they speak about the future: based on data 68, stated on authority 12, educated guess 11.
Kinds of claim: forecast 68, scenario (if… then) 11, mixed claim 8, commitment 4. · Download this report card as a picture
In the nine words
πρόγνωσιςInference from evidence66 · 73%πρόνοιαPreparing for the future10 · 11%μαντείαInspired knowledge8 · 9%προαναγγελίαPublic pre-announcement4 · 4%εἰκασίαConjecture2 · 2%φρόνησιςPractical wisdom1 · 1%
How to read this
Each box is one sentence a public figure or institution said about the future, word for word, with a link to the official text. Can be checked means it names what will happen, by when, and how likely - so it can be compared with official figures later. Too vague to check means it does not. Ambiguity (0-100) is how many different ways the sentence can be read. When the date passes, the forecast is compared with official data and marked came true, partly or did not come true. Labels judge the sentence, never the person. Full guide and glossary.Checked
The projections foresee average annual real GDP growth in a range between 2.3% and 2.9% in 2007 and between 1.8% and 2.8% in 2008.
Did not come true. Said: economic growth between 1.8% and 2.8% in 2008. Official figure for Germany: 0.9% (World Bank open data). Missed. Off by 0.9 points. official data · checked 14 Nov 2026 · automatic check against official data (rules v3)
On the record (91)
Specifically, there have been concerns that the credible commitment to ensure a low rate of inflation might restrict the leeway for monetary policy stabilisation, since, in the event of the massive interest rate cuts, the lower bound for nominal interest rates would be hit quite quickly.
Intergovernmental fiscal transfers beyond the rather moderate and earmarked payments from the EU budget (approximately 1% of GNP) are hardly acceptable; overburdening the financial solidarity of the people might jeopardise the idea of European integration.
As of next month, after seven years as a policymaker, I shall be taking up the position of a faculty member of the University of Chicago Booth School.
First results of this exercise are expected by mid-2011.
I firmly believe that the countries in trouble will return to growth if the necessary measures are taken within an appropriate timeframe.
For the current year, we consider it feasible that there will be a further decline in the deficit ratio in the order of 2%, provided that fiscal policy stays committed to consolidation.
Following a reversal from a roughly balanced budget before the crisis to a 3.0% deficit ratio in 2009, the 3.3% deficit ratio in 2010 was considerably lower than originally expected.
We assume that potential growth will go up again slightly to no more than 1% by 2012.
According to these forecasts, the current account deficit of the United States will increase slightly until 2015, while the Chinese current account surplus is expected to increase more sharply.
As the current European Financial Stabilisation Facility (ESFS) and the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) will expire in 2013, the European Council has decided on the main features of a European Stability Mechanism (ESM), which will then replace the EFSF and the EFSM.
If we manage to improve the regulatory framework for the financial system and maintain well-disciplined government budgets, we will be well on the way towards strong, sustainable and balanced growth in the future.
Particularly, the minimum core capital requirements will rise from currently 2% to then 4.5%, plus an extra 2.5% that will be introduced in stages from 2016 on.
However, in contrast to the U.S. current account deficit, which the IMF expects to increase only slightly over the next years, the Chinese surplus - in absolute terms the largest - is projected to re-increase significantly, to nearly 8% of GDP in 2015.
the new standards will be phased in by the end of 2012 provided that economic recovery is assured.
The fully calibrated set of measures will then be issued by the end of 2010 and
The fully calibrated set of measures will then be issued by the end of 2010 and the new standards will be phased in by the end of 2012 provided that economic recovery is assured.
In the course of the current year, the relevant measures will be calibrated on the basis of a comprehensive impact study and be finalised by the end of 2010.
In addition, the fiscal deficit was expected to exceed the Maastricht Treaty's deficit ceiling of 3% for the third year in succession, hence limiting the scope for fiscal action.
As the majority of the revenue losses caused by the economic downturn will accrue with a time lag to the business cycle, the prospects for public finances in this year are even more dire, with the public deficit expected to hit 5% of GDP.
The fully calibrated set of measures will then be issued by the end of 2010 and the new standards will be phased in by the end of 2012 provided that economic recovery is assured.
As the implementation of the agreed rules is what finally counts, 2010 and 2011 will prove to be crucial years.
Germany even delivered a positive surprise in the second quarter, when GDP grew by 0.3% on the quarter; the outlook for the third quarter is even better given a rebound in industrial activity and the levelling-out of the de-stocking cycle.
But these processes - which are currently going on to a significant extent (Germany alone will nearly halve its net exports by roughly 80 bn euros) -should also remain market-driven.
Given the enormous rise in public deficits and the strain this will put on future budgets, the fiscal exit strategy will have to kick in as soon as the recovery has firmed up, which means no later than 2011.
Although I expect a global recovery across the major world regions by 2010, the pace of growth should be much more moderate than in the past.
Both measures will have to be implemented by 2010.
The financial crisis may dominate the discussions of this year's conference as a matter of course.
Or - and this is the case that monetary policy should wish to avoid - market participants might increase their risk-taking if they take into account the fact that monetary policy will be relaxed in the case of decreasing asset prices in a financial downturn.
