Andrew G Haldane
Bank of England
Track record: No forecast checked yet (110 not due, 69 being checked).
179forecasts & commitments on the record
79%can be checked as stated
46average ambiguity (0-100)
0goalpost moves recorded
0confirmed U-turns
Timeline
came true partly did not not due / being checked / too vague
Calibration score: shown after 10 checked forecasts with a stated likelihood (now 0).
How they speak about the future: based on data 141, educated guess 20, stated on authority 18.
Kinds of claim: forecast 140, scenario (if… then) 28, mixed claim 11. · Download this report card as a picture
In the nine words
πρόγνωσιςInference from evidence130 · 73%πρόνοιαPreparing for the future28 · 16%μαντείαInspired knowledge18 · 10%εἰκασίαConjecture3 · 2%
How to read this
Each box is one sentence a public figure or institution said about the future, word for word, with a link to the official text. Can be checked means it names what will happen, by when, and how likely - so it can be compared with official figures later. Too vague to check means it does not. Ambiguity (0-100) is how many different ways the sentence can be read. When the date passes, the forecast is compared with official data and marked came true, partly or did not come true. Labels judge the sentence, never the person. Full guide and glossary.On the record (179)
Within the next year or so, the UK will reach a decision on CBDC.
As UK banks had an asset base of £6 trillion, much of which they themselves could not value, this was practically impossible.
Currently, financial markets expect UK interest rates to rise by an average 5 basis points each six months for the next 10 years.
By the end of this year, I expect UK inflation to be nearer 4% than 3%.
By the end of this year, the Bank will hold close to £1 trillion of nominal Government assets, around half of their total and 40% of GDP.
Recent estimates suggest the UK population may have shrunk by as much as 1.3 million people over the past year. 18 If these demographic trends continue -a smaller population fewer of whom are in work -this would turn the demographic tailwinds of the past decade into a headwind looking ahead, constraining supply and potentially amplifying inflationary forces.
In fact, the projections recently published by the MPC for UK nominal GDP growth over the next year are already in double-digits.
While output in the UK is likely to have fallen by around 8% during 2020, household incomes are likely to have been broadly flat.
In the UK, the MPC judge that the output gap has widened and will continue to widen in the near term, peaking at 3% and lowering inflation by around ½% in 2021.
The MPC's central view is that the UK's output gap will close this year, although uncertainty around the timing and pace is considerable.
a temporary abode of purchasing power. 16 If that definition holds true, by the middle of this year as much as £400 billion of savings by households and companies (around a third of annual GDP) will be seeking a new home, whether physical or financial assets or goods and services.
In the UK, once its current programme is complete, the Bank will have a balance only just shy of 50% of both GDP and the outstanding debt stock ( Chart 15 ).
The average reform to increase the independence of central bank s' financial stability policies over the past 20 years would be expected to have reduced the incidence of NPLs across the global banking system by somewhere between 1.7 and 2.9 percentage points, on average.
As the economic recovery gathers pace next year, it will be important central banks remain squarely focussed on their core medium-term price stability mandates.
Taken together with the huge amounts of policy stimulus provided this year, this will in my view leave risks to the economic outlook more evenly balanced than for some time, including risks to inflation over the medium term.
The justification for the QE actions taken by the MPC this year, and which I have supported, is that they will support demand and act as an insurance policy against any premature and undesirable rise in borrowing costs which would otherwise risk setting back the economic recovery and put at risk hitting the inflation target.
That, in turn, could lead to significant shortfalls in average output relative to potential (of around 2%) and average inflation relative to target (of as much as 2pp). 27
With global real interest rates having since fallen, recent work suggests the ZLB could bind much more frequently, between 20 and 40% of the time.
There are both positives and negatives from the shift in working practices that has taken place this year and the balance of these is likely itself to shift over time.
Indeed, this year may well have seen the largest shift in working practices ever seen, certainly the largest in modern times.
Prior to the Covid crisis, an estimated extra 5 million people in the UK were expected to have a digital skills deficit by 2030. 15 The switch to home-working is likely to have made inroads into this deficit.
In the August projections, this took unemployment from its pre-Covid level of 4% to around 7-7.5% at its year-end peak.
That unemployment projection, while necessarily very uncertain, flowed from an assumption that UK output would be around 7% below pre-Covid levels by year-end.
First, by the end of this year the misery index will have risen to around 8%, over two percentage points higher than at the start of the year.
Online spending has jumped from 20% to almost 27% of overall spending during the course of this year, peaking at a third of all spending in May.
The CJRS will end next month, to be replaced with the Job Support Scheme (JSS) announced by the Chancellor last week.
In its August projections, the MPC expected unemployment to rise to around 7.5% (or 2 ½ million people) by the end of the year.
20 These figures reflect the June MPC minutes, which noted that lending under TFSME 'was likely to exceed £100 billion over the coming year.' For simplicity we assume the TFSME reaches £100bn at end-2020.
If this level was maintained along the same growth trajectory, the average output gap over the next three years would be 3 percentage points smaller than in May.
Through these policies, the Bank of England's balance sheet has so far expanded by close to £200 billion, with a further £200 billion expected during the remainder of this year due to additional asset purchases and TFSME drawings. 20 This would take the Bank's balance sheet to around 45% of (2019) UK GDP by the year-end, more than double its …
Among the world's major central banks, there has so far been an expansion of asset purchases to end-May of around $2.8 trillion, with a further $2.2 trillion planned by the end of this year.
