Alan Greenspan
US Federal Reserve System
Track record: No forecast checked yet (139 not due, 94 being checked).
233forecasts & commitments on the record
70%can be checked as stated
41average ambiguity (0-100)
0goalpost moves recorded
0confirmed U-turns
Timeline
came true partly did not not due / being checked / too vague
Calibration score: shown after 10 checked forecasts with a stated likelihood (now 0).
How they speak about the future: based on data 122, educated guess 77, stated on authority 34.
Kinds of claim: forecast 128, scenario (if… then) 59, mixed claim 42, commitment 4. · Download this report card as a picture
In the nine words
πρόγνωσιςInference from evidence114 · 49%πρόνοιαPreparing for the future57 · 24%μαντείαInspired knowledge29 · 12%εἰκασίαConjecture25 · 11%προαναγγελίαPublic pre-announcement4 · 2%πρόβλεψιςSeeing the signs2 · 1%φρόνησιςPractical wisdom2 · 1%
How to read this
Each box is one sentence a public figure or institution said about the future, word for word, with a link to the official text. Can be checked means it names what will happen, by when, and how likely - so it can be compared with official figures later. Too vague to check means it does not. Ambiguity (0-100) is how many different ways the sentence can be read. When the date passes, the forecast is compared with official data and marked came true, partly or did not come true. Labels judge the sentence, never the person. Full guide and glossary.On the record (233)
But as I have argued previously, the system is ill-suited to address the unprecedented shift of population from the workforce to retirement that will start in 2008.
Under the intermediate assumptions of the program's trustees, the number of beneficiaries will have roughly doubled by 2030, and the ratio of covered workers to beneficiaries will be down to about 2.
Just three years after that, in 2011, the oldest baby boomers will reach 65 and will thus be eligible for Medicare.
In the end, I suspect that, unless we attain unprecedented increases in productivity, we will have to make significant structural adjustments in the nation's major retirement and health programs.
In 2008--just three years from now--the leading edge of the baby-boom generation will reach 62, the earliest age at which Social Security retirement benefits can be drawn.
The long-run projections from the Office of Management and Budget suggest that the share will rise to 9-1/2 percent by 2015 and to about 13 percent by 2030.
If the currently disturbing drift toward protectionism is contained and markets remain sufficiently flexible, changing terms of trade, interest rates, asset prices, and exchange rates will cause U.S. saving to rise, reducing the need for foreign finance and reversing the trend of the past decade toward increasing reliance on it.
Even if such returns on U.S. assets stay high, the rise of concentration risks in foreign official and private portfolios could still induce investors to slow their accumulation of dollar claims and thereby delimit the size of the financeable U.S. current account deficit.
The markets are not behaving in the way that some, if not most, analysts anticipated as the U.S. current account deficit rose above its previous high of 3-1/2 percent of GDP recorded in 1986.
Thus, although spending continued to rise rapidly last year, the deficit in the unified budget dropped to $319 billion, nearly $100 billion less than the figure for fiscal year 2004 and a much smaller figure than many had anticipated earlier in the year.
Most refineries, however, will be back on line within the next month or so, though a few may take longer.
Despite the major effort to expand imports, the Department of Energy forecasts LNG imports this year at only 3 percent of gas consumption.
But at present, China consumes roughly twice as much oil per dollar of GDP as the United States, and if, as projected, its share of world GDP continues to increase, the average improvements in world oil-intensity will be less pronounced than the improvements in individual countries, viewed separately, would suggest.
If history is any guide, should higher prices persist, energy use over time will continue to decline relative to GDP.
If so, leaving aside the effect of equity prices on consumption, should mortgage interest rates rise or home affordability be further stretched, home turnover and mortgage refinancing cash-outs would decline as would equity extraction and, presumably, consumption expenditure growth.
But unless world gas markets tighten aggressively, competitive pressures will arbitrage the U.S. natural gas price down, possibly significantly, through increased imports.
But at present, China consumes roughly twice as much oil per dollar of GDP as the United States, and if, as projected, its share of world oil consumption continues to increase, the average improvements in world oil-intensity will be less pronounced than the improvements in individual countries viewed separately would suggest.
Of critical importance will be the extent to which the more than 200 million light vehicles on U.S. highways, which consume 11 percent of total world oil production, become more fuel efficient as vehicle buyers choose the lower fuel costs of lighter or hybrid vehicles.
But if history is any guide, should higher prices persist, energy use over time will continue to decline relative to gross domestic product (GDP).
If larger banks could rely on low-cost insured deposits as their effective marginal source of funds, why would they pay higher interest rates to holders of their debentures?
Under the intermediate assumptions of the program's trustees, the number of beneficiaries will have roughly doubled by 2030, and the ratio of covered workers to
Just three years after that, in 2011, the oldest baby boomers will reach 65 and will thus be eligible for Medicare.
In 2008 - just three years from now - the leading edge of the baby-boom generation will reach 62, the earliest age at which Social Security retirement benefits can be drawn and the age at which about half of those eligible to claim benefits have been doing so in recent years.
The long-run projections from the Office of Management and Budget suggest that the share will rise to approximately 13 percent by 2030.
As demonstrated by recent innovations in the home equity lending and asset-backed securities markets, much of the $9 trillion in household credit can potentially be secured by real estate and thus may be available to the GSEs as investments.
But unless world gas markets tighten aggressively, competitive pressures will arbitrage the U.S. natural gas price down, possibly significantly, through increased imports.