And we should take into account that, even if in many countries - including Germany - the worst may be over in terms of negative growth rates, the labour market situation will visibly deteriorate in the quarters ahead.
According to the latest forecast by the European Commission - which is plausible in our view - the overall public deficit will deteriorate by 6% of GDP over 2009 and 2010.
For example, in Germany the contribution of automatic stabilisers in 2009 and 2010 will be nearly 3% of GDP (including developments in profit-related taxes).
In particular, the Governing Council of the ECB has declared that it will continue the fixed rate tender procedures with full allotment for as long as needed and, in any case, beyond the end of 2009.
According to World Bank estimates, the global economy is likely to shrink this year for the first time since the Second World War.
The influence of monetary policy on the behaviour of financial market participants might be especially strong in the event that the central bank follows an asymmetric monetary policy that is lowering rates aggressively in the face of macroeconomic downturns but increasing rates only gradually when downside risks have vanished.
Nonetheless, the US experience demonstrates how quickly inflation expectations can drift upwards if actual inflation is persistently above the stability norm of the central bank and if, consequently, market participants lose confidence in the central bank's will to restore price stability.
Recently, however, euroarea inflation has accelerated, remaining above 3% for the past seven months and reaching a worrying record high of 3.7% in May.
The forecast density also allows the calculation of probabilities associated with certain inflation ranges, that is, for example, the probability that inflation will lie between 1% and 2% in a specific period.
Thus, they might, for example, simply speak of upside risks to inflation towards the end of the forecast horizon, whereas the Bank of England might publish that the skewness of its inflation density forecast equals 0.1 in the third quarter of 2010, implying that there is a slight upward risk in that quarter.
Even under the optimistic assumption that recent dynamics in commodity prices diminishes over the projection horizon and that there will be no broad-based second-round effects, monthly HICP inflation rates will stay above our definition of price stability far into 2009.
While we will see a moderation in growth rates over the coming quarters, both in the euro area and also in Germany, already at the turn of the year we will have reached the through.
This is the highest rate since the euro's launch in 1999 and well above the Eurosystem's definition of price stability - inflation rates of below 2% in the medium term.
Instead, it is important to keep in mind that even if a full decoupling of the euro area economy from the US economy does not seem plausible for the time being, structural shifts in the world economy have taken place that support the view that a US slowdown will have less of an impact in Europe than in the past.
Hence, we will witness temporarily high inflation rates for a more protracted period than previously anticipated, though rates will eventually decline towards 2%.
And indeed, in the UK, after a decade or more of a non-inflationary consistently expansionary economy (a time dubbed 'nice' by Mervyn King, the Governor of the Bank of England), output growth is expected to moderate and inflation to rise further this year.
We at the ECB's Governing Council decided to leave the key ECB interest rate of 4.0% unchanged, but to continue to monitor very closely all developments over the coming weeks.
Average annual real GDP growth is now projected to be between 1.3% and 2.1% (average: 1.7%) in 2008 and between 1.3% and 2.3% (average: 1.8%) in 2009, which reflects moderate but ongoing economic activity.
Finally, even assuming a marked decline in food price inflation over the course of 2008, as embedded in the projections, does not result in annual HICP rates below 2 % in a single month in 2008.
Due to increases in unit wage costs core inflation rates are projected to equally exceed the 2 %
As you will probably know the Governing Council in its meeting yesterday has decided to keep the policy rate unchanged at 4 %.
Given these changes in the euro area's economic environment, chances are that both upside risks to inflation and downside risks to output growth will continue to remain elevated in the next few weeks.
Showing the newest 50 - the ledger has all 91.
Also said - not checkable as stated (12 newest)
Remarks about the future with no date, figure or likelihood that could be checked. They are kept on the record and shown here, but not scored.
Nevertheless, as developments in money and financial markets are of key importance for both monetary policy and macroprudential policy, there are likely interdependencies between them that should be taken into account.
Assuming that there will be a satisfactory exchange of information between both monetary and macroprudential policymakers in the future, the existing studies give no cause to fear that the objective of price stability will have to be compromised.
Instead, this problem must be tackled at root; the existing wrong incentives and regulatory loopholes must be eliminated in order to make crises less likely and less severe.
To strike the balance between uniformity and subsidiarity is certainly a formidable challenge but I am confident that we will eventually succeed and create a more stable and more resilient financial system.
As regards the other two areas, intensive discussions are ongoing, and results should emerge later this year.
To strengthen the macroprudential approach which supplements the traditional microprudential approach, the focus of supervision has to be broadened from the level of the individual bank to the systemic level.
Consequently, they already play, and should continue to play, a prominent role in safeguarding financial stability at the microprudential as well as at the macroprudential level.
And, in terms of the general future outlook for growth, we should bear in mind that the financial crisis has not impaired major growth drivers.
The reforms we have embarked on will lead to a much more elaborate regulatory framework and to a more resilient financial system - a perspective that is of particular relevance for the United Kingdom, which hosts one of the most important financial sectors worldwide.
Making this basic element of the financial system more stable will be an important step towards more systemic stability.
Hence, in the future, banks will have to hold more capital of better quality.
These rules, known as Basel III, will make individual banks more stable and will constitute a first line of defence against systemic crises.