For example, survey evidence of companies by the DMP suggests private sector employment could be almost 10% lower by the end of 2020, implying an unemployment path somewhat higher than in the May MPR scenario.
Globally, it is estimated that hours worked in Q2 were almost 11% lower than prior to the crisis, equivalent to over 300 million full-time workers. 5 The IMF forecast that the advanced economy unemployment rate will double this year to over 8%.
For example, closing the gender pay gap has been estimated to add £600 billion (or 27% of GDP) to UK GDP by 2025 (McKinsey (2016)), while full representation of BAME individuals across the labour market, through improved participation and progression, could add an additional £24 billion (or over 1% of GDP) per year (BEIS (2017)).
If we do the same thought-experiment under the 'deal' scenario, again using a simple Taylor Rule, we get instead an upwards-sloped trajectory for expected interest rates, on average 25-50 basis points higher than the slightly upward-sloped market path for interest rates prevailing in May.
Output is expected on average to fall by 3 ½%, employment by 3% and investment by 1 ¼%.
Having expected unemployment to peak at over 10.5%, the eventual peak of 8.5% was reached in late-2011.
Having expected rates to rise modestly at the time of the May Inflation Report , financial markets now expect UK interest rates to fall over the next year or so, before rising gradually.
Companies were asked 'Relative to the last 12 months, what is the likely impact on the following for your business over the next year in each scenario: a deal and transition period and no deal and no transition period?' For each relevant business factor, respondents were asked to choose between 'Fall greater than 10%'; '-10 to -2%'; 'Little change'; '+2 …
Most recently, the perceived risk of a 'no deal' Brexit has risen, with betting odds placing a roughly 30% probability on that event, double the probability earlier this year.
A key focus of work among economic geographers is the importance of agglomeration effects - that is, increasing returns to economic scale at the spatial level. 11 If those effects are powerful, and if workers are one of their most important sources, we would expect cartograms to have similar properties when looked at by population, income (per head) and wealth …
expected, on average, to boost GDP per head from £27,300 per head to £28,100 per head, or around 2.6%. 51
Demand for jobs with high levels of social and emotional skills are forecast to increase by 25%. 32 For all the jobs lost, new ones will be created in a different image, mirroring the pattern in previous Industrial Revolutions.
Studies suggest between 10% and 50% of the global workforce could see their jobs disrupted significantly, if not displaced entirely,
It has been estimated that, between now and 2030, demand for jobs where creativity is a key skill could increase by 30-40%.
Average weekly earnings growth (excluding bonuses) has risen to 2.9% a clear rise and a little stronger than the MPC had expected at the time of its Inflation Report in August.
Using the long-run estimates, that will have lowered wage growth by around 0.75 percentage points per year over the past 30 years, a significant effect.
In the UK, this premium is typically found to lie in the range 10-15%, though it may have fallen over time. 17 There is also evidence that falls in rates of unionisation and collective bargaining have resulted in wages becoming more dispersed and differentiated across occupations and locations. 18
For example, around a quarter of those in temporary work say they could not find a permanent job and over 10% of part-time workers say they could not find a full-time job. 12 A Skills and Employment Survey published just last week found around 1.7 million workers might be suffering from high levels of anxiety about their uncertain hours of …
That means the 2 percentage point narrowing in the UK unemployment gap since 2012 would be expected to have raised wage growth by 1.6 percentage points, a significant tailwind.
Showing the newest 50 - the ledger has all 179.
Also said - not checkable as stated (12 newest)
Remarks about the future with no date, figure or likelihood that could be checked. They are kept on the record and shown here, but not scored.
Though they will never (and should never) be complete, the FPC and PRC are essential additions to the UK's policymaking skyline.
They will need to adapt to these new challenges to boost public understanding of, and maintain democratic legitimacy in, central banks.
Of course, there could be costs as well as benefits from such a functional separation, including the possibility of reduced credit provision due to reduced levels of liquidity and maturity-transformation, that need to be worked through. 25 At the very least, however, these longer-term potential stability benefits of a very different functional model of intermediation need to be evaluated and …
In essence, these are expected to meet equivalent standards to commercial bank money in relation to stability of value, robustness of legal claim and the ability to redeem at par in fiat. 17 In his recent statement to Parliament, the Chancellor announced an HMT consultation on private sector stablecoins.
A key principle underlying the FPC's and Chancellor's statements is that the impact of stablecoins may extend well beyond payments system stability and efficiency.
As they potentially disrupt the ultimate settlement medium - money - they may carry important implications for financial and monetary stability too.
Among workers the picture is much the same, with surveys suggesting more than a quarter expect to spend more time home-working after the pandemic has abated.
Given these shifts, some of which seem likely to prove durable, what impact might they have had on workers' and businesses' economic contribution - that is to say, their productivity (the amount done per hour worked) and their overall output (productivity multiplied by working hours)?
5 These shifts are also likely to affect other labour market and economic behaviour, such as labour market participation and wage growth.
While it is widely recognised that these pay gap measures may be imperfect proxies for pay inequality, greater transparency about pay gaps can serve as an important incentive device.
Most workers under 25 are earning in the minimum wage range which is subject to regulation, and may also particularly represent part-time employment.
8 Unconditional gaps are calculated using raw pay data from the LFS and will not attempt to account for individual or job characteristics.