But if history is any guide, should higher prices persist, energy use will over time continue to decline, relative to GDP. 1 Long-term demand elasticities have proved noticeably higher than those that are evident short term.
This shrinkage means that, by 2030, total output per person will be 7 percent lower than it would be if the current population structure were to persist.
Under the intermediate population projections of the Social Security trustees, for example, the ratio of workers to total population will shrink about 7 percent by 2030.
According to the intermediate projections of the Social Security trustees, the population 65 years of age and older will be approximately 26 percent of the adult population in 2030, compared with 17 percent today.
In 2008, the leading edge of what must surely be the largest shift from work to retirement in our nation's history will become evident as some baby boomers become eligible for Social Security.
As you know, although they will not be required to adopt the new capital rules, many community and regional banks are uneasy that they may be left at a competitive disadvantage after the 2008 adoption of the new rules by their larger rivals.
Indeed, virtually any debt burden doubtless will become oppressive if incomes fall significantly.
The resolution of our current account deficit and household debt burdens does not strike me as overly worrisome, but that is certainly not the case for our fiscal deficit, which, according to the Congressional Budget Office, will rise significantly as the baby boomers start to retire in 2008.
Meanwhile, we have moved from a budget surplus in 2000 to a deficit that is projected by the Congressional Budget Office to be around 3-1/4 percent of GDP this year.
To be sure, as I pointed out earlier this year, we may be approaching a point, if we are not already there, at which exporters to the United States, should the dollar decline further, would no longer choose to absorb a further reduction in profit margins.
As you know, many economists believe that a consumption tax would be best from the perspective of promoting economic growth - particularly if one were designing a tax system from scratch - because a consumption tax is likely to encourage saving and capital formation.
Under the intermediate assumptions of the program's trustees, the number of beneficiaries will have roughly doubled by 2030, and the ratio of covered workers to beneficiaries will be down to about 2.
Just three years after that, in 2011, the oldest baby boomers will reach
The long-run projections from the Office of Management and Budget suggest that the share will rise to 9-1/2 percent by 2015 and will be in the neighborhood of 13 percent by 2030.
However, we may be approaching a point, if we are not already there, at which exporters to the United States, should the dollar decline further, would no longer choose to absorb a further reduction in profit margins.
Theoretically, if external assets and liabilities were always equal, implying a current account in balance, the ratio of liabilities to GDP could grow without limit.
These developments raise the question of whether the record imbalance will benignly defuse, as it largely did after its previous peak of about 3-1/2 percent of GDP in 1986, or whether the resolution will be more troublesome.
As you know, the Congressional Budget Office is projecting that, if current policies remain in place, the unified budget will post deficits throughout the remainder of this decade - a sharp turnaround from the large and growing surpluses projected just a few years ago.
Unless hiring picks up and layoffs ease, assuaging the latent job security fears of many of those currently employed, the share of income spent could decline, a development that would hamper the vigor of the expansion.
In about 2008, the proportion of the working-age population that will retire is projected to begin escalating.
If businesses are to spend and hire more vigorously, they will need to be convinced that economic growth can be sustained beyond the short run.
Overall, the number of electronic payments has increased almost fivefold in two decades and, this year or next, may well exceed the number of checks written.
If house turnover and price increases both slow, and presumably mortgage debt extensions on new homes do as well, increases in home mortgage debt will slow.
If all the mergers that have been announced are completed, the ten largest banking organizations in the United States will account for about 51 percent of all domestic banking assets, almost double their share in 1995.
Showing the newest 50 - the ledger has all 233.
Also said - not checkable as stated (12 newest)
Remarks about the future with no date, figure or likelihood that could be checked. They are kept on the record and shown here, but not scored.
If we succeed in opening up opportunities to everyone, the affluence within our borders will almost surely become more equally distributed.
Of even greater import, all people will come to recognize that they are part of a system that is fair and worthy of support.
As I note later, to the extent that an economy harbors elements of inflexibility, so that prices and quantities are slow to respond to new developments, the process of current account adjustment, besides affecting prices of goods and financial assets, is also more likely to adversely affect the levels of output and employment as well.
The greater rates of productivity growth in the United States, compared with still-subdued rates abroad, have apparently engendered corresponding differences in risk-adjusted expected rates of return and hence in the demand for U.S.-based assets.
Moving from a domestic to a foreign source altered international balance bookkeeping but arguably not economic stress. 8 Such transactions may, of course, take into account exchange rates in the adjustment process, similar to the manner in which prices of purchased components presumably are taken into account when one domestic supplier is substituted for another.
The apparent increase in the dispersion of the surpluses and deficits of U.S. economic entities over the past half-century and more is likely an extension of the growing specialization of the economy and the financial system within the United States.
As a result, the dispersion of such imbalances relative to incomes, or national product, can be expected to increase as the scope of trade expands from within regions, then nationwide, and finally across national borders.
Any diminution of the reserve status of the dollar, should it occur, is likely to be readily absorbed by a far more flexible U.S. economy than existed in Britain immediately following World War II.
Such a development would be particularly likely should risk-adjusted rates of return on assets outside the United States rise relative to investment opportunities in the United States.
What could be the potential consequences should the dollar's status as the world's reserve currency significantly diminish, especially if foreign investors reduce their rate of accumulation of claims on U.S. residents?
To the extent that an economy harbors elements of inflexibility, so that prices and quantities are slow to respond to new developments, the deficit-adjustment process is likely to adversely affect the levels of output and employment.
But going forward, these trends will need to be monitored carefully by the world's central banks.